Recently, the UK Parliament has been exerting pressure over Hong Kong's refusal to allow BN(O) visa holders to withdraw their Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) savings.
According to media reports, the UK Parliament held a hearing last week where Ian Stuart, CEO of HSBC UK, was hauled in to address mounting complaints. BNO holders from Hong Kong who relocated to Britain claim they cannot access their MPF funds held at HSBC. Stuart's response was clear and definite. He explained that Hong Kong law prohibits BN(O) visa holders from withdrawing their MPF.
The crux of the dispute lies in Hong Kong's sensible requirement that MPF early withdrawal is only permitted for those who have genuinely "permanently departed" the city. The Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority (MPFA) has consistently clarified that BN(O) is merely a travel document, not an accepted nationality or residency permit. This isn't bureaucratic pedantry—it's financial prudence.
Why Hong Kong Won't Budge on BN(O)
The MPFA's logic is sound: just as holding a Home Return Permit doesn't automatically prove permanent migration to mainland China, simply brandishing a BN(O) document fails to demonstrate genuine emigration to the UK. Additional supporting evidence is required to prevent exploitation of the "permanent departure" clause—a reasonable safeguard against premature pension raids.
This position reflects both legal reality and practical wisdom. Beyond China's nationality law, which never recognises BN(O) as conferring nationality, there's the inconvenient truth that BN(O) visa holders have no guarantee of permanent UK residency. The prospects for actually becoming British citizens are not just uncertain—they're deteriorating rapidly.
Labour's Immigration Crackdown Changes Everything
Since Labour's election victory, the immigration landscape has shifted dramatically. The government's Immigration White Paper released in May, “Restoring Control over the Immigration System”, officially tightened policies that will devastate BN(O) migrants' long-term prospects. The qualifying period for permanent residency has doubled from five to ten years, and new English proficiency requirements now apply to adult dependents, including spouses.
Despite desperate lobbying from BN(O) viasa holders for clarity on how these changes affect their scheme, the government has maintained studied silence. The writing is on the wall: the original "5+1" pathway (five years to permanent residency, plus one for citizenship) has likely become "10+1"—if you're lucky enough to qualify at all.
The new reality is even bleaker. After a decade of residence, only "high-skilled" individuals—doctors, nurses, engineers, AI specialists—will have fast-track options. Skilled worker visas are now restricted to university graduates, creating multiple barriers that will exclude most BN(O) migrants from permanent settlement.
The Real Risk: Drained and Deported
Here's the uncomfortable truth: most of those who moved to the UK from Hong Kong under the BN(O) scheme lack the qualifications, skills, or English proficiency that Labour's new criteria demand. Many sold property and liquidated savings to fund their UK adventure, but after ten years of burning through their assets, Britain may simply decide they're no longer useful and send them packing.
This isn't paranoia—it's politics. Nigel Farage's Reform UK party's landslide performance in January's local elections has put enormous pressure on Keir Starmer's government to slash immigration numbers. The far-right surge means continued tightening is inevitable, not optional.
Consider the devastating scenario: BN(O) holders in the UK drain their MPF savings upfront, spend a decade in Britain consuming their assets, then face deportation when they fail to meet tightened residency requirements. They'd return to Hong Kong financially depleted, potentially becoming a massive burden on the city's social welfare system.
Conclusion: Protecting Assets from Opportunism
Hong Kong's refusal to treat BN(O) as proof of "permanent departure" isn't obstructionism—it's protection. The policy shields both Hong Kong's finances and its people's retirement security from a scheme that increasingly resembles a sophisticated asset-stripping operation.
Post-Brexit Britain desperately needed capital injection, and the BN(O) scheme provided the perfect vehicle to attract Hong Kong's wealthy individuals and families. But allowing Hong Kong to subsidize Britain's post-EU economic struggles by emptying BNO holders' pension pots would be the height of folly. Why should Hong Kong pay for Westminster's financial opportunism?
Lo Wing-hung
Bastille Commentary
** The blog article is the sole responsibility of the author and does not represent the position of our company. **
At the arrival of 2026, the happiest thing is to see the "Hong Kong is dead" narrative—proclaimed so loudly by Western voices—die yet again.
Foreign Money Returns Home
The West has written Hong Kong's obituary more times than you can count. They believed the city's return to China should have been its death sentence. American magazine Fortune declared "The Death of Hong Kong" on its 1995 cover—two years before the handover even happened. Hong Kong survived the Asian financial turmoil in the early post-handover years. It survived SARS. Then came 2019's Black Riots, followed by US sanctions on Hong Kong officials in 2020 and the pandemic's hammer blow. Foreign capital fled in an American-orchestrated exodus, with much of it landing in Singapore.
