The most dramatic moment of Trump's China visit didn't happen in Beijing. It happened after he left.
During Trump's tour of the Temple of Heaven, reporters pressed him repeatedly on Taiwan. He deflected every question with a single line: "China is beautiful."
But once his visit concluded on May 15, the evasion ended. That evening, Foreign Minister Wang Yi summarized the visit with a pointed declaration: "We sensed that the US side understands China's position on Taiwan, takes China's concerns seriously, and — like the international community — does not recognize or accept Taiwan moving toward independence." At the time, Wang Yi's words seemed like a one-sided claim. Then Trump confirmed every word.
Fox News released an interview on May 16 in which anchor Bret Baier put the question bluntly: "After meeting with Xi Jinping, should people in Taiwan feel more safe or less safe?" Trump's answer was telling. "Neutral. This has been going on for years," he said. Then came the pivot. "I will say this: I'm not looking to have somebody go independent. And, you know, we're supposed to travel 9,500 miles to fight a war. I'm not looking for that."
Trump went further. "I want them to cool down. I want China to cool down. We don't want war. If you kept it the way it is, I think China is [going to] be OK with that. But we're not looking to have somebody say, ‘Let's go independent because the United States is backing us.'"
These remarks mark a significant break from decades of US policy. Washington had long maintained strategic ambiguity on Taiwan — avoiding direct comment on independence and simply calling for the status quo to be preserved. Trump's statement differs on two fronts. First, he explicitly said the US does not want to see Taiwan move toward independence and does not support it. Second, he made clear the US does not want to fight a war over Taiwan.
Arms sales proved equally contentious. Aboard Air Force One after departing Beijing, reporters raised the USD 14 billion arms sale to Taiwan. Trump said the US would consult "the people currently governing Taiwan" before making a decision soon. He did not mention Lai Ching-te by name — referring to him only as "the people currently governing Taiwan."
A reporter pressed back. Under the assurances President Reagan gave Taiwan in 1982, the US committed not to consult China on arms sales to Taiwan — yet that was precisely what appeared to be happening. Trump was unapologetic. "1982 was a long time ago," he said. "I certainly mentioned the arms sales to Taiwan with President Xi — we did discuss it, obviously. That's very detailed. And I'll make a decision."
Trump's Taiwan stance carries implications on several levels. The first is choreography. Trump waited until he had left Beijing before publicly opposing Taiwan independence — avoiding the awkward spectacle of being hounded by reporters in China about abandoning Taiwan. The timing appears coordinated between Washington and Beijing in advance. That explains why Wang Yi pre-announced that "the US does not recognize or accept Taiwan moving toward independence." Wang Yi said it first; Trump confirmed it after.
The second implication is commercial. Trump is a businessman, and his opposition to Taiwan independence is a bargaining chip for greater trade concessions. Both sides announced a trade deal and the establishment of a "Trade Council" to manage bilateral commerce — yet China has yet to publicize any figure for purchases of American goods. Beijing is holding back that announcement, waiting for Trump to take a definitive stance on Taiwan and resolve the arms sale question. Trump delivered his part. The US can now expect its reward.
The third implication is strategic — and its impact is immediate. Trump's remarks have dramatically narrowed the space for Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progressive Party to pursue independence. By saying he doesn't want to fight a war over Taiwan, Trump is effectively declaring: "Taiwan's problems are not my problems." That position runs directly counter to Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae's assertion that "a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency". The fallout does not stop with the pro-independence camp in Taiwan. Takaichi Sanae now finds herself in an extremely awkward and vulnerable position.
The US today follows an "America First" policy — an isolationist course in which American interests come before all else. Those who serve as Washington's pawns will ultimately find themselves discarded. In today's world, it is China and the United States who call the shots. China may not want to be part of a "G2" arrangement, but in reality, that is precisely what it has become.
Lo Wing-hung
Bastille Commentary
** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **
Trump's China visit is over. And there is no longer any doubt: China and the United States are a de facto G2 — two superpowers whose interactions shape the fate of the world. China's position has always been clear: come to talk, and you are welcome; come to fight, and that works too. In the end, it was Trump who came seeking China, opening the door to full bilateral dialogue and negotiations.
Part One: Defining the Relationship
China has firmly seized the initiative in defining Sino-American relations. The two countries have agreed on a new framework — building a "a constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability". That relationship encompasses positive stability with cooperation as the primary mode, healthy stability with bounded competition, normal stability with manageable differences, and durable stability with peace as the expectation. In short, competition exists — but stability is the central axis, steering both nations away from the Thucydides Trap and the prospect of war.
Professor Cui Hongjian of Beijing Foreign Studies University argued that, for too long, the absence of a clear definition for bilateral relations allowed the US side to interpret the relationship arbitrarily and without constraint. The new framework will have a significant impact on policy and behavioral norms. "Constructive" reflects China's long-held policy direction toward the US — avoiding conflict and confrontation while pursuing two-way engagement. "Strategic" reflects both nations' full recognition of the importance of the relationship; China-US ties have become the central axis of international relations, with many countries treating shifts in this relationship as the starting point for their own foreign policy.
