CIA Open Recruitment of Spies targeting at China

When a nation openly seeks to recruit spies to steal another country’s secrets, the target state cannot afford to look away. In the latest episode of this ongoing contest, the United States has taken center stage.

On May 1, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States released two new videos, publicly appealing to Chinese citizens to collaborate with the agency and engage in espionage against their own government. The videos mark a strikingly public approach to intelligence recruitment – a move that doubles as psychological warfare.

Last year, the CIA had already published an instructional video in Chinese, teaching Chinese nationals how to use the dark web to contact the agency securely. An anonymous US official puts it, as quoted by The New York Times,  the CIA would not have produced the latest videos if the earlier attempt had not yielded results.

John Ratcliffe, newly appointed as CIA director by Donald Trump, has made clear that China is now the agency’s top priority. In a message to CIA personnel last month, Ratcliffe underscored the urgency of rebuilding the agency’s human intelligence network in China, emphasizing the need to recruit Chinese officials to obtain state secrets.

Hong Kong in the Crosshairs

It would be a mistake to assume that these developments have little bearing on Hong Kong. The city remains a focal point for US intelligence-gathering efforts against China. The Hong Kong government has been drafting supplementary regulations to implement the Hong Kong National Security Law and the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance for some time. In the face of mounting challenges from the United States and other Western powers, early enactment of such regulations is a matter of prudence.

The new subsidiary legislation under the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance recently introduced by the government include provisions allowing the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (OSNS) to designate official premises and prohibit unauthorized disclosure of the office’s investigative work.

Existing Powers Clarified

After the announcement of the new regulations, some online commentators questioned whether this signalled an expansion of the OSNS’s powers. In reality, these authorities already exist; the new rules simply clarify their scope and procedures. Article 55 of the National Security Law stipulates that the OSNS may exercise jurisdiction in serious cases, including those involving foreign interference or when the SAR faces genuine difficulties in enforcement. The office’s authority to take over such cases has always existed and has not been expanded. Given the CIA’s public campaign to recruit Chinese spies, it would be naïve to assume that such scenarios will never arise.

The subsidiary legislation also sets out operational details. Civil servants are required to provide all necessary and reasonable assistance to the OSNS in a timely manner. Any individual must comply with legal instruments issued by the OSNS under Article 57 of the National Security Law; failing to comply, providing false information, or disclosing details of OSNS investigations all constitute criminal offenses. Deliberately obstructing the OSNS, impersonating its personnel, or forging its documents are also criminal acts. These provisions mirror similar offenses in existing Hong Kong law, simply making clear that OSNS personnel receive the same legal protections as other officials when performing their duties. In short, the regulations clarify the scope of authority – not expand it.

Enhancing Protections, Not Restrictions

When the OSNS exercises its duties in Hong Kong, the relevant legal procedures, the scope of protected work, and the obligations of other government agencies to assist must all be clearly defined by subsidiary legislation. Critics often view such regulations as restrictions on the public, but this is a misreading. For example, after the regulations took effect, the SAR government designated six locations, including the Metropark Hotel Causeway Bay, as restricted zones. Some have claimed these “forbidden zones” are close to residential areas and wondered whether one could even speak to people coming out of these places, fearing they might inadvertently break the law. Such concerns are exaggerated.

Designating OSNS offices as prohibited areas is no different from the military barracks found in urban districts, which are also clearly marked as off-limits. There are schools and residential buildings near the Kowloon Tong barracks, yet daily life is unaffected. Ordinary residents do not wander into such places; clear signage simply serves as a reminder not to trespass. This does not increase the risk of legal trouble for citizens – unauthorized entry was already illegal. In fact, the new rules enhance protection by reducing the chance of accidental trespass due to ignorance. Any sensible person should understand: unless you are answering the CIA’s recruitment call, you have no business entering OSNS offices.

The new national security regulations have no impact on law-abiding citizens, but they strike directly at foreign spies. By explicitly criminalizing acts related to the OSNS’s exercise of its powers, foreign agents caught red-handed can no longer exploit legal loopholes by claiming that OSNS personnel are not protected by local law or that they can openly defy authorities.

