Locked In on Rafales, Indonesia Doubles Down on China's J-10CE to Counter Australia's F-35A

Alan Warnes — publisher of the international military magazine Air Forces Monthly — dropped a significant revelation on social media. Indonesian Air Force officials confirmed to him that Indonesia has finalized plans to procure the J-10CE fighter jet. The order has doubled, from the originally planned 12 aircraft to 24. Indonesia will simultaneously introduce the PL-15E air-to-air missile, effectively acquiring the same fully configured J-10CE variant currently in service with the Pakistan Air Force.

Pakistan already flies the fully loaded J-10CE. Indonesia is buying the exact same jet.

Indonesia's interest in the J-10CE did not come out of nowhere. In October 2025, Indonesian Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin told media that Indonesia would soon purchase fighter jets from China as part of its military modernization program — adding that "Chinese fighter jets will fly over Jakarta." He stopped short of naming a specific model. Based on Jakarta's bidding process, observers concluded that only the J-10CE could realistically compete against Boeing's F-15EX, which was also in the running.

When Sjamsoeddin made those remarks, a critical backdrop was already in play. Indonesia's Defense Ministry had launched a review of its Rafale F4 order — and rumors circulated that Jakarta might cancel the deal and pivot to the J-10CE. The review was triggered on May 14, 2025, just one week after the May 7 air combat encounter in which Pakistan Air Force J-10CE fighters defeated India's Rafale F3R jets. That outcome left Jakarta in an uncomfortable position. The Rafale — billed as "Europe's top fighter" — had underperformed in actual combat, sparking domestic skepticism and speculation about an abrupt change of course.

The J-10CE's stellar air combat record forced Jakarta to completely rethink its fighter procurement.

The review ended quietly, without a public announcement. One year later, on May 18, 2026, France's Dassault Aviation delivered the first batch of six Rafale F4 jets to the Indonesian military — effectively confirming the verdict. Some observers assumed the J-10CE had lost out, reasoning that Jakarta would never simultaneously buy Rafales and Chinese fighters. The reality is Jakarta has been quietly running a two-track procurement strategy all along.

The J-10CE's performance aligns squarely with Indonesia's urgent need to modernize its air force. The fact that J-10CEs downed several Rafales does not make the French jets worthless — for Indonesia, more advanced fighters simply means more combat capability. Operating both the J-10CE and the Rafale offers real tactical upside: the two types can complement each other externally and enable adversarial training internally to sharpen combat readiness. More importantly, if the Rafale's air combat performance continues to fall short, the J-10CE can underpin overall Indonesian air power as a fallback.

Indonesia's air force maintains two primary hypothetical adversaries: Singapore — which controls the Strait of Malacca — and Australia to the south. Australia is the main strategic concern, driven by disputes over maritime resource boundaries. The Royal Australian Air Force operates 72 F-35A fighters that outperform Indonesia's current fleet of F-16s, Su-27s, and Su-30s.

Indonesia's Rafale purchase was designed precisely to counter Australia's F-35A. France had marketed the jet as Europe's most advanced "4.5-generation" fighter, citing exercise scenarios in which the Rafale reportedly "shot down" the F-22 and claimed near fifth-generation capabilities. Indonesia maintains good relations with the United States but is not a formal ally and lacks access to the F-35A. That made the Rafale a comparatively viable option. In 2022, the two countries signed an $8.1 billion deal — roughly HK$63.2 billion — for 42 Rafale F4 jets.

Many countries accepted France's promotional claims at face value — until May 7, 2025. That night, Pakistan Air Force J-10CEs reportedly shot down three Rafales. Equipped with advanced onboard radar and PL-15E missiles, the J-10CE gave its opponents virtually no chance to respond. Reported details paint a one-sided engagement: the J-10CE detected Rafales at approximately 200 km using its own radar, the PL-15E achieved a record engagement distance of 189 km, and the Rafale's radar warning system never triggered an alert.

