Visible justice, on the record. Lord Chief Justice Hewart’s line — “Not only must Justice be done; it must also be seen to be done” (R v Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy) — isn’t a slogan; it’s a standard you can verify by watching the process and reading the reasons. In the Jimmy Lai trial, Hong Kong’s court put that “visible rule of law” principle on full display.
After a 156-day trial, the court delivered its verdict today (December 15). A three-judge panel — Esther Toh, D’Almada Remedios, and Alex Lee Wan-tang — unanimously convicted Jimmy Lai on three counts: one count of “conspiracy to publish seditious publications” and two counts under the Hong Kong National Security Law (NSL) of “conspiracy to collude with foreign or external forces.” The court’s ruling is described as the first conviction for collusion-conspiracy offence in Hong Kong.
The court had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Lai committed sedition and colluded with foreign forces. And because the NSL took effect on June 30, 2020 — with laws not applying retroactively — prosecutors also had to prove the alleged collusion continued after that date, not just before it.
The presiding judges’ reasons point to two make-or-break findings that carried the convictions.
Credibility Verdict: Lai Fails
First pillar: Lai wasn’t credible. The court’s first core finding was blunt: his testimony didn’t withstand scrutiny.
In the judgment, the judges said Lai’s evidence was “evasive, incredible and unreliable”, as well as “riddled with inconsistencies and contradictions, evasiveness, and unworthy of belief,”and that the court rejected it. In plain terms, the court treated him as a witness that it could not rely on.
The prosecution’s key witnesses were six accomplice witnesses, including four Apple Daily senior executives at the relevant time: Cheung Kim-hung, Chan Pui-man, Yeung Ching-kee, and Chow Tat-kuen. They testified that Lai closely managed and personally directed Apple Daily’s editorial line; Yeung, who oversaw editorials and the forum section, said they had only “birdcage autonomy,” and that he wrote and selected content guided by Lai’s views. Multiple witnesses also described “lunchbox meetings” where Lai conveyed his political positions to senior staff — evidence the court used to frame Lai not as a publisher respecting editorial independence, but as someone driving agitation through a propaganda apparatus.
The remaining two accomplice witnesses were Chan Tsz-wah and Andy Li Yu-hin. Chan testified that in 2019 he tried to help Li seek financial support for the “G20” team’s international publicity campaign — a campaign described in evidence as aimed at urging foreign countries to apply political pressure on China and the HKSAR.
The judgment records that each accomplice witness faced deep cross-examination, yet the court found that this did not damage any of their credibility. The court hence deemed all six to be “honest and reliable” witnesses, and accepted what they said in evidence as truethei.
Collusion Persisted Post-NSL
Second pillar: offending continued after the NSL took effect.
The court ruled there was ample evidence that after the NSL took effect, Lai continued expressing an anti-China stance and kept engaging in activities requesting foreign states to impose sanctions, blockades, or other hostile actions. The key nuance in the judgment is that the court said Lai shifted tactics — more indirect, more subtle, less openly inflammatory — and that this could be seen in Apple Daily editorials and forum articles, as well as Lai’s own columns, posts, and programmes.
On that evidence, the court found that before the NSL, Lai requested foreign countries — especially the US — to impose sanctions and blockades on China and the HKSAR, and that he did not stop after the law took effect. Even if the messaging became subtle and obscure, the court found the intent remained while Lai continued with relevant activities, and convicted him of colluding with foreign or external forces.
Sentencing still to come. With the trial verdict delivered, the court will next hear mitigation from the defendants before imposing sentence. Under Article 29 of the NSL, serious collusion with foreign or external forces carries life imprisonment or a term of 10 years or more.
Looking back at the investigation, you can see a clear turning point: after the events, Chan Tsz-wah and Li Yu-hin attempted to flee, were intercepted and repatriated to Hong Kong, and then agreed to testify as accomplice witnesses; the four Apple Daily executives did the same. Because the alleged collusion was conducted covertly, the prosecution initially faced obvious evidence-gathering difficulty — and the accomplice testimony helped build a complete chain of evidence.
