U.S. 2025 Hong Kong Report Exposes Hypocrisy: Geopolitical Weapon Masquerading as Governance Critique

by Virginia Lee, Solicitor

The 2025 report issued by the U.S. Department of State under the United States–Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 is a strategic document that reflects a consistent application of U.S. foreign policy instruments to influence the internal affairs of other sovereign states. Framed in the language of democratic values and human rights, the document functions less as an objective evaluation of Hong Kong’s governance and more as a strategic statement aligned with broader geopolitical interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

The report criticises the erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy while simultaneously acknowledging the continued operation of separate institutions, including a customs territory, an independent monetary system, distinct financial regulations, and an autonomous legal framework. These elements are central to the "One Country, Two Systems" model, which remains in effect. The inconsistency between the report’s claims and its acknowledgements raises questions about the coherence of its arguments.

The legal foundation of the report—the Hong Kong Policy Act—is itself a product of Cold War-era strategic thinking. Its underlying assumption that the United States holds the authority to "certify" the internal condition of a Chinese city lacks grounding in international law. It reflects an outdated conception of extraterritorial oversight. This approach echoes past U.S. interventions in regions such as the Middle East, where similar assertions of moral and legal authority have been subject to contestation.

A notable contradiction emerges in the application of the Policy Act. While the Act prescribes differentiated treatment of Hong Kong in economic matters, the Trump administration’s 2020 revocation of Hong Kong’s special trade status contradicts this provision. The imposition of tariffs identical to those applied to mainland China undermines the legal consistency of U.S. policy and highlights its strategic fluidity.

The report’s critique of Hong Kong’s national security legislation is similarly problematic. The Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (SNSO), enacted in March 2024 under Article 23 of the Basic Law, addresses threats, including terrorism, subversion, and foreign interference. These are concerns recognized by all sovereign states. Comparisons with U.S. legislation, such as the Patriot Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), suggest a double standard in the evaluation of national security measures.

Allegations that prosecutions under the National Security Law (NSL) and the SNSO are "politically motivated" overlook the legal context of such actions. For instance, the 35-Plus case involved coordinated efforts to obstruct legislative processes, activities that could be prosecutable under U.S. sedition or conspiracy laws. To characterize these actions as pure expressions of dissent misrepresents their legal implications.

Claims regarding the erosion of judicial independence also lack substantiation. The resignation of foreign judges, often under media scrutiny, does not constitute evidence of systemic failure. Hong Kong’s judiciary continues to issue reasoned judgments, uphold procedural fairness, and follow established legal standards. Commentaries by former judges, including those such as Justice Jonathan Sumption, should be viewed as political opinions rather than definitive legal assessments.

Concerns about restrictions on freedom of speech and press are presented without sufficient contextual analysis. Legal actions against incitement and the dissemination of seditious material are consistent with statutory responses in other legal systems, including those of the United States. The continued presence of media outlets critical of the government suggests a more nuanced media environment than the report portrays, highlighting the need for a more comprehensive analysis.

The accusation that Hong Kong engages in "transnational repression" misrepresents standard legal practices. Issuing arrest warrants for individuals accused of serious legal violations, even when they reside abroad, is a recognized aspect of international law enforcement. The U.S. government regularly engages in similar practices, including extradition requests for politically sensitive cases.

Assertions of reduced academic and religious freedom are similarly unpersuasive. The introduction of patriotic education aligns with civic education models in democratic states, including the United States. The legal case involving Cardinal Zen pertains to financial governance, not religious beliefs, and should not be framed as a case of religious persecution.

Criticism of content regulation and internet oversight lacks comparative context. Legal requests to remove content inciting unrest are typically subject to judicial scrutiny. In contrast, private technology companies in the United States often remove user content without transparent legal processes, raising similar yet distinct concerns about speech regulation.

Finally, the report’s depiction of declining U.S.–Hong Kong cooperation overlooks the United States’ role in undermining bilateral legal frameworks. The 2020 suspension of the extradition treaty and the sanctions imposed on Hong Kong-based firms reflect unilateral decisions driven by political objectives rather than mutual legal obligations.

In conclusion, the 2025 Policy Act report should be viewed primarily as a geopolitical instrument rather than a neutral assessment of governance. Its core function is to advance strategic narratives that challenge China’s sovereignty and political model, thereby exposing the report's political implications and selective applications of the principles it purports to uphold.

