Grace Zhou, a member of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macau Studies
The dust has settled on Hong Kong’s 8th Legislative Council election, with voter turnout rising from 30.2% in 2021 to 31.9% this time. Hong Kong society and the new electoral system are gradually working out a new way of relating to each other. Rather than fixating on the numbers, a more meaningful question now is not whether people voted, but who did, on what basis they made their decisions, and how those evolving criteria might shape executive‑legislative relations over the next term.
The most notable part this time is how voters made their judgments. An increasing number of voters are no longer voting solely on the basis of party affiliation or political camp, but first examining a candidate’s résumé, professional competence and their actual performance in local districts or sectors before casting their vote—in other words, marking a “report card” with their ballots.
The 2021 poll was the first LegCo election after the reforms, and the public were unfamiliar with the new system. Four years on, the basic framework has stabilised, and voters have understood how the new system operates. As that sense of unfamiliarity recedes, attention naturally has shifted back to the candidates themselves.
If the previous era of high-intensity politics was driven by emotion and identity‑based voting, this election looks more like a cool-headed calculation. Voters care about who, within the existing system, can actually address concrete problems such as building safety, public housing maintenance, and medical and elderly care. Instead of being satisfied simply with a few slogans, they look for those who have put forward workable proposals and followed through over time. Many candidates who are not members of the main political parties emerged by specialised expertise and community service. Clearly, within the current political structure, voters are still using their ballots to reshape the internal balance of power. Emotions have cooled, but the bar has been raised – voters will remember who asks serious questions in the chamber and who merely shows up for the photo op.
Under the principle of “patriots governing Hong Kong” , executive leadership is the prerequisite, and the executive and legislature moving “in the same direction” is seen as a guarantee of stability. Lawmakers can and should, at the strategic level, support the move from governance to greater prosperity, economic development and safeguarding national security. But voters also want to see specific policies subjected to open debate and amendment, major incidents and governance failures be reasonably examined and institutionally reviewed; and budgets and bills be judiciously examined instead of a quick pass.
If the new LegCo is to respond to this pragmatic and rational public sentiment, it needs to position itself as a cooperative overseer.
Cooperation here means upholding executive primacy while leveraging the legislature’s professional expertise and public mandate to help refine and improve government policy. In practice, this could involve task forces, district networks and industry consultations to collate public input in the policy design phase and feed it into official deliberations at an early stage. When crises emerge, lawmakers and the executive should move in tandem — supporting speedy appropriations and measures while communicating feedback to policymakers in time. On long‑term issues such as the Northern Metropolis, transport infrastructure and elderly care, there should be sustained follow‑up through cross‑sector mechanisms — rather than disbanding committees upon the completion of a project and leaving it unattended.
Oversight is not about reflexive opposition at the eleventh hour but about targeted, constructive scrutiny throughout questioning and debate. Lawmakers should press for data and impact assessments, making full use of oral and written questions, and insist on disclosure of key figures and risk evaluations. They should also put forward alternative proposals, offering clear adjustments to procedures, supporting measures and timetables, so that debate becomes an instrument of refinement rather than mere rhetoric. Previous years of stagnation on the regulation of ride-hailing in Hong Kong was largely the result of simple opposition without substantive proposals. In terms of implementation and outcomes, follow-up committees, site visits and engagement with frontline stakeholders should be adopted to examine whether policies are being distorted in practice or resources misallocated. They should also help prompt timely adjustments where needed, rather than waiting until problems erupt and then vetoing everything in one go.
Overall, if the new LegCo is to respond to this rational, pragmatic public mandate, it must be a rigorous questioner on public safety and livelihood issues, a meticulous guardian over legislation and budgets, and an honest collaborator in executive interactions.
This election shows that there is still a group of voters willing to spend time finding out who the candidates are and what they have done before making up their minds. That conscientiousness is perhaps the most valuable seed of a new electoral culture. It is now up to the new LegCo and the HKSAR Government to answer that: they must demonstrate with visible reform outcomes that the system can not only maintain stability and properly manage elections, but also solve problems and improve people’s lives; and they must convince citizens that political confrontation has cooled and the system is more trustworthy. If they can respond to these expectations, there is a genuine opportunity for the principle of “patriots governing Hong Kong” to be gradually translated into good governance that people can benefit from in their daily lives.
InsightSpeak
** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **
Liang Yaqi, a member of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macau Studies
On 7 May 2026, the Central Criminal Court in London delivered its verdict on Chung Biu Yuen, Administrative Manager of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in London, and Chi Leung Wai, a former UK border official. This first national security case to be heard under the UK National Security Act 2023 has been marred by an air of irregularity from start to finish: persistent procedural flaws, a fragile chain of evidence and numerous inconsistencies have led many to question whether this was a fair trial or a carefully orchestrated political manoeuvre.
