After three years of proceedings, the court has spoken: Jimmy Lai, Hong Kong's most serious national security offender to date, will spend the next two decades
For the two charges of "conspiracy to collude with foreign or external forces" under the Hong Kong National Security Law, the court set a 15-year starting point based on the case's overall severity. An additional "sedition" charge carried a 21-month baseline.
The judges made clear that Lai wasn't just another defendant. The court stated explicitly that he was "the mastermind and driving force behind these conspiracies”, and therefore “the starting point” of his sentences was "enhanced". This bumped the two collusion charges from 15 to 18 years, while the sedition charge rose from 21 to 23 months. After accounting for concurrent sentences and minor adjustments, the final tally landed at 20 years.
The Evidence Speaks
Consider what the court had to work with.
In July 2019, Lai met with US Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. What happened next tells you everything you need to know about where his loyalties lay.
At a Foundation for Defense of Democracies symposium, Lai proclaimed that he and Hong Kong people were "fighting your (the US’s) war in your enemy's camp". Let that sink in: a Hong Kong resident explicitly stating he's fighting for a foreign power. A traitor who publicly declares he's "fighting for America" gets a 20-year sentence—and it's well deserved.
Essentially Life Imprisonment
Under the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance, prisoners serving sentences for National Security Law offences cannot have their cases referred to the Long-Term Prison Sentences Review Board for early release consideration—unless the Commissioner of Correctional Services is satisfied that early release wouldn't compromise national security.
What does this mean in practice? Ordinary prisoners who behave well typically see their sentences reduced by roughly one-third—but even this has always been at prison authorities' discretion, not an automatic right. The explicit language in the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance essentially signals that major national security offenders are highly unlikely to receive sentence reductions for early parole.
Lai is already serving time for a separate fraud conviction with 2 years and 3 months remaining. The court ordered that the current sentence essentially adds 18 years to his fraud term. Translation: if his fraud appeal fails, Lai will almost certainly serve the full 20 years. At 78 years old, he'd be 98 when released—meaning he'll very likely spend the rest of his life in prison.
The Cooperators' Calculus
Lai's case involved two groups of serious offenders. One group pleaded guilty and became accomplice witnesses, testifying against Lai. This included Wayland Chan and Li Yu-hin—who had fled Hong Kong but were brought back—as well as former Apple Daily CEO Cheung Kim Hung, former associate publisher Chan Pui-man, and former chief writer Yeung Ching-kee.
Starting from a 15-year baseline, these five ultimately received sentences ranging from 6 years and 3 months to 7 years and 3 months. That represents reductions of 7 years and 9 months to 8 years and 9 months. Five years came off for pleading guilty (the standard one-third reduction), with additional cuts for serving as accomplice witnesses.
The other three former Apple Daily executives—former editor-in-chief Law Wai Kwong, former executive editor-in-chief Lam Man-chung, and former English edition editor-in-chief Fung Wai Kwong—only received the one-third reduction for pleading guilty. Each was sentenced to 10 years.
Early Release on the Horizon
But that's not the full picture. After serving their sentences partially, accomplice witnesses have the opportunity to receive approval from the Correctional Services Department for early parole—potentially cutting another third off their time. In the "NSL 47 subversion case," accomplice witness Chiu Ka-yin received early parole, setting a precedent.
The five accomplice witnesses mentioned above may actually serve just 4-plus to 5-plus years before release. Since they were arrested in June 2021 and have already been detained for 4 years and 8 months, parole could come soon. The math is revealing: the difference between pleading guilty without becoming an accomplice witness versus pleading guilty and cooperating can be more than half your sentence—approximately 5 years. The entire judicial system incentivizes offenders to become accomplice witnesses.
Justice Delivered, Damage Done
Looking back at the entire trial, Hong Kong courts convicted and heavily sentenced the principal offender based on substantial and sufficient evidence. This is what judicial justice looks like. Lai didn't just collude with foreign governments, demanding sanctions against the Central and SAR governments—he actively tried to promote what he called "zhibao" (regime collapse) in China. His intentions were vicious from the start.
But the real damage goes deeper. Lai weaponized his own media outlets to incite subversive thoughts against the government, mobilizing large numbers of young people to take to the streets in 2019. Hundreds of rioters who believed Lai's political propaganda participated in riot after riot, ultimately getting arrested and imprisoned. Large numbers of black-clad rioters also fled overseas to escape prosecution, unable to ever return to Hong Kong.
Lai's poisoning of young minds and the damage he inflicted on Hong Kong society are too numerous to catalog. Twenty years' imprisonment is insufficient to compensate for his crimes.
The West's Selective Outrage
Before and after sentencing, foreign forces have been attacking Hong Kong extensively, with some even claiming they'll "rescue" Jimmy Lai. Make no mistake: Lai was arrested in his own country for violating national security laws and, after a fair trial, was sentenced. This is what the rule of law looks like in action.
Now contrast this with what happened to Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, who was illegally invaded and arrested by the United States, then taken back to America for trial. That's what a brutal trampling of international law looks like. Western political activists are so interested in rescuing Lai, yet no one's interested in rescuing Maduro. The hypocrisy is stunning.
What kind of logic are these people operating on? The answer is simple: wherever their American masters waves their flags, they follow. Logic doesn't enter the equation.
Lo Wing-hung
Bastille Commentary
** The blog article is the sole responsibility of the author and does not represent the position of our company. **
The United States today is undeniably far less impressive than it was 40 years ago.