Armed with powerful radar and PL-15E long-range missiles, the J-10CE strikes before the enemy can react.

That engagement exposed three concrete advantages the J-10CE holds over the Rafale. First, its onboard radar is powerful enough to deliver strong air combat performance even without extensive network support — a decisive edge for smaller air forces. Second, its long-range missiles allow the J-10CE to fully exploit detection range, seize the initiative, and deny opponents the time or space to retaliate. Third, the radar features low probability of intercept capabilities, rendering even the Rafale's advanced European warning systems largely ineffective.

Before May 7, 2025, Indonesia had almost no viable path to acquiring a fighter that combined all three qualities. With the Rafale's claimed superiority now shattered, Jakarta naturally wants the J-10CE to fill the gap — and counter Australia's F-35As.

Make no mistake: all of this rests on the assumption that Indonesia keeps buying Rafales. Jakarta financed the 42-jet order through loans from Paris. Canceling the contract would trigger massive penalty payments and devastating damage to Indonesia's international credit standing. This reflects a deliberate French export model. Paris knows that wealthy nations go to Washington. Its target market is financially constrained developing countries — Egypt, Serbia, and others — and it hooks them with high-percentage financing guarantees and low-interest loans, collecting profits over the long repayment window.

France uses massive loans to sell Rafales to developing nations—hooking buyers who cannot afford to walk away.

Egypt's deal illustrates how the model works. Egypt received loans covering up to 85% of its Rafale contract value, structured over 10 years. On a €4 billion deal — approximately HK$33.6 billion — Egypt needed only €600 million in upfront cash. Indonesia adopted the same structure: 15% down payment, 85% financed through commercial loans, on an $8.1 billion contract — roughly HK$63.2 billion. Given Indonesia's annual defense budget of only $11.6 billion — around HK$90.5 billion — walking away from the agreement is simply not financially feasible.

Indonesia's potential 24-jet J-10CE purchase also offers China a clear lesson. When Beijing exported the J-10CE to Pakistan, it provided low-interest loans worth RMB 10.14 billion — approximately HK$11 billion — but that fell short of France's mature, systematic financing model for arms exports. A strong product is only the first step. Creating effective mechanisms for customers to pay is equally critical. Indonesia's order may be precisely the opportunity China needs to build that capability.

The Art of Stopping War

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A newly released photograph has put the CNS Fujian’s electromagnetic catapult system in the spotlight. US military website The War Zone (www.twz.com) reported on July 9 that a J-15T carrier-based fighter had launched from the Fujian carrying four YJ-83K anti-ship missiles. It said this was the first time a J-15-series fighter had been seen taking off with four anti-ship missiles.

The fighter had engaged full afterburner before leaving the deck, and the outlines of all four missiles were clearly visible beneath its wings. The image offers more than a dramatic shot. It provides a concrete sign that the Fujian can catapult a heavily loaded aircraft into the air.

J-15T launches under full afterburner with four anti-ship missiles.

The War Zone concluded that Fujian’s electromagnetic catapult is unlocking the J-15T’s strike potential and creating a major deterrent for the US Navy. The report said China’s rapidly developing carrier force is overcoming a long-standing operational constraint: getting heavily armed, heavy strike fighters off a carrier deck.

That basic assessment fits the facts. More directly, however, the photograph is a key indication that Fujian’s electromagnetic catapult has successfully demonstrated heavy-load launch capability.

Why the Catapult Matters

The technical significance is straightforward. The “T” in J-15T denotes the catapult-launch variant, designed to take off at full load from carriers equipped with electromagnetic catapults.

Earlier J-15s on the Liaoning and Shandong relied on ski-jump decks. A ski-jump launch depends on the aircraft’s own speed as it crosses the upward-curving deck to generate lift. The heavier the payload, the less adequate the aircraft’s speed becomes at deck exit. That forces a trade-off between fuel and weapons.