West's Meddling Backfires
Zoom out and the bigger point is procedural: the court did not rush this case. It ran 156 trial days, heard witnesses from both sides in detail, and allowed meticulous cross-examination — making credibility, truthfulness, and contradiction something the public could observe. That is the “visible rule of law” claim in practice: defendants’ rights protected, process followed, and guilt found only after the court said it was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The political pressure campaign and repeated US and Western interference, however, ran alongside the trial. Ahead of the hearing, some US lawmakers proposed bills urging the White House to sanction HKSAR officials, prosecutors, and judges.
During the proceedings, members of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee made fact-distorting comments, including claims about Lai’s detention arrangements; and the “2025 Annual Report” by the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) is cited as further smearing Hong Kong’s law enforcement, prosecution, and judiciary to pile on pressure.
Washington’s fingerprints are obvious. The case concerns Lai colluding with the US and other foreign forces to endanger national security; and the US politicians commenting and pressuring are themselves implicated as parties to that foreign collusion. On this telling, the intent behind the commentary is not mere “human rights concern,” but an attempt to obstruct Hong Kong’s judicial fairness.
The US and its allies punish their own national-security cases harshly, but lecture Hong Kong when it prosecutes similar conduct. Just look at the US court’s 22-year sentence for Enrique Tarrio, the Proud Boys leader, over the 2021 Capitol riot, an example of how harsh Washington can be toward those it says incited disorder.
The guilty verdict is the warning shot: collusion with foreign forces and betrayal of the nation does not end well.
Lo Wing-hung
Bastille Commentary
** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **
China's strategy is simple: throw one punch to avoid a hundred.
On Wednesday, August 5, China fired back with five consecutive moves to counter a string of recent US measures that Beijing sees as hostile. A spokesperson for China's Ministry of Commerce called the countermeasures "generally restrained." The message was clear: since the China-US presidential meeting in Busan, the US Federal Communications Commission has ignored China's strong opposition and industry appeals. It keeps stretching the concept of national security to roll out restrictions on China.
Meanwhile, the US has added over 40 Chinese entities to the so-called Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act entity list. China demands the US immediately revoke these measures. And if Washington insists on new restrictions, "China will further retaliate."
China's moves are a direct answer to a series of petty US actions that fall into two main areas.
First, the FCC. Before the government took action, the People's Daily fired a warning shot. Under the byline "Zhong Sheng," it blasted the FCC for hiding behind banners like "non-discrimination" and "national security" to discriminate against and suppress Chinese companies.
The FCC recently added foreign-made power inverters and advanced robotic equipment to its so-called "Covered List." That means new models can't get certification and are locked out of the US market. The paper called the tactic typical unilateral bullying.
This isn't new. Back in 2021, the FCC put telecom and video surveillance gear from five Chinese companies on the list. Since then, it has steadily widened the net. In April, it proposed revoking the qualifications of testing and certification bodies from countries that haven't signed a "Mutual Recognition Agreement" with the US. That artificially raises the compliance bar for Chinese products.
And now, Reuters reports the FCC is drafting a ban on imports of new Chinese-made optical communication transceivers for data centers.
Second, the Xinjiang sanctions. On July 30, the US Department of Homeland Security added over 40 Chinese entities to the entity list under the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. The move, effective August 3, swells the list from 144 to 187, the biggest expansion since it was created. The new targets span food, clothing, and cotton. They include snack maker Qia Qia melon seeds, frozen food producer Zhengzhou Synear dumplings, and apparel brand Fujian Septwolves.
When the news hit the Chinese internet, netizens erupted in mockery. The joke going around teasing that "eating melon seeds can easily damage US soldiers' teeth."
China didn't waste a second. It fired back with five countermeasures, and the first one hits where it hurts: drones. Beijing is tightening export controls on drones and related technologies to the US. From now on, every shipment of drones, key components, and controlled technologies will face a strict case-by-case review.
And forget about any 'licensing facilitation' exemptions—those are off the table. Think about it: China is the world's drone superpower. The US wanted to block Chinese drones from coming in. Now China is flipping the script—it's restricting what goes out. The message is blunt: just because you want to buy doesn't mean we'll sell. Especially not advanced drones and components with military uses.