Last February, Stephen Roach—Yale University senior fellow—wrote in the UK's Financial Times with a headline that said it all: "It pains me to say Hong Kong is over." Foreign investors don't just track economic growth when they assess Hong Kong. They watch the stock market. And over the past year, Hong Kong's miraculous stock market comeback has bankrupted the "Hong Kong is dead" theory.
Hong Kong's economy grew an estimated 3.2% in 2025—ranking it among the developed world's top performers. But the stock market performance was getting really interesting. Average daily turnover in the first 11 months hit HK$230.7 billion—a massive 43% jump compared to 2024's same period.
Record-Breaking Fundraising Wins
The Hong Kong Stock Exchange crushed it in 2025. A total of 119 new listings raised HK$285.8 billion—a staggering 220% year-on-year increase and the highest since 2021. According to KPMG's report, HKEX ranked first globally in fundraising. The New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq tied for second place. Looking ahead, HKEX's fundraising is estimated to reach HK$300-350 billion in 2026, keeping it among the world's top exchanges.
Sure, Mainland capital is investing in Hong Kong. But foreign capital's return has been the real game-changer behind the stock market's strong performance. According to fund industry insiders, what we're seeing now is only wave one—primarily hedge funds and other medium-to-short-term players. As Hong Kong's trading volumes swell and quality Mainland companies list here, the long-term foreign funds will gradually return. The outlook for Hong Kong stocks continues to look favorable.
America's narrative said Hong Kong's National Security Law would scare capital away. Reality proved exactly the opposite. Hong Kong's stable environment gave Chinese companies the confidence to list here. America's targeting of Chinese concept stocks listed on its exchanges was self-destruction—forcing quality Chinese companies to turn to Hong Kong for listing instead. This made Hong Kong's stock market bigger and stronger, compelling even bearish foreign capital to come back.
Beijing's Seal of Approval
President Xi's remarks when meeting Chief Executive John Lee during his duty visit to Beijing in mid-December reveal what work the central government values in Hong Kong. President Xi opened with praise for the Chief Executive's courage and initiative in leading the SAR government. He highlighted four key achievements: steadfast maintenance of national security, successful Legislative Council elections, proactive integration into national development, and achieving steady economic growth.
President Xi's assessment underscores Beijing's high recognition of Hong Kong's ability to do both—safeguard national security and develop the economy simultaneously. Some Hong Kong people believed that having transitioned "from chaos to governance and then to prosperity," the city should set aside national security to focus on economic development. Reality proved this view wrong. Hong Kong must strike a balance between these seemingly contradictory goals and advance on both fronts at once.
Look at Hong Kong's development over the past five years. The city emerged from Black Riots and the pandemic in 2021, achieving a strong rebound from the bottom in 2023. The return to normalcy brought revenge spending that temporarily elevated market sentiment.
But entering 2024, local consumption patterns underwent structural changes. Hong Kong people shopping across the border diverted local retail spending. The strong Hong Kong dollar—tracking the US dollar—and high interest rates suppressed economic activity, leading to structural adjustment.
By the second half of 2025, Hong Kong entered a phase of moderate recovery. The property market began stabilizing after its decline. With the US starting rate cuts in September, capital supply loosened. Hong Kong can continue along this recovery path in 2026—that's the estimate anyway.
Despite the optimism, Hong Kong people must keep working hard. The many vacant shops you see on the streets tell the story—retail economy pressure remains real. In 2024, Hong Kong's total retail sales value of HK$376.8 billion represented a 7.3% year-on-year decline. That's painful for the retail sector.
Retail's Reversal Ahead
Through October 2025, retail sales values remained comparable to the previous year. But consumption began recovering in the second half—retail sales value rose 3.8% in August, 6% in September, and 6.9% in October. 2025 showed an early decline followed by growth, with accelerating consumption momentum. Retail consumption is expected to reverse its decline in 2026.
During this retail transformation, we Hong Kong people must continue their efforts. Old businesses will still be eliminated—that's inevitable. Strategic adjustments are required. New opportunities must be pursued.
Bottom line: Hong Kong's economic performance in 2025 proves once again that the "Hong Kong is dead" theory dies—one more time. Hong Kong has weathered different shocks repeatedly in the past, emerging reborn each time like a phoenix from the ashes.
Lo Wing Hung
