Watch your words before calling someone stupid—odds are you’re lining yourself up as the real fool. Still, I’m making an exception for this headline, cribbed and tweaked for a reason.
Francis Fukuyama—the American academic who shot to fame with his “End of History” in 1989—just dropped another grand theory, this time pinning down the roots of Western populism.
He’s no stranger to regular columns, with his “Frankly Fukuyama” series keeping academics and armchair pundits entertained. But his latest piece, “It’s the Internet, Stupid,” goes all in—blaming our age of global populism on the glowing phone screens in our pockets.
He isn’t alone. Post-Brexit, since Trump’s White House win, everyone from social scientists to barbers has lined up to try to decode the populist surge. Fukuyama rattles off the usual suspect
1.Economic inequality brought on by globalization and neoliberal policies.
2.Racism, nativism, and religious bigotry on the part of populations that have been losing status.
3.Broad sociological changes that have sorted people by education and residence, and resentment at the dominance of elites and experts.
4.The special talents of individual demagogues like Donald Trump.
5.The failiure of mainstream political parties to deliver growth, jobs, security, and infrastructure.
6.Dislike or hatred of the progressive Left’s cultural agenda.
7.Failures of leadership of the progressive Left.
8.Human nature and people’s proclivities towards violence, hatred, and exclusion.
9.Social media and the internet.
Sit back, Fukuyama says—he’s spent a decade pondering this puzzle, and his answer is all about that final culprit: the internet’s rise. It’s point nine—or bust. He gets there by process of elimination: dismiss one through eight, and voilà, only the net is left standing.
Here’s the rub: his philosophy is full of holes. He buys the nine factors on offer as gospel. Rule out eight, and bingo, you’ve got your winner. If the original shortlist missed the big reason, his whole logic falls flat.
The Past Still Bites
If you want to pop Fukuyama’s internet theory bubble, look no further than Nazi Germany.
Hitler’s brand of populism—the ugliest kind—fed off stoking hate, supercharged with nationalism, and plunged the world into chaos. The twist? Hitler had zero internet, not even a flip phone. His pulpit was the cavernous German beer hall—rowdy barns stuffed with hundreds, sometimes thousands.
Remember the Beer Hall Putsch? That was Hitler, 1923, storming Munich’s Bürgerbräukeller, itching to outdo Mussolini, tear down the Weimar Republic, and set up his National Socialist state.
Long before Facebook and memes, populists rallied bodies, not bots. The beer hall was their battleground—prime real estate for political disruption.
To be fair, today’s smartphones and the internet blitzkrieg ideas faster than any taproom. But pinning all modern populism on Wi-Fi? That’s not just off base—it’s clueless.
What Fukuyama misses is the biggest culprit hiding in plain sight: the Western democratic system itself. When voters give up on both party A and party B—when every debate feels staged, every outcome rigged, and personal fortunes just keep sliding—they turn to anyone outside the broken loop.
Back in Weimar Germany, political gridlock and World War I reparations crushed hope. People starved while parties dithered.
The Roots of Decay
That collapse sprouted from failure. But today? America’s breakdown is a product of too much “success.”
After World War II, America led the West into a slugfest with the Soviet bloc. External threats forced discipline. Even the “deep state” and power brokers played by the rules, putting the nation first. But when the USSR dissolved in 1991, Fukuyama was right there, chanting “the end of history” and the unbeatability of American democracy.
What happened next? The elites dropped the mask and the Deep State looted the spoils. The system broke down fast—hello, gerontocracy. Presidential tickets featured men well into their seventies; Congress, steered by octogenarian Nancy Pelosi, was deep in the grip of elder rule.
That’s just the visible rot. Behind the curtain, arms dealers and Wall Street call the shots. The 2008 subprime meltdown? Only Lehman’s CEO did the perp walk, while big banks cashed in on government bailouts.
Trillions printed, trillions owed—debt vaulted from $10 trillion in 2008 to $37 trillion now. Most of that fresh cash? Hoovered up by Big Tech, energy moguls, the arms sector. For the little guy, rising prices, tougher life, leaders hapless against immigration and drugs—just more symptoms of terminal decay.
When picking between party A and B means picking the same dead end, why not roll the dice on rebel party C? And that’s where Trump comes in.
Blind Spots and Hard Truths
Fukuyama’s 1989 blunder is back in 2025. He oversold American democracy, and still can’t admit populism is just the system’s death rattle. So he punts to a tired excuse: it’s the internet’s fault.
The lesson? Don’t be taken in by Fukuyama’s intellectual shell game. Hong Kong people once took the bait—trying to carbon-copy Western democracy brought the populist chaos of 2019. Now, we know better. Time to fix course, use the system we’ve got, ditch paralyzing opposition, and seize a constructive path forward.
Lo Wing-hung
Bastille Commentary
** The blog article is the sole responsibility of the author and does not represent the position of our company. **
At the arrival of 2026, the happiest thing is to see the "Hong Kong is dead" narrative—proclaimed so loudly by Western voices—die yet again.