The second measure is a highly targeted strike: China has added six US entities to its Countermeasures List, all of which it says assisted US sanctions on Xinjiang-related companies.
Applied DNA Sciences, Inc. is believed to provide DNA-based traceability and verification services for relevant products.
Stratum Reservoir, LLC is believed to conduct stable-isotope testing and related analysis to determine the origin of Xinjiang-linked materials.
Altana Technologies, Inc., which operates a global supply-chain mapping and management platform, is believed to help the US government trace supply chains involving Xinjiang-linked products.
The Responsible Business Alliance, which promotes responsible business conduct in global supply chains and operates assessment programmes for member companies, is believed to help companies exclude Xinjiang-linked products from their supply chains.
Verité Group, Inc., a nonprofit focused on labour rights and human rights, examines alleged forced labour in global supply chains.
Human Rights in China, a New York-based human-rights organization, advocates sanctions related to Xinjiang.
China’s countermeasures against these six entities are therefore highly targeted.
The third measure targets a US compliance testing company that helped the FCC impose China-related sanctions. That company will now be locked out of the compliance testing business in the Chinese market. The ripple effect: it could drive up compliance costs for US products trying to enter China.
The fourth measure hits at the heart of product certification. China is suspending the entrustment of US agencies to conduct factory follow-up inspections for CCC certification. Remember, CCC certification is a must-have for US products to enter the Chinese market. By pulling the plug on US inspectors, China shifts the review work to its own agencies. That spells more time and more uncertainty for American exporters.
The fifth measure, a national security investigation into imported US printing and copying office equipment. On the surface, this one looks like a light tap.
China imported about $2.08 billion worth of such equipment in 2025, mostly from Japan ($1.72 billion). The US slice was small. But this is just the opening move.
The US has banned Chinese software and hardware from connected and autonomous vehicles on American roads—and until now, China held its fire.
Now Beijing is investigating US printers and copiers on national security grounds. The message is unmistakable: if Washington plays the national security card at every turn, Beijing can just as easily slap an 'unsafe' label on American phones and EVs running US software.
But that's not the main battlefield. Artificial intelligence is the real arena. Over the past month, Chinese companies have rolled out one high-performance, low-cost AI model after another, sending US AI giants reeling. When Anthropic released a new model in June, the US government demanded it be kept out of non-American hands. The clash forced Anthropic to pull the model. Trump signed an executive order in June setting up an AI safety framework, including a voluntary program for companies to submit cutting-edge models for government review.
Then Chinese developers like Moonshot AI and DeepSeek unleashed open-source systems that rival top-tier US models, fueling a fierce debate in Washington over how to regulate open-weight models. Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei pushed for mandatory government safety reviews for both open and proprietary models, taking direct aim at Chinese open-source systems. He won backing from Treasury Secretary Bessent and others, but ran into a wall of opposition from US tech giants, including Nvidia.
On August 4, the Trump administration delivered its verdict. In a meeting led by the Office of the National Cyber Director, top US AI companies were told that under the new AI safety framework, open-source models from Chinese rivals would not face US government safety testing.
For Anthropic, it was a crushing defeat. US National Cyber Director Sean Cairncross later spelled out the thinking at a cybersecurity conference in Las Vegas: the US government wants to back the American open-source AI ecosystem. He called such models 'tremendously valuable' and insisted the regulatory framework must stay 'flexible.'
Otherwise, he warned, 'it would not only stifle growth, development, and innovation, but the regulatory regime would become obsolete within 48 hours of completing its process.'
The bottom line: Washington keeps chipping away at China with petty moves. But when the pile gets high enough, Beijing punches back hard—and signals it has heavier blows ready.
President Xi is due to visit the US in September, and Trump will be in Shenzhen in mid-November for the APEC summit. Trump doesn't want things to spiral out of control; at crunch time, he'll yank the leash on his officials.
The real battlefield is artificial intelligence. It was almost certain that the White House's decision to leave Chinese open-source models alone came after fierce pushback from China.
Lo Wing-hung
