Trump arrives in Beijing with an empty hand. The US-Iran negotiations have hit a fresh stalemate, and any hope of sealing a peace deal before his state visit to China — which began this Wednesday, May 13 — is all but gone.
Iran refused to budge on treaty terms at the last minute. It went further — publicly declaring its willingness to back China's four-point proposal for peace and stability in the Middle East. On May 11, Iran's Ambassador to China, Fazli, posted on social media that Tehran supports the four principles: peaceful coexistence, state sovereignty, international rule of law, and coordinated development and security. By pivoting to China's foundational principles precisely when treaty language was being negotiated with Washington, Iran was playing the China card directly. The message to Trump was blunt: go ask Beijing to mediate.
Frustrated with nowhere to vent, Trump lashed out in all directions. The US State Department announced a reward of up to US$15 million for information on the financial mechanisms of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The US Treasury simultaneously announced unilateral sanctions on three individuals and nine companies — including four Hong Kong companies, four UAE companies, and one firm registered in Oman — on the grounds that they had assisted Iran in transporting oil to China.
A Reuters analysis put it plainly: with the sanctions timed to the eve of Trump's China trip, the US is almost certainly trying to "create leverage out of thin air." Washington's goal is to manufacture bargaining chips — enough pressure to push China into resolving the Iran deadlock and reopening the crucial Strait of Hormuz. "Creating leverage out of thin air" is the right diagnosis. The truth is, Trump has no real cards left to play.
The lead-up to the summit was itself revealing. The US broadcast Trump's mid-May visit to China well in advance, yet Beijing held off on any official confirmation. It was only after the White House announced the visit details on May 10 that China's Foreign Ministry finally confirmed, on Monday morning May 11, that Trump would undertake a state visit from May 13 to 15.
White House Principal Deputy Press Secretary Anna Kelly described the visit as carrying "enormous symbolic significance." She framed it around rebalancing US-China relations through reciprocity and fairness to restore America's economic independence. US officials also leaked to foreign wire agencies that the two sides are expected to announce multiple economic and trade cooperation arrangements. These include a dialogue mechanism to promote bilateral trade and investment, and the possible establishment of a "Trade Commission" and an "Investment Commission" — though both mechanisms still require further detailing before they can be implemented. The officials also floated the prospect of China announcing purchases of Boeing aircraft, US agricultural products, and energy.
These leaks amount to America's wish list. US officials hammered two themes above all else: China buying more US goods, and China maintaining its supply of rare earths. That is what Washington wants most.
China's priorities, by contrast, are sharply defined. Continuing to supply rare earths is manageable. Buying more Boeing aircraft, energy, and agricultural products is not a problem either — China holds ample foreign exchange reserves. The core demands are different: curbing Taiwan independence movement is a non-negotiable priority, reducing US arms sales to Taiwan is the central issue, and the US must cut out the petty manoeuvres it uses to suppress Chinese industry and maintain stable trade relations.
Diplomatic negotiations are ultimately a test of relative position, and China currently holds the upper hand. Compare this to Trump's previous state visit to China in November 2017. Then, Trump arrived riding high — barely nine months into his first term, full of momentum, on the cusp of launching his trade suppression campaign. His demand was sweeping: China must buy American goods in bulk and commit to staying in the low-to-mid-end manufacturing ecosystem, surrendering any ambition to compete in high-tech sectors. It was, in essence, a Chinese version of the Plaza Accord. China refused. Half a year later, the trade war began.
Nine years on, the US has not crushed China. Chinese industry continues to advance across high-technology sectors. Bringing a new Plaza Accord to Beijing is simply not an option for Trump today. Three specific details show that China is controlling the pace of this summit.
First, the US announced Trump's visit early, but China waited until three days before — May 11 — to make the confirmation public. Beyond signalling that Beijing is unhurried while Washington is not, the delay carried real leverage: until the announcement was made, plans could always change.
Second, China's Ministry of Commerce announced on May 10 that Chinese and US officials would hold economic and trade consultations in South Korea on May 12 and 13 — the day before and the day of Trump's arrival in China. In past US presidential visits, all substantive issues would have been resolved weeks or months beforehand, leaving the visit itself as a celebration and signing ceremony. Holding a working economic meeting in a third country on the eve of the summit signals that core issues remain unresolved. The more eagerly US officials leak optimistic talking points, the more their lack of confidence shows.
Third, the US-Iran war is swaying the entire equation. Washington has managed only a temporary ceasefire — a formal peace treaty remains out of reach. China arranged for Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to visit Beijing on May 5, listening to Tehran's position and showing Iran a measure of respect. With the US now heavily dependent on China to broker a peace agreement, Trump enters the summit as a supplicant — and that dependence makes him even more passive.
Trump's original script read like a conquest narrative. He first invaded Venezuela, captured President Nicolás Maduro, and took control of Venezuelan oil resources. He then attacked Iran, killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and aimed to control Iran's oil supply as well — arriving in China as a conqueror on a winning streak. But Trump badly miscalculated Iran's capacity to counter-attack. The heroic script collapsed into farce. Arriving in Beijing humiliated and empty-handed, Trump will find that China isn't losing any sleep over it — when the storm hits, Beijing doesn't flinch.
Lo Wing-hung
Bastille Commentary
** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **
China envisions a world in harmony. Nations talk through their differences instead of fighting them out, and the rising tides lift all boats.
On June 18, the British Financial Times republished an article by Bridgewater Associates founder Ray Dalio, titled "China's Tribute System and the New World Order." Dalio writes that earlier this year he spent a month in Asia, meeting with senior policymakers from China and across the region. He returned convinced that the global order is undergoing a profound shift.
