Qing Ping
After Jimmy Lai was lawfully convicted by the High Court of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for crimes including colluding with foreign forces and conspiring to publish seditious publication, some politicians in the United States and the West disregarded the facts, spreading false narratives such as "political prisoner" and "political prosecution." Such claims not only violate the fundamental principles of international law but also completely contradict the facts of the case and legal provisions. In reality, Jimmy Lai's actions seriously violated the Hong Kong National Security Law and local Hong Kong laws. His crimes are criminal offenses endangering national security, not "political dissent." The trial of his case represents the legitimate actions of Hong Kong's judicial authorities in safeguarding national security in accordance with the law, fully aligning with the fundamental principles of international law and standards of judicial justice.
Due to varying differences in ideology, political systems, laws, and policies among countries, there is no clear and unified standard for defining the concept of "political prisoner" in international law. However, through long-term international practice and academic consensus, basic criteria and exclusions have emerged. The definition of "political prisoner" revolves around two core principles: "peaceful expression" and "no harm to national security." Its application must satisfy two key conditions: first, the actions must be based on the expression of political beliefs and must not involve violence; second, they must not severely endanger national security, public interests, or the lawful rights and interests of others, exhibiting clear "altruistic" and "peaceful" characteristics. Actions such as endangering national security and colluding with foreign forces have long been excluded by the international community from the category of "political prisoners."
Jimmy Lai's actions are entirely inconsistent with the core connotations of a "political prisoner."
In terms of the nature of his actions, Jimmy Lai's conduct was not "peaceful political expression" but rather criminal acts seriously endangering national security. The core feature of a "political prisoner" is the peaceful expression of political beliefs without harming national security, public interests, or the lawful rights of others. In contrast, Jimmy Lai's collusion with foreign forces, as stipulated in Article 29 of the Hong Kong National Security Law, constitutes a serious crime such as "imposing sanction or blockade, or engaging in other hostile activities against the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or the People's Republic of China." This directly infringes upon national sovereignty, security, and development interests, undermines Hong Kongs prosperity and stability, and completely deviates from the "peaceful" and "altruistic" characteristics of a "political prisoner." Such actions would be classified as criminal offenses in any country and are far from so-called "political dissent."
From the perspective of international law exclusion rules, Jimmy Lai's crimes fall outside the category of "political prisoners." His acts of colluding with foreign forces and endangering national security meet the constituent elements of crimes under the Hong Kong National Security Law, clearly excluding him from the "political prisoner" category. Moreover, foreign forces nurturing Jimmy Lai as an agent to oppose China and destabilize Hong Kong, and funding activities to disrupt Hong Kong, violate the fundamental international law principle of "non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries." Acts such as treason and collusion with foreign forces are universally and severely targeted by criminal laws across nations and are by no means so-called "political prosecutions."
In terms of judicial procedures, the trial of Jimmy Lai's case was completely fair, just, and transparent, with no political motives involved. The Hong Kong National Security Law explicitly guarantees litigation the right to fair trials and the right to defense, and the trial of Jimmy Lai's case strictly adhered to these provisions. The court proceedings were entirely open, with Jimmy Lai himself testifying for 52 days. He enjoyed full defense rights, all parties had legal representation, and no party raised issues of unfair treatment. The court ultimately issued a publicly available 855-page judgment detailing the application of law and evidence analysis, fully complying with Hong Kongs common law judicial procedures. The so-called "political prosecution" narrative is both a deliberate smear against the independence of Hong Kongs judiciary and a disregard for the principles of judicial justice in international law.
Using the concept of "political prisoner" to recklessly interfere in the internal affairs of other countries is shameless and despicable.
The original intent of establishing the concept of "political prisoner" in international law was to provide humanitarian protection for individuals who have committed crimes but possess legitimate political purposes, shielding them from persecution while safeguarding the sovereign interests of nations. At the same time, every country has the right to combat crimes endangering national security, a legitimate right that no external forces should interfere with or smear.
However, a few countries, groups, or individuals, to achieve ulterior political motives, exploit the ambiguous concept of "political prisoner" to exonerate their political agents. Under the guise of "human rights" "democracy" and "freedom" they recklessly interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and hinder the independent exercise of judicial power. This despicable conduct has long been seen through by people around the world and is destined to face firm opposition and complete failure, ultimately being condemned to the pillar of historical shame.
Safeguarding national sovereignty, security, and development interests is the highest principle of the "one country, two systems" policy. Any attempt to portray Jimmy Lai as a "political prisoner" or distort the lawful trial as a "political prosecution" is a deliberate distortion of facts and a blatant disregard for international rules. The implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law and the fair trial of related cases are not only essential requirements for safeguarding national sovereignty, security, and development interests but also a cornerstone for protecting the lawful rights and interests of Hong Kong residents and ensuring long-term stability and prosperity in Hong Kong. This is beyond dispute.
InsightSpeak
** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **
Liang Yaqi, Chinese Association of Hong Kong & Macao Studies
Since the release of Hong Kong’s first five-year plan, one line of interpretation has grouped together its provisions on cooperation with the mainland and security governance, and from there concluded that a substantial part of the plan is not really about Hong Kong’s own development. With the latest Policy Address continuing to place strong emphasis on national security, the argument goes a step further: Hong Kong’s development agenda, it is said, is increasingly being crowded out by other priorities.
