Britain has just delivered a verdict that says more about politics than justice.
The UK government prosecuted Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office (London) administrative manager Yuen Chung-biu and former UK border officer Wai Chi-leung in an alleged espionage case. A jury found both men guilty, ruling that they had assisted a foreign intelligence agency in violation of the UK National Security Act.
China's response was direct and unsparing. The Chinese Embassy in the UK issued a statement condemning the case, accusing the British side of abusing the law, manipulating judicial procedures, and staging a politically motivated farce. The Embassy argued the prosecution was designed to shield and support anti-China, destabilising elements who had fled to the UK, while smearing China, the central government, and the Hong Kong SAR government. China has lodged solemn representations with the UK.
The case did not emerge from nowhere. It began with a series of incidents in which Hong Kong officials visiting the UK were attacked or harassed by protesters. Various acts of disruption and sabotage targeting the SAR government also took place. External security services were then hired to address those threats. The UK government seized on this to accuse the contractor Wai Chi-leung and liaison officer Yuen Chung-biu of collecting information on the protesters — framing that activity as assisting Chinese intelligence and thus breaching the UK National Security Act.
Throughout the trial, the evidence appeared extremely weak. The case against Yuen Chung-biu in particular was poorly substantiated, with a fragmented chain of evidence that failed to meet the criminal standard of proof — beyond reasonable doubt.
Yet a guilty verdict was never surprising. Because the case was decided by a jury, and jurors are naturally influenced by local public opinion, the outcome was almost foreordained. The courtroom became an extension of the political climate outside.
The entire case carries the unmistakable flavour of a political prosecution. Between states, even genuine espionage cases are usually resolved through diplomatic channels — not open court proceedings. By choosing public prosecution, the UK government sent a signal: discrediting China was the goal, not justice. The prosecution was initiated under the Conservative government, when anti-China sentiment in the UK ran especially high. Producing such a spectacle readily satisfied domestic political demands for a tough stance on China.
While the espionage case was drawing to a close, a second crisis was unfolding — this one in the bond market. On May 5, the yield on 30-year UK government bonds surged to 5.78%, its highest since 1998. The 10-year yield climbed to around 5.05%, approaching levels not seen since before the 2008 financial crisis. Rising yields mean falling bond prices. Investors were selling in panic, driving prices down and yields up.
Consider this: the yield spread between UK and German government bonds has widened to about 2 percentage points. Germany's economy is widely regarded as weak, yet the UK's bond market performance suggests the UK is now in an even worse position. Sovereign bonds reflect national creditworthiness, and the UK's standing — compared with the US, Germany, France, and Japan — is edging toward a critical threshold.
Two factors are driving this bond yield surge.
First: energy and inflation pressures. Ongoing tensions in the Middle East have driven energy prices sharply higher. In the 1970s, the UK could rely on North Sea oil to meet its own energy needs. But as those reserves decline, import dependence has grown steadily. By 2025, domestic energy production had fallen 68% from its 1999 peak. Net import dependence had reached 43.5%. Rising oil prices now feed directly into domestic inflation. The Bank of England forecasts inflation exceeding 6.2% by the first quarter of next year — and bond investors are voting with their feet, signalling a loss of confidence in UK credit.
Second: domestic political risk. In the same week that yields spiked, the UK was heading into local elections. Markets widely expected the ruling Labour Party to suffer heavy losses, while the far-right Reform UK was poised to rise. British politics is also fracturing — shifting from a two-party system into a five-party contest. Concerns that Prime Minister Keir Starmer's position could be undermined intensified risk aversion across markets, triggering large-scale bond sell-offs.
The UK economy has entered a precarious state. In 2016, Brexit — driven by Conservative leadership — set Britain on a course like a train derailing in slow motion. Ties with EU partners weakened on one side. On the other, US President Donald Trump pursued isolationism, treating the UK as expendable. The current Labour government has sought to improve relations with China, yet the lingering fallout from this espionage case — initiated under the previous administration — is likely to damage Sino-British relations regardless.
Britain is a textbook case of a country that puts politics in command, and this is where that path leads: marching step by step toward the edge of a cliff.
Lo Wing-hung
Bastille Commentary
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Trump has done it again — he has pushed back the negotiation deadline. This time, he did not even bother setting a new one. He said only that, at the request of mediator Pakistan, he agreed to extend the ceasefire with Iran until Tehran submits its proposal and completes the relevant consultations.
Trump has apparently grown tired of his own deadlines. So this time, he simply stopped making them. The reality is, a "deadline" that can be postponed indefinitely is not a deadline at all — and once that coercive power is gone, the other side has no reason to rush.