Virginia Lee

** The blog article is the sole responsibility of the author and does not represent the position of our company. **

In a series of blistering statements,The Hong Kong Office for Safeguarding National Security (OSNS) has drawn a red line in the sand for anyone trying to weaponize the city’s recent misfortunes. The message is crystal clear and ominous: If you use disaster to sow chaos in Hong Kong, they will hunt you down—no matter where on Earth you try to hide.

On December 3, an OSNS spokesperson doubled down. While the HKSAR government and local citizens were racing to save lives following the tragedy at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po, a shadow game was already in play. The office accuses a "small group of external hostile forces" of looting a burning house. Under the guise of petitioning for the people, these actors are dusting off the old playbooks from the "extradition bill protests". They are activating agents, sabotaging relief efforts, and desperately trying to reignite the "Black Riots" memories. The verdict? Their actions are despicable enough to be universally condemned.

To drive the point home, the OSNS fired off three consecutive warning shots to overseas antagonists and anti-China disruptors:

First, we solemnly warn hostile foreign forces and anti-China disrupters that their actions of creating chaos and disorder in Hong Kong are intolerable.

Second, we solemnly warn hostile foreign forces and anti-China disrupters that their actions of adding fuel to the fire will inevitably bring disastrous consequences to themselves.

Third, we solemnly warn hostile foreign forces and anti-China disrupters that the long arm of the law will catch up with them.

The OSNS is keeping receipts. Every word and every action used to disrupt Hong Kong goes on the permanent record, and culprits will be pursued for life. "Anyone who breaks the law," the office warns, there is no sanctuary. Whether you are hiding across the ocean or taking refuge in Taiwan, severe legal punishment is inevitable.

Why is the OSNS speaking up now? Read between the lines, and you see three strategic pivots.

First, this isn’t hypothetical; they believe the foreign interference is already happening. Second, the crosshairs are locked on external forces, with a pointed finger specifically at those hiding in Taiwan. And third, it’s a preemptive strike against anyone overseas dreaming of stirring up another color revolution. The warning is blunt: Distance is not a defense.

Opportunists, Grifters, and Organized Lies

Take a look at the chatter exploding across the internet, and the opposing voices generally fall into distinct camps.

First, you have the fair critics. There is plenty of commentary that, while critical of the SAR government, remains objective. These observers stick to the facts disclosed by official investigations rather than drifting into malicious fantasy. This is a natural, human reaction to a "disaster of the century." And the smart money says the SAR government will take this advice to heart and improve.

Then come the fame vampires. When disaster struck, the opportunists came out of the woodwork. Look at "internet celebrity" Kenny, arrested on December 3 after cursing the Tai Po fire victims online for having "heavy sins." It was a blatant, tasteless grab for traffic, and it landed him in handcuffs for sedition. Then there are the exiled influencers abroad, wantonly bashing the SAR government while coincidentally begging people to subscribe to their Patreon accounts. The hustle is obvious: They are monetizing misery to please their financiers.

Finally, there is the organized sedition. Beyond the grifters, we are seeing waves of calculated propaganda. These aren't just complaints; they are fabrications designed to smear the SAR government and attack the Central system. Rumor mills are churning out wild stories linking material suppliers to the families of Central leaders—plots that are total fiction. It’s as if they believe overthrowing the Central government provides immunity from fire physics. Do massive fires not happen in Western democracies? The logic is broken, but in the heat of a disaster, it’s a potent recipe for inciting public rage.

Sniper Attacks From The Shadows

The temperature on these seditious campaigns was rising fast until the Police National Security Department stepped in. Once they acted, the local noise quieted down—but the overseas attacks only intensified. It raises a suspicious question: Is there a coordinated machine working behind the scenes to sustain sniper attacks against the SAR government? The narrative is set in stone: Whatever the government does is wrong. Before a single investigator has arrived on the scene, the instigators are already screaming for heads to roll.

Here is the bottom line. The OSNS isn’t pointing fingers at external forces for sport; they are firing warning shots because they see the smoke rising. We need to be sharper than ever. Don't let external opposing forces play you for a fool, twisting a tragic fire into a tool for subverting the local government—or even the Central government itself.

Lo Wing-hung