China Forces America to Seek Peace – Trump Says nothing but Praises China on His Way Home

Trump's China visit is over. And there is no longer any doubt: China and the United States are a de facto G2 — two superpowers whose interactions shape the fate of the world. China's position has always been clear: come to talk, and you are welcome; come to fight, and that works too. In the end, it was Trump who came seeking China, opening the door to full bilateral dialogue and negotiations.

Part One: Defining the Relationship

China has firmly seized the initiative in defining Sino-American relations. The two countries have agreed on a new framework — building a "a constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability". That relationship encompasses positive stability with cooperation as the primary mode, healthy stability with bounded competition, normal stability with manageable differences, and durable stability with peace as the expectation. In short, competition exists — but stability is the central axis, steering both nations away from the Thucydides Trap and the prospect of war.

Professor Cui Hongjian of Beijing Foreign Studies University argued that, for too long, the absence of a clear definition for bilateral relations allowed the US side to interpret the relationship arbitrarily and without constraint. The new framework will have a significant impact on policy and behavioral norms. "Constructive" reflects China's long-held policy direction toward the US — avoiding conflict and confrontation while pursuing two-way engagement. "Strategic" reflects both nations' full recognition of the importance of the relationship; China-US ties have become the central axis of international relations, with many countries treating shifts in this relationship as the starting point for their own foreign policy.

Together, "constructive" and "strategic" ultimately point toward "stability." This helps the two countries move from peaceful coexistence toward a more predictable relationship — and from there, toward genuine opportunities for cooperation. With this directional framework set at the summit level, China-US relations now have a clear course with built-in constraints, preventing repeated setbacks or regression.

China views Trump as a businessman who intends to improve ties — but one who has been held back by rampant anti-China forces within the US, including voices inside the Republican Party itself, dragging Washington into petty provocations. By establishing this "constructive and strategically stable relationship" as the official framework, China now has grounds to demand that Washington rein in any American politician who crosses the line.

In the perspective of the US, endorsing this framework represents a major concession — one that effectively signals the US is no longer seeking confrontation with China. Secretary of State Rubio, in an interview with Fox News, described China as both America's greatest geopolitical challenge and its most important relationship to manage carefully. He acknowledged that China has long had its own plan — believing it will become the world's most powerful nation, surpassing the United States — and that China is executing on that plan. He then added that this is understandable, as long as China's rise does not come at America's expense. That statement amounts to an admission that suppressing China's rise is no longer a matter of US national policy.

Part Two: Exchanging Interests

China's primary focus is Taiwan. Ideally, Trump would personally declare his opposition to Taiwan independence; reducing US arms sales to Taiwan is also a substantive concern. Trump was visibly uncomfortable with the issue. When he visited the Temple of Heaven and reporters repeatedly pressed him on Taiwan, he responded only with: "The Temple of Heaven is incredibly beautiful." Rubio was equally evasive in his Fox News interview — saying only that China wants to reunify with Taiwan, but that what China really hopes for, in a perfect world, is Taiwan's voluntary unification with China, and that China hopes Taiwan will one day hold a referendum to return to China. Rubio was employing a carefully calibrated approach: saying things China would not dispute, in order to avoid making any direct statement on Taiwan.

As for the United States, it wants China to purchase American goods in large quantities — for example, 500 Boeing aircraft, along with substantial quantities of agricultural products and energy. China and the US plan to establish a trade committee, reportedly carving out USD 30 billion worth of goods on each side to be mutually exempted from tariffs. China's position is straightforward: the US kept the fentanyl tariffs, so China responded with counter-tariffs on American agricultural products and energy. American goods became so expensive that Chinese consumers could not afford them. If both sides mutually exempt tariffs on equal terms, China can increase its purchases of American goods.

On the Boeing deal, Trump revealed that China agreed to purchase 200 aircraft — quipping, "Boeing wanted to sell 150; China ended up buying 200." But that spin clearly failed to convince the market. Boeing had reportedly been hoping to sell 500 aircraft. When the news broke, Boeing's share price fell nearly 5%, reflecting the market's obvious disappointment with China's order. The two sides continue to spar over trade issues. The reality is that as long as the US is unwilling to make a clearer commitment on Taiwan, China has no reason to offer a sweeter deal.