Two developments stand out.
First, Washington's handling of Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has left Asian leaders broadly skeptical about whether the United States is truly willing to bear the costs of war.
Second, China is generating enormous wealth through exports. Its companies and banks are piling up vast capital surpluses. That buildup is pushing the RMB higher and driving its wider use in trade and financial transactions. China's investors and capital markets are emerging as genuine rivals to their American counterparts.
Dalio then argues that, having visited China over 42 years, understanding China's worldview is essential. That worldview, he says, is rooted in Confucian culture, the tributary system, and Sun Tzu-style strategic thinking.
China's historical lessons matter just as much. During the century of national humiliation, foreign powers seized vast swathes of Chinese territory and exploited its people. A lesson seared into China's psychology and strategic outlook.
The tribute system Dalio refers to describes an order between states built on explicit hierarchical roles: not one of equality, but one that openly acknowledges superior and subordinate relationships. He argues that China's leaders do not seek to build an empire to control other nations, because doing so would be inefficient.
The Western approach, Dalio argues, has always relied on war to seize territory and impose control. The primary reason why the United States maintains 700 to 800 military bases across 80 countries. China, by contrast, has only one overseas military base. Dalio even interprets the stream of foreign leaders who visited China over the past six months as a sign of willingness to forge ties with China akin to tributary allegiance.
Dalio gets some things right. China does indeed practice "winning without fighting" — one need only observe how President Xi has handled his dealings with Trump to see this in action. But China has no desire to build a tribute system. Such feudal imperial mindset is fundamentally at odds with the modernizing vision of China's current leadership.
Dalio's use of the tribute system as a framework for understanding China's approach to international relations does have roots in Western political science and international relations theory. Two theories are most frequently cited.
Finlandization Theory
The term "Finlandization" originated in West German political circles during the Cold War. Western strategists now routinely invoke it as a modern analogue for a "neo-tribute system."
The concept is straightforward. A smaller nation, facing an overwhelming neighbor, quietly abandons any foreign policy that might provoke it. In return, the powerful neighbor leaves its sovereignty and economy intact. Survival, not pride, drives the bargain.
Many Western hawks argue that China's economic diplomacy has a hidden agenda. The Belt and Road Initiative, they contend, is the primary vehicle. Its true purpose, they say, is to "Finlandize" neighboring countries and even Europe into a modern-day form of tribute extraction.
The Tianxia (All-Under-Heaven) Framework
Western scholars specializing in East Asia — such as Brantly Womack — frequently bring the ancient Chinese concept of tianxia (天下, "all under heaven") into Western theoretical discourse.
The core argument cuts to a fundamental divide. The West champions the Westphalian system, built on the absolute equality of sovereign states. The East, by contrast, emphasizes "relationalism." International politics is viewed as a web of asymmetric but reciprocal relationships. Proximity, hierarchy, and mutual obligation matter more than legal equality.
These scholars argue that China's vision of a new world order is not built on legal contracts binding nations together. It is defined by how close, or how distant, each country's relationship with Beijing actually is. Precisely what Dalio describes as "superiors and subordinates acknowledging their relative positions, with pressure applied through harmony and strategic acumen."
These two Western interpretations of China's supposed tributary mentality represent two distinct schools of thought.
The first, the realist school, leans critical, viewing China as simply using repackaged language to expand its sphere of influence.
The second school is cultural-historical in its approach, and it takes a more sympathetic view. It accepts that China operates from a security logic that is genuinely different from the West's. It also holds that China's preference for non-violent, coercion-free order is real. The condition is simple. Other nations must satisfy China's cultural-psychological need to “save face, earn respect, and occupy a central role”. Meet that need, and China will choose harmony over confrontation every time.
Alas, neither of these Western political theories can adequately explain China as it actually exists today. China has put forward the concept of “a community with a shared future for mankind", as the strategic foundation of its foreign relations. Modern China's external policy differs fundamentally from the ancient tribute system in two key respects.
Asymmetric Reciprocity
China advocates a correct approach to justice and interests — placing righteousness before profit. It extends unilateral tariff exemptions to the vast majority of African nations, helping them export more goods to China. It has also funded the construction of substantial infrastructure on their behalf and written off portions of their debt.
Such are the actions of a responsible great power. Having grown prosperous itself, China hopes to extend the same opportunity to other developing nations.
Sovereign Equality
The tribute system's defining characteristic is an unequal ruler-subject relationship. The vision of "A Community of Shared Future for Mankind," by contrast, is grounded in the legal principle enshrined in the UN Charter: the absolute equality of sovereign states and non-interference in internal affairs.
This differs from the ancient tribute system, which demands the political submission of weaker states. A framework built on international treaties rather than bilateral relationships.
Western political scientists — even those sympathetic China-watchers with deep understanding of the country — tend to characterize China's leaders as driven by a need to "save face, earn respect, and occupy a central role."
In reality, those three descriptions fit US President Trump far more aptly. It is American leadership, not Chinese, that insists on remaining the supreme superpower, the center of the world.
Consider the controversy in which Trump claimed that Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni had "begged" to take a photo with him at the G7 summit, only for Italy to flatly deny the allegation and subsequently cancel its foreign minister's visit to the United States.
Clearly, it is not Beijing that cannot afford to look small.
Americans have a habit of projecting their own impulses onto others. Since US GDP surpassed Britain's in 1914, America has spent over a century constructing a system of asymmetric global power dependency centered on itself. Now that this hegemony is showing cracks, America projects its own image onto China.
China does not need other nations to come and pay tribute. It simply seeks to build a peaceful, mutually beneficial new world.
Lo Wing-hung
