by Dr. Celeste Lo, Solicitor
In my recent research, I uncovered a noteworthy U.S. district court decision that directly engaged with Hong Kong’s National Security Law (NSL) and related judicial determinations (Chung Chui Wan v. Michel Dale Debolt, No. 20-cv-3233, 2021 WL 1733500 (C.D. Ill. May 3, 2021)). This ruling presents significant jurisprudential implications that warrant careful examination, which this analysis will explore.
The case involved a child custody dispute under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, implemented in the U.S. via the International Child Abduction Remedies Act. The respondent (father) had unilaterally removed the children from Hong Kong to the U.S. in August 2020. The petitioner (mother) sought the children’s mandatory return under the Convention, while the father invoked three exceptions on the grounds of “age and maturity” (Article 13), “grave risk” (Article 13) and “protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Article 20) to oppose the petition.
Regarding the “grave risk” defence, the father argued that the children would face a grave risk of harm because Hong Kong would not adequately protect the children after the passage of the NSL. Moreover, the NSL had unleashed a psychological war, and the children would have to live under the culture of fear and silence instilled by the NSL.
In evaluating the father’s claim, the court scrutinised the legal threshold for “grave risk”. It emphasised that a generalised risk of violence in a jurisdiction was not enough. The potential harm to the children must be severe, and the legal of risk and danger required to trigger the “grave risk” exception had consistently been held to be very high. The gravity of a risk involved not only the probability of harm, but also the magnitude of harm if the probability materialised.
The U.S. court thus reviewed Hong Kong’s constitutional and legal framework post-1997, including the “One Country, Two Systems” principle, the large-scale protests in 2019, and the NSL’s enactment. Notably, it cited the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal’s ruling in HKSAR v. Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3, which affirmed that the rights, freedoms and values in the Basic Law and the Bill of Rights [Ordinance] were to be protected and adhered to in applying the NSL. The court therefore found no evidence that the Basic Law had ceased to exist or that the children would face arbitrary detention risks.
The father’s expert, Dr. Phil C.W. Chan, claimed Hong Kong’s rule of law had “collapsed,” but the court dismissed this as highly speculative. Conversely, it credited testimony from the mother’s expert, Mr. Azan Aziz Marwah, a Hong Kong barrister, who confirmed that the Basic Law was still intact and the people of Hong Kong enjoyed freedom and human rights. The court concluded that returning the children to Hong Kong posed no grave risk.
On the Article 20 “human rights and freedoms” exception, the court noted this defence had never been used in a published opinion in the U.S. to prevent the return of children, and this case did not present circumstances that would make it the first. Even if this exception was applicable, the respondent had not presented sufficient evidence that returning the children to Hong Kong would raise “human rights concerns” or “utterly shock the conscious of the court”. The situation in this case certainly did not rise to that level.
As the first U.S. case to engage substantively with the NSL, this ruling notably affirmed that the continued operation of rights and freedoms under Hong Kong’s Basic Law, while offering an implicit counterpoint to politicised narratives about Hong Kong’s legal environment by grounding its analysis in documented legal protections rather than speculative assertions.
While the decision contained certain factual inaccuracies (notably the erroneous suggestion that Hong Kong was “meant to have governing autonomy until 2034”), its overall evaluation of Hong Kong’s post-NSL legal framework demonstrates judicial restraint. This case establishes an important precedent suggesting that U.S. courts may adopt a more nuanced approach than political rhetoric when assessing Hong Kong matters. The decision warrants careful consideration by policymakers formulating evidence-based positions on Hong Kong-related issues.
InsightSpeak
** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **
Liang Yaqi, Chinese Association of Hong Kong & Macao Studies
Since the release of Hong Kong’s first five-year plan, one line of interpretation has grouped together its provisions on cooperation with the mainland and security governance, and from there concluded that a substantial part of the plan is not really about Hong Kong’s own development. With the latest Policy Address continuing to place strong emphasis on national security, the argument goes a step further: Hong Kong’s development agenda, it is said, is increasingly being crowded out by other priorities.
The central problem with this interpretation is that it artificially separates policy objectives that are, in reality, deeply intertwined.
For Hong Kong today, can “integration with the mainland,” “security” and “economic development” really be treated as three distinct agendas?
The answer is more complicated than it may appear.
On the one hand, the five-year plan explicitly calls for Hong Kong to align itself proactively with national development strategies. On the other, it also defines Hong Kong as a “super connector” between the mainland and global markets.
