Alan Warnes — publisher of the international military magazine Air Forces Monthly — dropped a significant revelation on social media. Indonesian Air Force officials confirmed to him that Indonesia has finalized plans to procure the J-10CE fighter jet. The order has doubled, from the originally planned 12 aircraft to 24. Indonesia will simultaneously introduce the PL-15E air-to-air missile, effectively acquiring the same fully configured J-10CE variant currently in service with the Pakistan Air Force.
Pakistan already flies the fully loaded J-10CE. Indonesia is buying the exact same jet.
Indonesia's interest in the J-10CE did not come out of nowhere. In October 2025, Indonesian Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin told media that Indonesia would soon purchase fighter jets from China as part of its military modernization program — adding that "Chinese fighter jets will fly over Jakarta." He stopped short of naming a specific model. Based on Jakarta's bidding process, observers concluded that only the J-10CE could realistically compete against Boeing's F-15EX, which was also in the running.
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Pakistan already flies the fully loaded J-10CE. Indonesia is buying the exact same jet.
The J-10CE's stellar air combat record forced Jakarta to completely rethink its fighter procurement.
Armed with powerful radar and PL-15E long-range missiles, the J-10CE strikes before the enemy can react.
France uses massive loans to sell Rafales to developing nations—hooking buyers who cannot afford to walk away.
When Sjamsoeddin made those remarks, a critical backdrop was already in play. Indonesia's Defense Ministry had launched a review of its Rafale F4 order — and rumors circulated that Jakarta might cancel the deal and pivot to the J-10CE. The review was triggered on May 14, 2025, just one week after the May 7 air combat encounter in which Pakistan Air Force J-10CE fighters defeated India's Rafale F3R jets. That outcome left Jakarta in an uncomfortable position. The Rafale — billed as "Europe's top fighter" — had underperformed in actual combat, sparking domestic skepticism and speculation about an abrupt change of course.
The J-10CE's stellar air combat record forced Jakarta to completely rethink its fighter procurement.
The review ended quietly, without a public announcement. One year later, on May 18, 2026, France's Dassault Aviation delivered the first batch of six Rafale F4 jets to the Indonesian military — effectively confirming the verdict. Some observers assumed the J-10CE had lost out, reasoning that Jakarta would never simultaneously buy Rafales and Chinese fighters. The reality is Jakarta has been quietly running a two-track procurement strategy all along.
The J-10CE's performance aligns squarely with Indonesia's urgent need to modernize its air force. The fact that J-10CEs downed several Rafales does not make the French jets worthless — for Indonesia, more advanced fighters simply means more combat capability. Operating both the J-10CE and the Rafale offers real tactical upside: the two types can complement each other externally and enable adversarial training internally to sharpen combat readiness. More importantly, if the Rafale's air combat performance continues to fall short, the J-10CE can underpin overall Indonesian air power as a fallback.
Indonesia's air force maintains two primary hypothetical adversaries: Singapore — which controls the Strait of Malacca — and Australia to the south. Australia is the main strategic concern, driven by disputes over maritime resource boundaries. The Royal Australian Air Force operates 72 F-35A fighters that outperform Indonesia's current fleet of F-16s, Su-27s, and Su-30s.
Indonesia's Rafale purchase was designed precisely to counter Australia's F-35A. France had marketed the jet as Europe's most advanced "4.5-generation" fighter, citing exercise scenarios in which the Rafale reportedly "shot down" the F-22 and claimed near fifth-generation capabilities. Indonesia maintains good relations with the United States but is not a formal ally and lacks access to the F-35A. That made the Rafale a comparatively viable option. In 2022, the two countries signed an $8.1 billion deal — roughly HK$63.2 billion — for 42 Rafale F4 jets.
Many countries accepted France's promotional claims at face value — until May 7, 2025. That night, Pakistan Air Force J-10CEs reportedly shot down three Rafales. Equipped with advanced onboard radar and PL-15E missiles, the J-10CE gave its opponents virtually no chance to respond. Reported details paint a one-sided engagement: the J-10CE detected Rafales at approximately 200 km using its own radar, the PL-15E achieved a record engagement distance of 189 km, and the Rafale's radar warning system never triggered an alert.
Armed with powerful radar and PL-15E long-range missiles, the J-10CE strikes before the enemy can react.
That engagement exposed three concrete advantages the J-10CE holds over the Rafale. First, its onboard radar is powerful enough to deliver strong air combat performance even without extensive network support — a decisive edge for smaller air forces. Second, its long-range missiles allow the J-10CE to fully exploit detection range, seize the initiative, and deny opponents the time or space to retaliate. Third, the radar features low probability of intercept capabilities, rendering even the Rafale's advanced European warning systems largely ineffective.
Before May 7, 2025, Indonesia had almost no viable path to acquiring a fighter that combined all three qualities. With the Rafale's claimed superiority now shattered, Jakarta naturally wants the J-10CE to fill the gap — and counter Australia's F-35As.
Make no mistake: all of this rests on the assumption that Indonesia keeps buying Rafales. Jakarta financed the 42-jet order through loans from Paris. Canceling the contract would trigger massive penalty payments and devastating damage to Indonesia's international credit standing. This reflects a deliberate French export model. Paris knows that wealthy nations go to Washington. Its target market is financially constrained developing countries — Egypt, Serbia, and others — and it hooks them with high-percentage financing guarantees and low-interest loans, collecting profits over the long repayment window.
France uses massive loans to sell Rafales to developing nations—hooking buyers who cannot afford to walk away.
Egypt's deal illustrates how the model works. Egypt received loans covering up to 85% of its Rafale contract value, structured over 10 years. On a €4 billion deal — approximately HK$33.6 billion — Egypt needed only €600 million in upfront cash. Indonesia adopted the same structure: 15% down payment, 85% financed through commercial loans, on an $8.1 billion contract — roughly HK$63.2 billion. Given Indonesia's annual defense budget of only $11.6 billion — around HK$90.5 billion — walking away from the agreement is simply not financially feasible.
Indonesia's potential 24-jet J-10CE purchase also offers China a clear lesson. When Beijing exported the J-10CE to Pakistan, it provided low-interest loans worth RMB 10.14 billion — approximately HK$11 billion — but that fell short of France's mature, systematic financing model for arms exports. A strong product is only the first step. Creating effective mechanisms for customers to pay is equally critical. Indonesia's order may be precisely the opportunity China needs to build that capability.
The Art of Stopping War
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