Foreign Money Returns Home
The West has written Hong Kong's obituary more times than you can count. They believed the city's return to China should have been its death sentence. American magazine Fortune declared "The Death of Hong Kong" on its 1995 cover—two years before the handover even happened. Hong Kong survived the Asian financial turmoil in the early post-handover years. It survived SARS. Then came 2019's Black Riots, followed by US sanctions on Hong Kong officials in 2020 and the pandemic's hammer blow. Foreign capital fled in an American-orchestrated exodus, with much of it landing in Singapore.
Last February, Stephen Roach—Yale University senior fellow—wrote in the UK's Financial Times with a headline that said it all: "It pains me to say Hong Kong is over." Foreign investors don't just track economic growth when they assess Hong Kong. They watch the stock market. And over the past year, Hong Kong's miraculous stock market comeback has bankrupted the "Hong Kong is dead" theory.
Hong Kong's economy grew an estimated 3.2% in 2025—ranking it among the developed world's top performers. But the stock market performance was getting really interesting. Average daily turnover in the first 11 months hit HK$230.7 billion—a massive 43% jump compared to 2024's same period.
Record-Breaking Fundraising Wins
The Hong Kong Stock Exchange crushed it in 2025. A total of 119 new listings raised HK$285.8 billion—a staggering 220% year-on-year increase and the highest since 2021. According to KPMG's report, HKEX ranked first globally in fundraising. The New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq tied for second place. Looking ahead, HKEX's fundraising is estimated to reach HK$300-350 billion in 2026, keeping it among the world's top exchanges.
Sure, Mainland capital is investing in Hong Kong. But foreign capital's return has been the real game-changer behind the stock market's strong performance. According to fund industry insiders, what we're seeing now is only wave one—primarily hedge funds and other medium-to-short-term players. As Hong Kong's trading volumes swell and quality Mainland companies list here, the long-term foreign funds will gradually return. The outlook for Hong Kong stocks continues to look favorable.
America's narrative said Hong Kong's National Security Law would scare capital away. Reality proved exactly the opposite. Hong Kong's stable environment gave Chinese companies the confidence to list here. America's targeting of Chinese concept stocks listed on its exchanges was self-destruction—forcing quality Chinese companies to turn to Hong Kong for listing instead. This made Hong Kong's stock market bigger and stronger, compelling even bearish foreign capital to come back.
Beijing's Seal of Approval
President Xi's remarks when meeting Chief Executive John Lee during his duty visit to Beijing in mid-December reveal what work the central government values in Hong Kong. President Xi opened with praise for the Chief Executive's courage and initiative in leading the SAR government. He highlighted four key achievements: steadfast maintenance of national security, successful Legislative Council elections, proactive integration into national development, and achieving steady economic growth.
President Xi's assessment underscores Beijing's high recognition of Hong Kong's ability to do both—safeguard national security and develop the economy simultaneously. Some Hong Kong people believed that having transitioned "from chaos to governance and then to prosperity," the city should set aside national security to focus on economic development. Reality proved this view wrong. Hong Kong must strike a balance between these seemingly contradictory goals and advance on both fronts at once.
Look at Hong Kong's development over the past five years. The city emerged from Black Riots and the pandemic in 2021, achieving a strong rebound from the bottom in 2023. The return to normalcy brought revenge spending that temporarily elevated market sentiment.
But entering 2024, local consumption patterns underwent structural changes. Hong Kong people shopping across the border diverted local retail spending. The strong Hong Kong dollar—tracking the US dollar—and high interest rates suppressed economic activity, leading to structural adjustment.
By the second half of 2025, Hong Kong entered a phase of moderate recovery. The property market began stabilizing after its decline. With the US starting rate cuts in September, capital supply loosened. Hong Kong can continue along this recovery path in 2026—that's the estimate anyway.
Despite the optimism, Hong Kong people must keep working hard. The many vacant shops you see on the streets tell the story—retail economy pressure remains real. In 2024, Hong Kong's total retail sales value of HK$376.8 billion represented a 7.3% year-on-year decline. That's painful for the retail sector.
Retail's Reversal Ahead
Through October 2025, retail sales values remained comparable to the previous year. But consumption began recovering in the second half—retail sales value rose 3.8% in August, 6% in September, and 6.9% in October. 2025 showed an early decline followed by growth, with accelerating consumption momentum. Retail consumption is expected to reverse its decline in 2026.
During this retail transformation, we Hong Kong people must continue their efforts. Old businesses will still be eliminated—that's inevitable. Strategic adjustments are required. New opportunities must be pursued.
Bottom line: Hong Kong's economic performance in 2025 proves once again that the "Hong Kong is dead" theory dies—one more time. Hong Kong has weathered different shocks repeatedly in the past, emerging reborn each time like a phoenix from the ashes.
Lo Wing Hung