Trump is trapped. He has no clear path to victory if he fights, yet he is unwilling to make concessions for peace. On the military side, the original plan was to strike if no agreement was reached by the deadline — but the war has now dragged on for a month and a half. America knows its weapons and ammunition stockpiles are limited, while Iran appears to have an inexhaustible supply of missiles.
Without deploying ground troops, what real chance does the US have from long-range bombardment alone? And if ground troops are deployed, the risks are enormous — Afghanistan is a cautionary tale that needs no elaboration.
On the diplomatic front, Trump cannot stomach the conditions Iran has put forward. Caught in the middle with no way forward or back, he has become the butt of a "Donald's Art of War" joke. When Donald Trump himself does not know what his own strategy is, his adversaries certainly cannot figure it out either.
Trump has repeatedly insisted that the US and Iran are close to a deal — and the two sides have indeed narrowed their differences. But key sticking points remain unresolved. Three main areas of dispute have emerged.
First: The Strait of Hormuz
Iran's hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps demanded that the US first lift its blockade of Iranian vessels in the Strait of Hormuz before resuming negotiations. Trump refused. That is why the second round of talks never got off the ground.
On the question of future transit rights through the strait, Iranian sources revealed that the US proposed joint management of the waterway — a proposal Iran flatly rejected. Iran insists on retaining full control and claims the right to collect tolls from vessels passing through. Analysts suggest Iran is not simply fighting over symbolic sovereignty. Because the US has refused to offer any compensation for starting the war without justification, Iran is demanding toll revenues as a form of reparations.
Reports also suggest the US floated an alternative proposal: having Gulf states pay compensation to Iran instead. Trump is not one for principles — as long as America does not foot the bill, he would likely find that easier to accept. The question is whether the Gulf states are willing to play the role of the fall guy.
Second: Unfreezing Iranian Assets
Iran initially demanded the unfreezing of its assets as a precondition for talks, but later dropped that insistence. Iranian sources indicated that the US has agreed to release US$6 billion in frozen funds held in Qatar — but Iran is asking for US$20 billion. This appears to be the area where Washington is most willing to make concessions, though Trump has not moved ahead of a final agreement.
Third: Uranium Enrichment
This is the central sticking point. Both sides have drawn their red lines, and the two positions barely overlap. The US demands Iran completely abandon its nuclear programme; Iran refuses.
Trump has suggested that under the proposed ceasefire agreement, Iran would transfer its enriched uranium abroad, with both countries cooperating on a thorough inspection of Iran's uranium stockpile. Iran, however, has made clear it will not accept any proposal to remove enriched uranium from its territory. Iran insists it is not seeking to develop nuclear weapons — but maintains it has every right to continue enrichment activities on its own soil.
Talks had once moved into the stage of exchanging draft texts — a sign that both sides were already haggling over specific wording. The gaps may not be as wide as widely assumed; for instance, there are reportedly no major disagreements over lifting sanctions on Iran. But after the US doubled down on its insistence to blockade Iranian ports last Friday, relations deteriorated rapidly. Iran hardened its stance and became unwilling to return to the negotiating table at all.
Trump now stands frozen at a crossroads, unsure of which way to turn. Most observers believe continuing this war is deeply damaging to him. Since March, his approval ratings have collapsed across the board — every key policy area has simultaneously swung negative, and the declines have been steep. If the war drags on to the November midterm elections, Republicans face not only a very strong chance of losing control of the House, but potentially the Senate as well.
The latest polls, measured by net approval ratings on specific issues, tell a grim story. On "inflation and prices," Trump's net approval has plunged to minus 35 — an outright collapse. On "jobs and the economy," it has fallen to minus 20. On "foreign policy," it sits at minus 18. Across the board, his numbers have swung from positive to deeply negative — a clear harbinger of a Republican wipeout.
The military picture is no less bleak. With ammunition supplies running low, a US victory looks increasingly remote. Former CIA analyst Larry Johnson disclosed on a podcast that at an emergency White House meeting on April 18, an extraordinarily reckless proposal surfaced: Trump reportedly raised the idea of studying the use of nuclear weapons against Iran. General Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, immediately shot it down, saying the consequences would be unthinkable.
In ordinary times, such rumours would be dismissed outright. But in the Trump era, nothing is too outlandish to be real. With no viable military path to victory, there is no telling what desperate ideas might take hold. Trump has painted himself into a corner.
If America steps back, there is still room to breathe. The differences between the US and Iran are not as insurmountable as they appear. The key question is whether Washington is willing to make concessions — allowing Iran to retain a small quantity of enriched uranium on its soil, while demanding significant restrictions on its enrichment programme and accepting monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). That could be enough to get a deal done.
Whether Iran goes to war or to peace ultimately rests on a single decision by Trump.
Lo Wing-hung