Part Three: A De Facto G2

Trump's visit to China calls to mind Nixon's trip to Beijing in 1972. At the time, the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union was at its peak. Nixon chose to reconcile with China — the two countries effectively calling the shots together to contain the Soviet Union. I was a young child then, watching the spectacle of two countries that had been loudly trading insults — the US vowing to completely contain "Red China," China denouncing America as imperialist — suddenly see Nixon travel to Beijing to meet Chairman Mao. That is how realpolitik works: even sworn enemies can find room to cooperate.

Today, China does not want to give the impression that two superpowers are dictating the world's affairs, and still officially resists the "G2" label. But this de facto G2 dynamic is now impossible to reverse. The European Union has effectively disarmed itself. Russia has been bogged down by the war in Ukraine. In reality, only China and the United States have the power to shape the world's direction.

When China and the US ease tensions, the world stabilizes; when they clash, the world shudders. A China-US détente represents a historic choice for both countries — and especially for America. Trump's willingness to adopt a humble posture in Beijing speaks volumes. Just look at how he has humiliated world leaders in the White House — and you will understand just how deferential he was in Beijing.

Anti-China hawks — watching all of this unfold — found it hard to stomach. They latched onto the moment when President Xi shook hands with Rubio, repeatedly noting that China could not touch this sanctioned individual. China's view is entirely pragmatic. When Rubio was a senator railing against China, sanctions were naturally imposed. Now that he has put on the Secretary of State's hat and come to China seeking accommodation, China welcomes him. And the day he takes off that hat and becomes an anti-China figure again, China can always escalate the sanctions. Those who witnessed the handshake between Chairman Mao and Nixon know this amounts to nothing remarkable.

The self-congratulatory commentary from anti-China circles is nothing more than self-delusion. The reality is that even the proudest American president dared not provoke China — and humbly made the trip to Beijing. When Air Force One departed, it did not take Jimmy Lai with it. Those counting on America to come to their rescue will inevitably see that hope dashed. America only looks out for its own interests; these individuals are no more than pawns to be used and discarded. To put it bluntly: if China buys another 100 Boeing aircrafts, America would not say no to a few more dissidents being locked up.

The conclusion is clear: the world has changed. After eight years of trade war, China — through its unwavering resolve and formidable strength — has forced America to come to China seeking peace. And even as Air Force One lifted off, Trump still felt compelled to declare: "It's been an incredible visit. I think a lot of good has come of it."

Lo Wing-hung

Bastille Commentary

** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **

Trump arrives in Beijing with an empty hand. The US-Iran negotiations have hit a fresh stalemate, and any hope of sealing a peace deal before his state visit to China — which began this Wednesday, May 13 — is all but gone.

Iran refused to budge on treaty terms at the last minute. It went further — publicly declaring its willingness to back China's four-point proposal for peace and stability in the Middle East. On May 11, Iran's Ambassador to China, Fazli, posted on social media that Tehran supports the four principles: peaceful coexistence, state sovereignty, international rule of law, and coordinated development and security. By pivoting to China's foundational principles precisely when treaty language was being negotiated with Washington, Iran was playing the China card directly. The message to Trump was blunt: go ask Beijing to mediate.

Frustrated with nowhere to vent, Trump lashed out in all directions. The US State Department announced a reward of up to US$15 million for information on the financial mechanisms of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The US Treasury simultaneously announced unilateral sanctions on three individuals and nine companies — including four Hong Kong companies, four UAE companies, and one firm registered in Oman — on the grounds that they had assisted Iran in transporting oil to China.

A Reuters analysis put it plainly: with the sanctions timed to the eve of Trump's China trip, the US is almost certainly trying to "create leverage out of thin air." Washington's goal is to manufacture bargaining chips — enough pressure to push China into resolving the Iran deadlock and reopening the crucial Strait of Hormuz. "Creating leverage out of thin air" is the right diagnosis. The truth is, Trump has no real cards left to play.