Lo Wing-hung

Bastille Commentary

** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **

For any society that has spent a long time neglecting the rule of law, the process of returning to legal order is neither swift nor painless.

China has been stressing the rule of law for more than 2000 years. During the Warring States Period, Qin Xiaogong ascended the throne in 361 BC, actively brought in talents, and enlisted Shang Yang to implement legal reforms. To convince a skeptical public that the law would definitely be enforced, Shang Yang erected a three-zhang-tall wooden pole at the southern gate of the capital, promising ten gold pieces to anyone who could carry it to the northern gate. When no one responded, he increased the reward to fifty gold pieces. Only then did someone step forward, and, true to his word, Shang Yang paid the reward. The episode, now known as “moving the pole to establish credibility,” marked a turning point in public trust toward the law.

Hong Kong’s own journey has been far less linear. In 2019, the city experienced a period of intense upheaval, fuelled in part by the opposition’s embrace of the notion of “Disobedience for Justice”. Benny Tai, a former associate professor at the University of Hong Kong’s law faculty, advocated for civil disobedience as a means to confront the government, arguing that the pursuit of justice could justify unlawful acts. He advanced this argument from within the very institution charged with training the city’s future legal professionals.

Such reasoning, however, does not withstand scrutiny. If the pursuit of justice alone were sufficient to override the law, there would be little reason to study statutes or case law. Legal education would become obsolete. Yet, in any society, there will be those willing to believe convenient falsehoods, and the idea that illegality can be justified by higher ideals briefly gained traction. It was only after the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law that the government reasserted control.

Recently, Hong Kong’s National Security Department arrested the father and elder brother of Anna Kwok, a wanted activist living abroad. Authorities allege that Kwok’s family attempted to alter the terms of her insurance policy in order to withdraw a balance of HK$90,000, in violation of Article 90(2)(b) and 90(3) of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance and Section 159G of the Crimes Ordinance, which prohibit dealing with the assets of absconders. Police have reminded the public that such offenses carry a maximum penalty of seven years’ imprisonment, urging citizens not to test the law.

When the government issued wanted warrants for Kwok and others, critics dismissed the move as futile, arguing that fugitives living overseas were beyond the reach of Hong Kong law. Some mocked the police for “making something out of nothing.” Yet, these individuals continue to advocate for the subversion of state power and to call for foreign sanctions against Hong Kong officials -- actions that, authorities argue, violate the National Security Law. The pursuit of these cases, officials say, is a matter of legal principle.

With the passage of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance, the government has specifically criminalized the act of assisting absconders in handling their assets. The intent is clear: to freeze the financial resources of those who have fled and to prevent them from receiving further support from relatives. That Kwok would go to such lengths to recover her insurance payout suggests both a degree of desperation and the practical impact of the government’s enforcement efforts.

Some have argued that Kwok’s family members are innocent bystanders. Ultimately, their fate will be decided in court. What is clear, however, is that police are prepared to question the families of fugitives and to warn them against providing support. The willingness of some to risk prosecution may reflect a lingering belief, once common in Hong Kong, that the government would not enforce the law. This “non-enforcement theory,” paired with the idea that breaking the law can be justified by a higher cause, has encouraged some to act with impunity. But such arguments do not hold up in court. Just as a driver cannot escape a parking ticket by claiming to have parked illegally without consequence the day before, past laxity does not excuse present violations.

The opposition, meanwhile, continues to adapt its tactics. Overseas groups such as the European Hong Kong Diaspora Alliance have accused the government of “transnational repression” in its pursuit of fugitives’ families. Yet, as officials point out, the failure to enforce the law would itself undermine the rule of law. Enforcement, they argue, is not repression.

If the global debate is about transnational law enforcement, critics might do well to consider the United States, whose Foreign Corrupt Practices Act allows for prosecution of individuals for alleged corruption anywhere in the world, regardless of whether the conduct occurred on American soil. That, Hong Kong authorities argue, is true extraterritoriality.

As Hong Kong moves from a period of legal ambiguity toward renewed adherence to the rule of law, those accustomed to a more permissive environment will inevitably face discomfort. But, as history suggests, such growing pains may be the price of restoring public trust in the law.

Lo Wing-hung