For any society that has spent a long time neglecting the rule of law, the process of returning to legal order is neither swift nor painless.
China has been stressing the rule of law for more than 2000 years. During the Warring States Period, Qin Xiaogong ascended the throne in 361 BC, actively brought in talents, and enlisted Shang Yang to implement legal reforms. To convince a skeptical public that the law would definitely be enforced, Shang Yang erected a three-zhang-tall wooden pole at the southern gate of the capital, promising ten gold pieces to anyone who could carry it to the northern gate. When no one responded, he increased the reward to fifty gold pieces. Only then did someone step forward, and, true to his word, Shang Yang paid the reward. The episode, now known as “moving the pole to establish credibility,” marked a turning point in public trust toward the law.
Hong Kong’s own journey has been far less linear. In 2019, the city experienced a period of intense upheaval, fuelled in part by the opposition’s embrace of the notion of “Disobedience for Justice”. Benny Tai, a former associate professor at the University of Hong Kong’s law faculty, advocated for civil disobedience as a means to confront the government, arguing that the pursuit of justice could justify unlawful acts. He advanced this argument from within the very institution charged with training the city’s future legal professionals.
Such reasoning, however, does not withstand scrutiny. If the pursuit of justice alone were sufficient to override the law, there would be little reason to study statutes or case law. Legal education would become obsolete. Yet, in any society, there will be those willing to believe convenient falsehoods, and the idea that illegality can be justified by higher ideals briefly gained traction. It was only after the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law that the government reasserted control.
Recently, Hong Kong’s National Security Department arrested the father and elder brother of Anna Kwok, a wanted activist living abroad. Authorities allege that Kwok’s family attempted to alter the terms of her insurance policy in order to withdraw a balance of HK$90,000, in violation of Article 90(2)(b) and 90(3) of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance and Section 159G of the Crimes Ordinance, which prohibit dealing with the assets of absconders. Police have reminded the public that such offenses carry a maximum penalty of seven years’ imprisonment, urging citizens not to test the law.
When the government issued wanted warrants for Kwok and others, critics dismissed the move as futile, arguing that fugitives living overseas were beyond the reach of Hong Kong law. Some mocked the police for “making something out of nothing.” Yet, these individuals continue to advocate for the subversion of state power and to call for foreign sanctions against Hong Kong officials -- actions that, authorities argue, violate the National Security Law. The pursuit of these cases, officials say, is a matter of legal principle.
With the passage of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance, the government has specifically criminalized the act of assisting absconders in handling their assets. The intent is clear: to freeze the financial resources of those who have fled and to prevent them from receiving further support from relatives. That Kwok would go to such lengths to recover her insurance payout suggests both a degree of desperation and the practical impact of the government’s enforcement efforts.
Some have argued that Kwok’s family members are innocent bystanders. Ultimately, their fate will be decided in court. What is clear, however, is that police are prepared to question the families of fugitives and to warn them against providing support. The willingness of some to risk prosecution may reflect a lingering belief, once common in Hong Kong, that the government would not enforce the law. This “non-enforcement theory,” paired with the idea that breaking the law can be justified by a higher cause, has encouraged some to act with impunity. But such arguments do not hold up in court. Just as a driver cannot escape a parking ticket by claiming to have parked illegally without consequence the day before, past laxity does not excuse present violations.
The opposition, meanwhile, continues to adapt its tactics. Overseas groups such as the European Hong Kong Diaspora Alliance have accused the government of “transnational repression” in its pursuit of fugitives’ families. Yet, as officials point out, the failure to enforce the law would itself undermine the rule of law. Enforcement, they argue, is not repression.
If the global debate is about transnational law enforcement, critics might do well to consider the United States, whose Foreign Corrupt Practices Act allows for prosecution of individuals for alleged corruption anywhere in the world, regardless of whether the conduct occurred on American soil. That, Hong Kong authorities argue, is true extraterritoriality.
As Hong Kong moves from a period of legal ambiguity toward renewed adherence to the rule of law, those accustomed to a more permissive environment will inevitably face discomfort. But, as history suggests, such growing pains may be the price of restoring public trust in the law.
