Cui Jianchun, Commissioner of the MFA Office in Hong Kong, called in the US Consul General in Hong Kong on September 30 to make solemn representations regarding her actions after taking office. Commissioner Cui urged Julie Eadeh to abide by the basic principles of international relations such as non-interference in Hong Kong’s internal affairs. He spelled out clearly four “Don’ts” to her: don’t meet with people you shouldn’t, don’t collude with anti-China elements, don’t fund or incite anti-China acdtivities, and don’t meddle in Hong Kong’s national security cases.
This wasn’t Cui’s first shot across Eadeh’s bow. Just a week earlier, when Eadeh arrived, Cui had already told her to stick to her role without poking her nose into Hong Kong or China’s internal affairs. Two warnings in a week, made public and direct, are about as clear as you can get. The message? Step over the red line, and there will be consequences.
Let’s break down the Eadeh saga from a few key angles to really understand what’s at stake.
1. Breaking Promises and Playing Politics
Appointing a consul requires the host’s okay, and China gave it to Eadeh only after the US promised she wouldn’t meddle in Hong Kong’s affairs. Eadeh was no stranger—back in 2019 she was the head of the political section at the US Consulate in Hong Kong and Macau, where she was known as a “subversion expert.” China was wary and once blocked her appointment. Only after US lobbying and promises did China give the green light.
But as soon as Eadeh set foot in Hong Kong, she held receptions and renewed ties with major opposition figures like Anson Chan and Emily Lau, blatantly breaking that promise. China can’t just ignore that.
2. The U.S.-China Chessboard Has Shifted
Years ago, the US cleverly used Hong Kong’s so-called democracy movement to stir up internal conflicts and then pulled the Hong Kong issue into Sino-American talks as leverage—not to support democracy, but to gain advantages elsewhere. Back then, when relations were relatively good, this game worked in America’s favor.
But everything changed after the 2018 trade war. By 2021, when Biden came in, Chinese officials at the Anchorage meeting challenged the US, saying China now “speaks by its position of strength.” The whole Sino-American game changed, with every negotiation on the verge of collapse. If Eadeh keeps stirring the pot with old tactics, it won’t bring the US trade gains—it’ll only break ties further.
3. Trump’s Priority -- American Soybean Farmers
Right now, Trump is keen to sit down with Xi Jinping—face to face—to cut through the trade mess. To Trump, the soybean farmers are what really matters. On October 1, Trump said on social media that he’ll meet Xi at the APEC summit late October to “have a good talk” about China not buying American soybeans. And he vowed to “make soybeans and other crops great again.”
Trump’s clearly putting American interests first, leaning into isolationism. Defense News leaked that the US is prioritizing “defending the homeland and the Western Hemisphere” over Asia. Trump’s cabinet changes—from hawkish Mike Pompeo to more moderate Rubio as Secretary of State—reflect this shift.
Old Hawks Out, New Path In
Pompeo was a notorious China hawk, calling China an “oppressor” and framing the rivalry as a battle between “freedom and tyranny.” His 2020 Nixon Library speech was basically America’s Cold War 2.0 declaration. But that’s behind us now. Trump dumped Pompeo, signaling a desire to reset relations with China.
Imagine if Eadeh keeps cozying up with opposition leaders or meddles in the Jimmy Lai trial. That’s crossing the line in Beijing’s book. The blowback would hit not just Eadeh, but also State Secretary Rubio.
After the 2019 chaos, Hong Kong people fear a rerun and detest foreign meddling that destabilizes Hong Kong. Eadeh should just do her job, follow Trump’s orders, and help push US-China ties back to normal. Otherwise, China won’t just talk next time.
Lo Wing-hung
Bastille Commentary
** The blog article is the sole responsibility of the author and does not represent the position of our company. **
Ignorance is not an alibi you can pull out after breaking the law. The maxim that “ignorance of the law is no excuse” matters even more when national security is at stake, because those who gamble on “not knowing” usually do so after reading the headlines and deciding to ignore them.
On Monday (24 November), the Secretary for Security exercised section 60(1) of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance and issued an order proposing to prohibit the operation of the “Hong Kong Parliament” and the “Hong Kong Democratic Independence Union” in Hong Kong, with separate written notices sent to both groups as required by the statute.
According to the Security Bureau’s explanation, these two organisations have an openly declared aim of subverting state power: they push “self‑determination”, talk about drafting a separate “constitution” for Hong Kong, and seek to overturn or undermine the basic system of the People’s Republic of China as laid down in the PRC Constitution, including the organs of state power of both the Central Authorities and the HKSAR.
Before any final prohibition order is made, the two organisations have been given the statutory chance to make representations, and only after considering these will the Bureau issue its final decision, in line with the procedural safeguards spelled out in section 60.
Who Built This “Parliament”?
Two fugitives wanted by the Hong Kong Police, Elmer Yuen and Victor Ho, set up the so‑called “Hong Kong Parliament” Electoral Organizing Committee in Canada on 27 July 2022, marketing it as a “parliament of Hong Kong people” with the explicit goal of pushing Hong Kong “independence”.
