The United States today is undeniably far less impressive than it was 40 years ago.
Back in 1983, when I was in college, a political science class focused specifically on the US government’s successful decision-making during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Harvard professor Graham Allison, later renowned for his theory of Thucydides Trap - The Rise of Great Powers, published a detailed article analyzing how the US managed to resolve this severe crisis so swiftly.
In 1962, at the height of the US-Soviet Cold War, the Soviets planned to deploy ballistic missiles in Cuba, right next to the US, in response to America’s missile deployments in Italy and Turkey. Then-President John F. Kennedy boldly imposed a naval blockade on Cuba, showing extraordinary courage and resolve. His actions ultimately forced the Soviets to withdraw their nuclear missiles. Allison praised the US decision-making in that episode as a model of democracy combined with high efficiency.
Those were truly America’s golden years. Kennedy became president at 43, successfully defused the Cuban Missile Crisis, but was assassinated just a year later at the age of 45. The prevailing US view then was that socialist regimes produced only aging leadership and could never match the youthful energy and efficiency of the capitalist system.
Time has marched on. The country once led by young leaders is now locked in the hands of elders. President Donald Trump is 79, older than Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev when he died at 75—someone the US once criticized fiercely. Trump’s decision to launch a war against Iran is widely judged by scholars at home and abroad as a costly misstep.
Bloomberg reported on April 8 that Trump’s military action against the Iranian regime proved "a serious strategic failure." Rather than weakening rivals, it bolstered China and Russia, eroded America’s advantages, and ultimately positioned Iran as the strategic winner. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps remains intact, Iran keeps control over the Strait of Hormuz, and the US "failed to achieve any military objectives."
The New York Times published a detailed feature on April 7 titled "How Trump Pulled the US Into a War With Iran." The report uncovers the inner workings of the decision and shows how, amid internal disagreements and repeated warnings, Trump ultimately chose war based largely on intuition. White House reporters Jonathan Swan and Maggie Haberman tracked this process closely. They highlight a pivotal moment on February 11, when Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu visited the White House and aggressively pitched the plan to attack Iran in the White House Situation Room.
During a one-hour briefing, Netanyahu and Mossad chief David Barnea pressed Trump hard. They argued Iran was vulnerable to regime change and that a combined US-Israeli strike could topple the Islamic Republic. Netanyahu outlined what they saw as near-certain conditions for victory, including:
1. Destroying Iran’s ballistic missile program within weeks;
2. Weakening the Iranian regime enough to prevent it from blockading the Strait of Hormuz;
Third, the chance of Iran hitting US interests through neighboring countries was judged extremely low;
Fourth, street protests within Iran would flare again, and with Israeli intelligence agencies stirring things up, intense bombing could create an opening for Iranian opposition forces to topple the regime;
Fifth, Israel also suggested that Iranian Kurdish armed groups might cross from Iraq into Iran to open a ground front.
Trump responded at the time, saying, "Sounds good."
The day after the meeting—February 12—a briefing was held in the White House Situation Room with only US officials attending, who divided Netanyahu's proposals into four parts:
First, a decapitation strike—the assassination of Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei;
Second, to weaken Iran's missile projection capabilities and its threats to neighboring countries;
Third, to spark large-scale protests among the Iranian people;
Fourth, regime change, with a secular leader taking control of Iran.
US officials judged that the first two objectives could be achieved through American intelligence and military power. However, the third and fourth goals promoted by Netanyahu—mass protests and regime change—are divorced from reality.
CIA Director Ratcliffe called the "fantasy of regime change" absurd and laughable. Secretary of State Rubio bluntly dismissed it as "complete nonsense." The top military leader, Joint Chiefs Chairman Caine, told Trump, "In my experience, this is basically Israel’s usual play—they tend to exaggerate, but their plans aren’t always flawless."
However, Trump remained interested in the first two objectives: a decapitation strike and weakening Iran's military strength.
In the days that followed, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Caine presented Trump with a stark military assessment. He warned that a large-scale strike against Iran would severely deplete US weapons stockpiles, including interceptor missiles already strained by support for Israel and Ukraine. Caine also highlighted the risks of Iran blockading the Strait of Hormuz and the enormous challenges the US would face in securing the Gulf region.
Trump dismissed these warnings, convinced the Iranian regime would surrender before such consequences materialized. He was likely influenced by the previous year's US bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities, expecting this war to be just as brief.
Nevertheless, Trump was increasingly resolved to strike Iran. Meanwhile, peace talks between the US and Iran were still underway. The turning point came in late February, when new intelligence from US and Israeli agencies revealed that Iran’s supreme leader Khamenei and other senior officials would soon meet in a ground-level building. This would leave Khamenei fully exposed to an airstrike—an opportunity US and Israeli officials believed was fleeting and unlikely to recur.
On February 26, the White House Situation Room convened for a final discussion. Many expressed doubts about going to war, including Vice President Vance, who told Trump, “You know I think this is a bad idea, but if you want to do it, I’ll support you.” Joint Chiefs Chairman Caine withheld clear endorsement and focused on risk warnings. The strongest advocate was Defense Secretary Esper, who argued if the Iran issue is going to be resolved sooner or later, better to do it now. Ultimately, Trump made the strike decision impulsively, relying on his gut instinct.
The New York Times report exposes critical flaws in decision-making at the highest levels of the United States government. Although most advisors believed striking Iran was unwise, no one dared truly oppose Trump’s imperial-style leadership. Trump behaved like a stubborn, glory-seeking elder focused only on immediate gains—much like a retail investor chasing quick profits in the stock market. His choice dragged the US into a deep quagmire it still struggles to escape. Forty years ago, the US criticized socialist countries for flawed decision-making; today, those same issues have surfaced within America itself.
Lo Wing-hung
Bastille Commentary
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