Back in 1983, when I was in college, a political science class focused specifically on the US government’s successful decision-making during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Harvard professor Graham Allison, later renowned for his theory of Thucydides Trap - The Rise of Great Powers, published a detailed article analyzing how the US managed to resolve this severe crisis so swiftly.
In 1962, at the height of the US-Soviet Cold War, the Soviets planned to deploy ballistic missiles in Cuba, right next to the US, in response to America’s missile deployments in Italy and Turkey. Then-President John F. Kennedy boldly imposed a naval blockade on Cuba, showing extraordinary courage and resolve. His actions ultimately forced the Soviets to withdraw their nuclear missiles. Allison praised the US decision-making in that episode as a model of democracy combined with high efficiency.
Those were truly America’s golden years. Kennedy became president at 43, successfully defused the Cuban Missile Crisis, but was assassinated just a year later at the age of 45. The prevailing US view then was that socialist regimes produced only aging leadership and could never match the youthful energy and efficiency of the capitalist system.
Time has marched on. The country once led by young leaders is now locked in the hands of elders. President Donald Trump is 79, older than Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev when he died at 75—someone the US once criticized fiercely. Trump’s decision to launch a war against Iran is widely judged by scholars at home and abroad as a costly misstep.
Bloomberg reported on April 8 that Trump’s military action against the Iranian regime proved "a serious strategic failure." Rather than weakening rivals, it bolstered China and Russia, eroded America’s advantages, and ultimately positioned Iran as the strategic winner. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps remains intact, Iran keeps control over the Strait of Hormuz, and the US "failed to achieve any military objectives."
The New York Times published a detailed feature on April 7 titled "How Trump Pulled the US Into a War With Iran." The report uncovers the inner workings of the decision and shows how, amid internal disagreements and repeated warnings, Trump ultimately chose war based largely on intuition. White House reporters Jonathan Swan and Maggie Haberman tracked this process closely. They highlight a pivotal moment on February 11, when Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu visited the White House and aggressively pitched the plan to attack Iran in the White House Situation Room.
During a one-hour briefing, Netanyahu and Mossad chief David Barnea pressed Trump hard. They argued Iran was vulnerable to regime change and that a combined US-Israeli strike could topple the Islamic Republic. Netanyahu outlined what they saw as near-certain conditions for victory, including:
1. Destroying Iran’s ballistic missile program within weeks;
2. Weakening the Iranian regime enough to prevent it from blockading the Strait of Hormuz;
Third, the chance of Iran hitting US interests through neighboring countries was judged extremely low;
Fourth, street protests within Iran would flare again, and with Israeli intelligence agencies stirring things up, intense bombing could create an opening for Iranian opposition forces to topple the regime;
Fifth, Israel also suggested that Iranian Kurdish armed groups might cross from Iraq into Iran to open a ground front.
Trump responded at the time, saying, "Sounds good."
The day after the meeting—February 12—a briefing was held in the White House Situation Room with only US officials attending, who divided Netanyahu's proposals into four parts:
First, a decapitation strike—the assassination of Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei;
Second, to weaken Iran's missile projection capabilities and its threats to neighboring countries;
Third, to spark large-scale protests among the Iranian people;
Fourth, regime change, with a secular leader taking control of Iran.
US officials judged that the first two objectives could be achieved through American intelligence and military power. However, the third and fourth goals promoted by Netanyahu—mass protests and regime change—are divorced from reality.
CIA Director Ratcliffe called the "fantasy of regime change" absurd and laughable. Secretary of State Rubio bluntly dismissed it as "complete nonsense." The top military leader, Joint Chiefs Chairman Caine, told Trump, "In my experience, this is basically Israel’s usual play—they tend to exaggerate, but their plans aren’t always flawless."
However, Trump remained interested in the first two objectives: a decapitation strike and weakening Iran's military strength.
In the days that followed, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Caine presented Trump with a stark military assessment. He warned that a large-scale strike against Iran would severely deplete US weapons stockpiles, including interceptor missiles already strained by support for Israel and Ukraine. Caine also highlighted the risks of Iran blockading the Strait of Hormuz and the enormous challenges the US would face in securing the Gulf region.
Trump dismissed these warnings, convinced the Iranian regime would surrender before such consequences materialized. He was likely influenced by the previous year's US bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities, expecting this war to be just as brief.
Nevertheless, Trump was increasingly resolved to strike Iran. Meanwhile, peace talks between the US and Iran were still underway. The turning point came in late February, when new intelligence from US and Israeli agencies revealed that Iran’s supreme leader Khamenei and other senior officials would soon meet in a ground-level building. This would leave Khamenei fully exposed to an airstrike—an opportunity US and Israeli officials believed was fleeting and unlikely to recur.
On February 26, the White House Situation Room convened for a final discussion. Many expressed doubts about going to war, including Vice President Vance, who told Trump, “You know I think this is a bad idea, but if you want to do it, I’ll support you.” Joint Chiefs Chairman Caine withheld clear endorsement and focused on risk warnings. The strongest advocate was Defense Secretary Esper, who argued if the Iran issue is going to be resolved sooner or later, better to do it now. Ultimately, Trump made the strike decision impulsively, relying on his gut instinct.
The New York Times report exposes critical flaws in decision-making at the highest levels of the United States government. Although most advisors believed striking Iran was unwise, no one dared truly oppose Trump’s imperial-style leadership. Trump behaved like a stubborn, glory-seeking elder focused only on immediate gains—much like a retail investor chasing quick profits in the stock market. His choice dragged the US into a deep quagmire it still struggles to escape. Forty years ago, the US criticized socialist countries for flawed decision-making; today, those same issues have surfaced within America itself.
Lo Wing-hung