Public footage has shown ski-jump-launched J-15s carrying no more than two YJ-83K anti-ship missiles. Carrying four YJ-83Ks with full fuel would be virtually impossible in ski-jump mode.

Ski-jump carriers limit heavy-load launches.

The YJ-83K is a mainstay subsonic anti-ship missile of the PLA Navy. Each missile weighs about 600 kilograms, meaning four add up to 2.4 tonnes.

Add the J-15T’s own takeoff weight and internal fuel, and the catapult must deliver substantial energy. The photograph shows the aircraft leaving the deck successfully under full afterburner. That points to three developments: stable and reliable electromagnetic-catapult thrust under heavy loads, calibrated carrier-aircraft launch parameters, and successful coordination with the arresting and recovery system.

With these three elements working together, Fujian’s carrier-aircraft launch-and-recovery system has entered a practical operational stage. The system is no longer simply a concept on deck.

A New Strike Equation

The tactical shift is even more direct. A single J-15T carrying four YJ-83Ks could strike at least four maritime targets in one sortie. It could also launch a four-missile saturation salvo against one high-value target.

With a combat radius of about 1,500 kilometers and a YJ-83K range of about 180 kilometers, one aircraft can cover a substantial maritime area. Fujian’s electromagnetic catapult also enables efficient sortie generation. A wave of J-15Ts could put far more anti-ship missiles into the air than carriers operating in the ski-jump era.

That changes the equation. The Fujian carrier group’s anti-ship firepower is moving beyond merely adequate and into a new class.

New carrier aircraft point to a next-generation strike system.

The Next Weapons Test

Still, outside observers should not overstate this development. The YJ-83K is a mature subsonic anti-ship missile that began entering PLA service in the early 2000s.

The supersonic YJ-15 and longer-range YJ-18 have both been in service for years. A stealth cruise-missile version, the YJ-18B, has also appeared publicly. The YJ-15 displayed in military parades is reported to reach Mach 3 to Mach 4 and have a range exceeding 400 kilometers.

The J-15T has now demonstrated that it can carry four medium-range missiles. In theory, it could eventually be adapted for heavier models. If future tests verify the carriage and launch of advanced heavy weapons such as the YJ-15, its strike power would show a more substantial breakthrough.

A Full Carrier System

CNS Fujian’s true value, however, lies in the wider system rather than in any one aircraft. The J-15T handles anti-ship strikes and long-range interception. The J-35 stealth fighter is intended for air-superiority penetration and deep strike, while the KJ-600 fixed-wing airborne early-warning aircraft provides broad-area situational awareness, command, and guidance.

Together, these three carrier-based aircraft types form a complete carrier strike system. The Liaoning and Shandong faced systemic shortcomings: they relied on helicopters for airborne early warning, lacked stealth fighters, and could not launch heavy fighters at full loads.

Fujian is addressing those gaps one by one. The J-15T’s full-load catapult launch is only one milestone in that broader process.

From Photo to Capability

A photograph is not the same as combat capability. Demonstrating the carriage and takeoff of four YJ-83Ks does not mean a full weapons-release test has been completed.

High-intensity sortie training, the rhythm of multiple catapult-launch waves, carrier-group coordination exercises, and realistic confrontation in complex electromagnetic environments all need time to mature. The road from a successful deck launch to sustained combat performance remains a long one.

Two years ago, when Fujian first put to sea, many people were still asking whether its electromagnetic catapult could work. The images now emerging suggest that Fujian has cleared its most difficult stage.

The Signal From Fujian

A single photograph can reveal more than an official announcement. The J-15T’s takeoff from Fujian carrying four anti-ship missiles sends an unmistakable signal: China’s carrier-based aircraft are beginning to realize the payload potential expected of a heavy fighter.

What could not be done before is now being achieved. Ranges once beyond reach are extending. How far this capability can develop will be answered by the live-fire test images that follow.