The lead-up to the summit was itself revealing. The US broadcast Trump's mid-May visit to China well in advance, yet Beijing held off on any official confirmation. It was only after the White House announced the visit details on May 10 that China's Foreign Ministry finally confirmed, on Monday morning May 11, that Trump would undertake a state visit from May 13 to 15.

White House Principal Deputy Press Secretary Anna Kelly described the visit as carrying "enormous symbolic significance." She framed it around rebalancing US-China relations through reciprocity and fairness to restore America's economic independence. US officials also leaked to foreign wire agencies that the two sides are expected to announce multiple economic and trade cooperation arrangements. These include a dialogue mechanism to promote bilateral trade and investment, and the possible establishment of a "Trade Commission" and an "Investment Commission" — though both mechanisms still require further detailing before they can be implemented. The officials also floated the prospect of China announcing purchases of Boeing aircraft, US agricultural products, and energy.

These leaks amount to America's wish list. US officials hammered two themes above all else: China buying more US goods, and China maintaining its supply of rare earths. That is what Washington wants most.

China's priorities, by contrast, are sharply defined. Continuing to supply rare earths is manageable. Buying more Boeing aircraft, energy, and agricultural products is not a problem either — China holds ample foreign exchange reserves. The core demands are different: curbing Taiwan independence movement is a non-negotiable priority, reducing US arms sales to Taiwan is the central issue, and the US must cut out the petty manoeuvres it uses to suppress Chinese industry and maintain stable trade relations.

Diplomatic negotiations are ultimately a test of relative position, and China currently holds the upper hand. Compare this to Trump's previous state visit to China in November 2017. Then, Trump arrived riding high — barely nine months into his first term, full of momentum, on the cusp of launching his trade suppression campaign. His demand was sweeping: China must buy American goods in bulk and commit to staying in the low-to-mid-end manufacturing ecosystem, surrendering any ambition to compete in high-tech sectors. It was, in essence, a Chinese version of the Plaza Accord. China refused. Half a year later, the trade war began.

Nine years on, the US has not crushed China. Chinese industry continues to advance across high-technology sectors. Bringing a new Plaza Accord to Beijing is simply not an option for Trump today. Three specific details show that China is controlling the pace of this summit.

First, the US announced Trump's visit early, but China waited until three days before — May 11 — to make the confirmation public. Beyond signalling that Beijing is unhurried while Washington is not, the delay carried real leverage: until the announcement was made, plans could always change.

Second, China's Ministry of Commerce announced on May 10 that Chinese and US officials would hold economic and trade consultations in South Korea on May 12 and 13 — the day before and the day of Trump's arrival in China. In past US presidential visits, all substantive issues would have been resolved weeks or months beforehand, leaving the visit itself as a celebration and signing ceremony. Holding a working economic meeting in a third country on the eve of the summit signals that core issues remain unresolved. The more eagerly US officials leak optimistic talking points, the more their lack of confidence shows.

Third, the US-Iran war is swaying the entire equation. Washington has managed only a temporary ceasefire — a formal peace treaty remains out of reach. China arranged for Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to visit Beijing on May 5, listening to Tehran's position and showing Iran a measure of respect. With the US now heavily dependent on China to broker a peace agreement, Trump enters the summit as a supplicant — and that dependence makes him even more passive.

Trump's original script read like a conquest narrative. He first invaded Venezuela, captured President Nicolás Maduro, and took control of Venezuelan oil resources. He then attacked Iran, killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and aimed to control Iran's oil supply as well — arriving in China as a conqueror on a winning streak. But Trump badly miscalculated Iran's capacity to counter-attack. The heroic script collapsed into farce. Arriving in Beijing humiliated and empty-handed, Trump will find that China isn't losing any sleep over it — when the storm hits, Beijing doesn't flinch.

Lo Wing-hung