Together, "constructive" and "strategic" ultimately point toward "stability." This helps the two countries move from peaceful coexistence toward a more predictable relationship — and from there, toward genuine opportunities for cooperation. With this directional framework set at the summit level, China-US relations now have a clear course with built-in constraints, preventing repeated setbacks or regression.
China views Trump as a businessman who intends to improve ties — but one who has been held back by rampant anti-China forces within the US, including voices inside the Republican Party itself, dragging Washington into petty provocations. By establishing this "constructive and strategically stable relationship" as the official framework, China now has grounds to demand that Washington rein in any American politician who crosses the line.
In the perspective of the US, endorsing this framework represents a major concession — one that effectively signals the US is no longer seeking confrontation with China. Secretary of State Rubio, in an interview with Fox News, described China as both America's greatest geopolitical challenge and its most important relationship to manage carefully. He acknowledged that China has long had its own plan — believing it will become the world's most powerful nation, surpassing the United States — and that China is executing on that plan. He then added that this is understandable, as long as China's rise does not come at America's expense. That statement amounts to an admission that suppressing China's rise is no longer a matter of US national policy.
Part Two: Exchanging Interests
China's primary focus is Taiwan. Ideally, Trump would personally declare his opposition to Taiwan independence; reducing US arms sales to Taiwan is also a substantive concern. Trump was visibly uncomfortable with the issue. When he visited the Temple of Heaven and reporters repeatedly pressed him on Taiwan, he responded only with: "The Temple of Heaven is incredibly beautiful." Rubio was equally evasive in his Fox News interview — saying only that China wants to reunify with Taiwan, but that what China really hopes for, in a perfect world, is Taiwan's voluntary unification with China, and that China hopes Taiwan will one day hold a referendum to return to China. Rubio was employing a carefully calibrated approach: saying things China would not dispute, in order to avoid making any direct statement on Taiwan.
As for the United States, it wants China to purchase American goods in large quantities — for example, 500 Boeing aircraft, along with substantial quantities of agricultural products and energy. China and the US plan to establish a trade committee, reportedly carving out USD 30 billion worth of goods on each side to be mutually exempted from tariffs. China's position is straightforward: the US kept the fentanyl tariffs, so China responded with counter-tariffs on American agricultural products and energy. American goods became so expensive that Chinese consumers could not afford them. If both sides mutually exempt tariffs on equal terms, China can increase its purchases of American goods.
On the Boeing deal, Trump revealed that China agreed to purchase 200 aircraft — quipping, "Boeing wanted to sell 150; China ended up buying 200." But that spin clearly failed to convince the market. Boeing had reportedly been hoping to sell 500 aircraft. When the news broke, Boeing's share price fell nearly 5%, reflecting the market's obvious disappointment with China's order. The two sides continue to spar over trade issues. The reality is that as long as the US is unwilling to make a clearer commitment on Taiwan, China has no reason to offer a sweeter deal.
Part Three: A De Facto G2
Trump's visit to China calls to mind Nixon's trip to Beijing in 1972. At the time, the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union was at its peak. Nixon chose to reconcile with China — the two countries effectively calling the shots together to contain the Soviet Union. I was a young child then, watching the spectacle of two countries that had been loudly trading insults — the US vowing to completely contain "Red China," China denouncing America as imperialist — suddenly see Nixon travel to Beijing to meet Chairman Mao. That is how realpolitik works: even sworn enemies can find room to cooperate.
Today, China does not want to give the impression that two superpowers are dictating the world's affairs, and still officially resists the "G2" label. But this de facto G2 dynamic is now impossible to reverse. The European Union has effectively disarmed itself. Russia has been bogged down by the war in Ukraine. In reality, only China and the United States have the power to shape the world's direction.
When China and the US ease tensions, the world stabilizes; when they clash, the world shudders. A China-US détente represents a historic choice for both countries — and especially for America. Trump's willingness to adopt a humble posture in Beijing speaks volumes. Just look at how he has humiliated world leaders in the White House — and you will understand just how deferential he was in Beijing.
Anti-China hawks — watching all of this unfold — found it hard to stomach. They latched onto the moment when President Xi shook hands with Rubio, repeatedly noting that China could not touch this sanctioned individual. China's view is entirely pragmatic. When Rubio was a senator railing against China, sanctions were naturally imposed. Now that he has put on the Secretary of State's hat and come to China seeking accommodation, China welcomes him. And the day he takes off that hat and becomes an anti-China figure again, China can always escalate the sanctions. Those who witnessed the handshake between Chairman Mao and Nixon know this amounts to nothing remarkable.
The self-congratulatory commentary from anti-China circles is nothing more than self-delusion. The reality is that even the proudest American president dared not provoke China — and humbly made the trip to Beijing. When Air Force One departed, it did not take Jimmy Lai with it. Those counting on America to come to their rescue will inevitably see that hope dashed. America only looks out for its own interests; these individuals are no more than pawns to be used and discarded. To put it bluntly: if China buys another 100 Boeing aircrafts, America would not say no to a few more dissidents being locked up.
The conclusion is clear: the world has changed. After eight years of trade war, China — through its unwavering resolve and formidable strength — has forced America to come to China seeking peace. And even as Air Force One lifted off, Trump still felt compelled to declare: "It's been an incredible visit. I think a lot of good has come of it."
Lo Wing-hung