Lo Wing-hung
Bastille Commentary
** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **
After months of escalating tariff battles between the United States and China, the first significant turning point has emerged. Both sides are preparing for new talks, while Beijing has introduced a sweeping set of measures to shore up its economy.
Trade Talks Resume Amid Economic Maneuvers
China announced that Vice Premier He Lifeng will travel to Switzerland from May 9 to 10, where he is scheduled to meet with the US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. A spokesperson for the Ministry of Commerce said that senior American officials have recently signaled a willingness to discuss tariff adjustments, reaching out to Beijing through multiple channels in hopes of opening negotiations. China, after careful assessment of American overtures, taking into account global expectations, its own interests, and the appeals of American industry and consumers, agreed to resume contact.
The ministry spokesperson underscored that “any dialogue or negotiation must be based on mutual respect, equal consultation, and mutual benefit.” Quoting a Chinese proverb, the spokesperson added, “Listen to what they say, watch what they do.” If the United States were to say one thing and do another, or use talks as a pretext for coercion, China “will not agree, nor will it sacrifice its principles or international fairness and justice for the sake of any agreement.”
Key Takeaways on the Current Landscape:
Dialogue is preferable to stalemate. The resumption of direct contact marks a pivotal moment in US–China relations.
A swift agreement is unlikely. Recent talks between the United States and both South Korea and Japan have yielded no breakthroughs. Drawing on the experience of the Trump administration’s first term, these negotiations are expected to be lengthy and difficult.
Endurance will determine the outcome. Both countries are absorbing the pain of elevated tariffs. Whichever side proves less able to withstand the pressure and becomes eager for a deal will likely have to make greater concessions. China, for its part, is preparing for a protracted contest, aiming to inflict enough economic discomfort on the United States to secure a favorable agreement. Unlike Washington, Beijing is not promising a quick resolution.
This context helps explain why, as it announced new talks with Washington, Beijing also unveiled a package of measures in support of the economy. The People’s Bank of China, the National Financial Regulatory Administration, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission jointly introduced the plan. Several elements stand out among the others:
First, the central bank lowered the required reserve ratio for banks, injecting one trillion yuan in long-term liquidity into the financial system. By cutting the ratio by 0.5 percentage points, banks can lend more against their deposits, boosting credit supply. The required reserve ratio for auto finance and leasing companies was reduced from 5 percent to zero, increasing the availability of loans for purchases of cars and equipment. The central bank will also provide 500 billion yuan in new loans for consumer services and elderly care, encouraging spending and investment.
Pan Gongsheng, governor of the central bank, summarized first-quarter financial market performance: The Shanghai SE Composite Index hovered around 3,300 points and rebounded quickly after a dip in early April; 10-year government bond yields remained stable at about 1.65 percent; and after a slight depreciation, the renminbi recovered to about 7.2 per dollar, signaling relatively balanced cross-border capital flows.
The message from Beijing is clear: Even as the United States intensified its tariff campaign, China’s financial markets remained stable. Now, as trade talks resume, Beijing is again moving to bolster liquidity and support the economy, preparing for what could be a drawn-out tariff battle.
Contrasting American and Chinese Approaches
Since taking office, Trump launched tariff battles against the world. The United States has tended to act on impulse, pushing all its chips on the table in hopes of intimidating opponents and securing quick, favorable deals. But when confronted with China’s firm resistance, Washington has appeared short on follow-through. Trump repeatedly talked up negotiations to steady market sentiment, but offered few concrete measures to support the economy, relying instead on threatening Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell to cut interest rates. Yet with tariffs fueling inflation, the Fed’s room to maneuver is limited. Trump’s approach has been characterized by bravado, not by sustained strategy.
China, by contrast, has long prepared for the possibility of renewed tariff conflict. Its approach is methodical and deliberate, with contingency plans in place. Last September, Beijing took early steps to stabilize markets and cushion the economic slowdown. Now, as negotiations begin again, it is rolling out another round of liquidity measures – demonstrating a strategy of “building high walls, stockpiling grain, and waiting patiently,” rather than boasting of easy victories.
If the current dynamic holds, the side less able to endure the pain will be the first to seek a deal, and will have to make the greater concessions. China is in no rush; the pace and outcome of talks will depend on how much pain the United States can withstand, and how much it is willing to give up, and how quickly.
Lo Wing-hung