The central problem with this interpretation is that it artificially separates policy objectives that are, in reality, deeply intertwined.
For Hong Kong today, can “integration with the mainland,” “security” and “economic development” really be treated as three distinct agendas?
The answer is more complicated than it may appear.
On the one hand, the five-year plan explicitly calls for Hong Kong to align itself proactively with national development strategies. On the other, it also defines Hong Kong as a “super connector” between the mainland and global markets.
The provisions concerning the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, or CEPA, go further still, calling for wider access to the mainland market for Hong Kong service providers. In finance, the plan proposes deeper links with both mainland and overseas markets, enabling international capital to participate through Hong Kong in the growth of China and Asia while helping mainland companies and capital expand globally.
To classify all of this simply as “supporting mainland policy” is already to assume something that should instead be examined: that anything connected with national development is, by definition, separate from Hong Kong’s own development.
Yet Hong Kong’s economic structure makes that distinction increasingly difficult to sustain.
Hong Kong’s most distinctive economic value lies in its ability to connect two economic spheres vastly larger than itself. On one side is mainland China; on the other are global capital, trade, professional services and institutional networks. Much of Hong Kong’s competitive advantage has long rested on precisely this intermediary role.
That is why, in many cases, there is no clear line separating policies that “serve the country” from policies that “develop Hong Kong.”
Rather than asking how much of the plan is devoted to the mainland, the more meaningful question is whether those connections ultimately make Hong Kong more difficult to replace.
If closer access to China’s vast market generates greater demand for international financing, asset management, legal and arbitration services, RMB business and corporate globalization in Hong Kong, then deeper integration with the mainland and a stronger international role can advance at the same time.
Security should be understood within the same framework.
A common intuition is that policy attention is finite: the more emphasis placed on security, the less attention remains for economic growth and social welfare. But for a highly open international financial centre such as Hong Kong, security and development do not exist in a simple zero-sum relationship.
Capital does not merely chase the highest nominal return. It seeks the best risk-adjusted return.
For a highly open international financial centre, security is not separate from development. It is part of the economic environment that businesses and investors assess when deciding where to place capital, establish regional headquarters or manage wealth. They look not only at taxes and growth prospects, but also at financial stability, reliable infrastructure, cybersecurity and regulatory predictability.
In other words, companies choosing Hong Kong are not simply choosing lower taxes or office space. They are choosing an institutional environment that reduces uncertainty.
The International Monetary Fund’s 2026 assessment of Hong Kong illustrates this relationship well. On the one hand, the IMF recognised the financial system’s strong capital and liquidity buffers and its sound regulatory foundations. On the other, it noted that Hong Kong’s highly open and interconnected economy leaves it exposed to geopolitical and trade tensions, volatility in global financial markets, and disruptions to trade and capital flows. It also highlighted risks associated with commercial real estate, cybersecurity and operational resilience.[1]
The more open Hong Kong is, the more important strong risk management becomes.
This is also why the five-year plan’s emphasis on “coordinating development and security” should not be understood solely through a narrow conception of security. The plan also calls for stronger economic and urban resilience, better risk-warning mechanisms, closer cross-departmental coordination, improved cybersecurity and emergency governance, and greater use of technology to enhance the efficiency of public administration.
These priorities reflect a broader shift in global economic governance in recent years: economic competition is moving away from a singular pursuit of maximum efficiency towards a balance between efficiency and resilience.
The earlier phase of globalisation prized the lowest possible costs, minimal inventories and ever-longer cross-border supply chains. After the pandemic, geopolitical conflict, financial volatility and repeated supply-chain disruptions, however, governments and companies have become increasingly concerned with a different question: when a system is hit by a shock, can it continue to function?
For Hong Kong, that resilience is itself part of what an international financial centre offers. Clear rules, predictable enforcement and reliable institutions allow businesses to price risk with greater confidence; uncertainty, by contrast, raises risk premiums and discourages long-term investment.
The proper measure of Hong Kong’s future security governance, therefore, is not how often security appears in the five-year plan or the Policy Address. The more important question is whether that governance ultimately makes Hong Kong more predictable.
Over the next five years, several developments will be worth watching.
As Hong Kong deepens its links with the mainland, will demand increase for international capital to use the city as a platform for allocating assets in China and across Asia? As mainland companies expand globally, will they rely more heavily on Hong Kong’s financial, legal and professional services? Will Hong Kong’s ties with Europe, the United States, ASEAN and the Middle East deepen at the same time? And will security governance reduce the uncertainty costs inherent in operating an open economy?
If these functions become stronger, then “integrating into national development,” “safeguarding security” and “remaining international” are not competing objectives.
They may, in fact, be three dimensions of the same question:
In an increasingly fragmented and uncertain world, how can Hong Kong remain an interface that both China and the rest of the world want to use—and one that neither can easily replace?
[1]https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2026/114/002.2026.issue-114-en.xml?cid=576398-com-dsp-crossref