The provisions concerning the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, or CEPA, go further still, calling for wider access to the mainland market for Hong Kong service providers. In finance, the plan proposes deeper links with both mainland and overseas markets, enabling international capital to participate through Hong Kong in the growth of China and Asia while helping mainland companies and capital expand globally.
To classify all of this simply as “supporting mainland policy” is already to assume something that should instead be examined: that anything connected with national development is, by definition, separate from Hong Kong’s own development.
Yet Hong Kong’s economic structure makes that distinction increasingly difficult to sustain.
Hong Kong’s most distinctive economic value lies in its ability to connect two economic spheres vastly larger than itself. On one side is mainland China; on the other are global capital, trade, professional services and institutional networks. Much of Hong Kong’s competitive advantage has long rested on precisely this intermediary role.
That is why, in many cases, there is no clear line separating policies that “serve the country” from policies that “develop Hong Kong.”
Rather than asking how much of the plan is devoted to the mainland, the more meaningful question is whether those connections ultimately make Hong Kong more difficult to replace.
If closer access to China’s vast market generates greater demand for international financing, asset management, legal and arbitration services, RMB business and corporate globalization in Hong Kong, then deeper integration with the mainland and a stronger international role can advance at the same time.
Security should be understood within the same framework.
A common intuition is that policy attention is finite: the more emphasis placed on security, the less attention remains for economic growth and social welfare. But for a highly open international financial centre such as Hong Kong, security and development do not exist in a simple zero-sum relationship.
Capital does not merely chase the highest nominal return. It seeks the best risk-adjusted return.
For a highly open international financial centre, security is not separate from development. It is part of the economic environment that businesses and investors assess when deciding where to place capital, establish regional headquarters or manage wealth. They look not only at taxes and growth prospects, but also at financial stability, reliable infrastructure, cybersecurity and regulatory predictability.
In other words, companies choosing Hong Kong are not simply choosing lower taxes or office space. They are choosing an institutional environment that reduces uncertainty.
The International Monetary Fund’s 2026 assessment of Hong Kong illustrates this relationship well. On the one hand, the IMF recognised the financial system’s strong capital and liquidity buffers and its sound regulatory foundations. On the other, it noted that Hong Kong’s highly open and interconnected economy leaves it exposed to geopolitical and trade tensions, volatility in global financial markets, and disruptions to trade and capital flows. It also highlighted risks associated with commercial real estate, cybersecurity and operational resilience.[1]
The more open Hong Kong is, the more important strong risk management becomes.
This is also why the five-year plan’s emphasis on “coordinating development and security” should not be understood solely through a narrow conception of security. The plan also calls for stronger economic and urban resilience, better risk-warning mechanisms, closer cross-departmental coordination, improved cybersecurity and emergency governance, and greater use of technology to enhance the efficiency of public administration.
These priorities reflect a broader shift in global economic governance in recent years: economic competition is moving away from a singular pursuit of maximum efficiency towards a balance between efficiency and resilience.
The earlier phase of globalisation prized the lowest possible costs, minimal inventories and ever-longer cross-border supply chains. After the pandemic, geopolitical conflict, financial volatility and repeated supply-chain disruptions, however, governments and companies have become increasingly concerned with a different question: when a system is hit by a shock, can it continue to function?
For Hong Kong, that resilience is itself part of what an international financial centre offers. Clear rules, predictable enforcement and reliable institutions allow businesses to price risk with greater confidence; uncertainty, by contrast, raises risk premiums and discourages long-term investment.
The proper measure of Hong Kong’s future security governance, therefore, is not how often security appears in the five-year plan or the Policy Address. The more important question is whether that governance ultimately makes Hong Kong more predictable.
Over the next five years, several developments will be worth watching.
As Hong Kong deepens its links with the mainland, will demand increase for international capital to use the city as a platform for allocating assets in China and across Asia? As mainland companies expand globally, will they rely more heavily on Hong Kong’s financial, legal and professional services? Will Hong Kong’s ties with Europe, the United States, ASEAN and the Middle East deepen at the same time? And will security governance reduce the uncertainty costs inherent in operating an open economy?
If these functions become stronger, then “integrating into national development,” “safeguarding security” and “remaining international” are not competing objectives.
They may, in fact, be three dimensions of the same question:
In an increasingly fragmented and uncertain world, how can Hong Kong remain an interface that both China and the rest of the world want to use—and one that neither can easily replace?
[1]https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2026/114/002.2026.issue-114-en.xml?cid=576398-com-dsp-crossref