From February to May this year, this committee staged what it called “parliamentary elections” and selected 15 so‑called “members of parliament”, a made‑for‑camera exercise designed to dress up a separatist political project as if it were some kind of alternative legislature.
Another wanted exile, Keung Ka‑wai, created the “Hong Kong Democratic Independence Union”, which likewise openly advocates Hong Kong “independence” and feeds into the same overseas network challenging China’s sovereignty over the city.
Seven members of this group announced early this year that they would stand in the “Hong Kong Parliament” Electoral Organizing Committee elections and called on the public to vote.
Debunking The “No Operation In Hong Kong” Myth
After the Security Bureau moved to prohibit these two organisations from operating in Hong Kong, online critics immediately jumped in, claiming that the groups do not actually operate here and that the Secretary for Security’s move is therefore pointless – a claim that collapses the moment you read the Ordinance and the facts in existing cases.
Such arguments are textbook examples of “legal illiteracy”. By invoking the National Security Ordinance to prohibit these organisations, the first concrete effect is that every part of their operation in Hong Kong instantly becomes illegal.
Before any prohibition order, if these organisations carried out activities in Hong Kong, the Government had to analyse their conduct under both the Hong Kong National Security Law and the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance to see whether particular acts crossed into defined offences, which made enforcement slower and more complex.
Take a simple example. If some members of such an organisation – who are not themselves wanted persons – came to Hong Kong and ran a “how to invest in virtual currencies” event, using it as a recruitment tool and then gradually radicalising participants into anti‑government activists, the crypto‑investment seminar, viewed in isolation, would not obviously be unlawful.
But once the organisations are expressly designated as prohibited, every activity in Hong Kong undertaken in their name becomes unlawful by definition, closing off the tactic of hiding political mobilisation behind seemingly neutral subjects.
The second major effect is that section 62 of the National Security Ordinance criminalises participation in the activities of a prohibited organisation.
Under section 62, once an organisation is designated as prohibited, anyone who serves as an officer, claims to be an officer, or manages the organisation commits an offence and faces up to a HK$1 million fine and 14 years’ imprisonment on conviction.
Even an ordinary member who participates in the organisation’s activities or assemblies, or who pays money to it or provides other forms of assistance, also breaks the law and risks, upon conviction, up to HK$250,000 in fines and 10 years in prison.
From Grey Area To Clear Line
Think about how this worked in the past. When these organisations tried to recruit in Hong Kong, there was a grey area over whether ordinary participants were committing any offence, and prosecutors had to prove that participants knew the organisation was engaging in activities to subvert the government or split the country before laying the related charges or relying on the lesser “aiding and abetting” route.
Now that these two organisations are expressly designated as illegal, prosecution becomes far more straightforward: simply becoming a member already constitutes an offence, and anyone claiming to be an officer risks a heavy sentence of up to 14 years in jail.
Since the Secretary for Security has publicly named these organisations and moved to ban their operation in Hong Kong, defendants can no longer credibly argue that they “did not understand” the nature of the groups or pretend they thought they were just joining some harmless civic club.
The Bettie Lan Wake‑Up Call
There is already a concrete case connected to these illegal organisations. Court records show that one of the wanted persons, Lam Chin‑gan (Tony Lam), instructed his former girlfriend, Bettie Lan Fei, to record promotional videos for the “Hong Kong Parliament” in Canada between March and May this year and use social media to urge the public to join the so‑called “Hong Kong Parliament” vote. When Lan later returned to Hong Kong, she was arrested and charged with one count of doing an act with seditious intention under the National Security Ordinance.
Lan eventually pleaded guilty, calling herself naïve and saying she only offended because she was incited by her ex‑boyfriend.
When passing sentence on 13 November, Chief Magistrate Victor So Wai‑tak stressed that the defendant had clearly supported the “Hong Kong Parliament” as a so‑called “overseas regime”, spreading slanders against China internationally, seriously misleading overseas audiences and promoting extremist ideas – aggravating factors that justified adding two months and jailing her for one year.
Lan’s case shows the real cost of ignorance. For each promotional video, she took 100 Canadian dollars; in exchange, she now has to spend a year in custody and carry a criminal record tied to national security‑related sedition.
At the same time, her case highlights that while her openly seditious videos clearly satisfied the offence of acts with seditious intention, there may be many other participants in these two illegal organisations who have not yet been prosecuted under the earlier legal framework, simply because the tools were less sharply defined.
Once the Secretary for Security designates the two groups as illegal organisations, any participation in their activities – even something that looks as casual as “liking” their content online, sharing their messages, or donating money – can fall within section 62(2)(d) of the National Security Ordinance as “making payments to the organisation or providing other forms of assistance”, exposing the person to potential prosecution.
Ignorance is not a defence, especially not after the authorities have publicly named and moved against these organisations. People should not be misled by “legally illiterate” commentators claiming that the Secretary for Security’s plan to ban the two groups from operating in Hong Kong is meaningless, when the Ordinance expressly turns their activities and support networks into prosecutable conduct.
In reality, tightening the legal net is both highly effective and badly needed to protect national security, defend China’s constitutional order, and send a clear message that dressing up separatism as an “overseas parliament” will not escape the reach of Hong Kong law.
Lo Wing‑hung