Preconceived notions shaped public perception, undermining procedural fairness. Even before the trial had formally commenced, the public discourse was already fraught with tension. Following the case’s first court appearance in 2024, a document purported to be a ‘summary of the charges’ circulated widely in the media. It disclosed in detail the defendant’s specific actions, included screenshots of CCTV footage from relevant activities, and even listed details concerning the London Economic and Trade Office’s involvement in the case, clearly intended to steer public attention towards the Office’s role. Some Hong Kong media outlets have questioned why, in the past, law enforcement agencies would typically handle indictments involving sensitive case details with great caution or even keep them confidential; the current situation appears rather unusual. Even before a jury has been selected and the formal trial has begun, the public and potential jurors have already been led by preconceived notions into a narrative of the case dominated by the prosecution. This directly crosses the red line set by Section 52(a) of the UK’s Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which prohibits the media from reporting content that may prejudice the defendant during the preliminary hearing stage. Before the defendants have even spoken, they have been labelled – this practice of ‘pre-conviction’ by the media is clearly extremely unfair to the defence and undermines procedural fairness.
The mysterious death of the third defendant has deepened the mystery surrounding the case. Even more chilling is the fact that shortly after the case was brought before the court, the third defendant, Matthew Trickett, a former Royal Marines serviceman, died under mysterious circumstances in a park. As a former soldier and an enforcement officer with the Home Office’s Immigration Service, Trickett could have provided crucial testimony to clarify whether the operation was ‘officially authorised’ or a private act. His sudden passing deprived the defence of a vital witness, preventing the full chain of evidence from being thoroughly examined in court and sparing the prosecution from the potential risks of cross-examination. Given the highly sensitive timing of his death, Trickett’s solicitor expressed shock at his passing, whilst some netizens have even suspected that he was “silenced”. Although the authorities have denied foul play, it is lamentable that the judicial process has been “streamlined” due to the death of a single individual.
The prosecution’s evidence was flimsy and unconvincing. Section 3 of the UK National Security Act 2023 stipulates that the offence of “aiding a foreign intelligence service” requires proof that the act “is likely to substantially assist a foreign intelligence service”. Yet throughout the trial, the prosecution failed to present any fundamental evidence that the defendant’s actions had substantially harmed UK national security. The alleged acts cited by the prosecution—such as the defendant’s purported surveillance of Hong Kong residents, unauthorised access to immigration databases, and door-to-door “debt collection”—sound more like ordinary criminal offences. The prosecution essentially pieced together a case based on electronic evidence such as communication records and financial transactions, yet never produced irrefutable proof that the defendant engaged in “intelligence activities” that posed an actual security threat to the UK. Forcing ordinary behaviour to be elevated to the level of national security constitutes a “hat trick” that fails to convince.
The judge’s guidance was markedly biased, contravening her role of impartiality. Prior to the verdict, the judge’s instructions to the jury were also biased. She repeatedly emphasised the prosecution’s perspective regarding the admissibility of evidence and the assessment of witness credibility. For instance, although much of the evidence presented by the prosecution in court occurred before the UK National Security Act 2023 came into force—and should therefore not have retroactive effect—the judge reminded the jury that they could treat this as “background information” to understand the defendant’s network of contacts. Although the judge stated that such background information could not be used directly as a basis for conviction, and this appeared neutral on the surface, in reality it had already painted the defendant in a negative light. Furthermore, when the jury had deliberated for several days without reaching a ‘unanimous verdict’ on all charges against the defendant, the judge instructed that the standard be lowered from a ‘unanimous verdict’ to a ‘majority verdict’. Whilst this move was not unlawful, in such a highly sensitive national security case, might the proactive lowering of the threshold to facilitate a conviction give rise to public doubts regarding the impartiality of the trial? Might it create a negative perception that the judicial process is not sufficiently fair?
The jury’s deliberations were fraught with difficulties, and there appeared to be political pressure. The deliberation phase was marked by a series of setbacks: one juror was hospitalised due to ill health, whilst another requested to withdraw. Chi Leung Wai’s defence counsel at one point questioned whether this juror had been ‘bullied’ by other dissenting jurors; this was precisely why the judge instructed the jury that day to ‘respect differences of opinion but continue to work together to seek consensus’.After four days of deliberations, the jury had still failed to reach a “unanimous verdict”, indicating that it was struggling to reach a consensus on the facts of the case. It was not until the fifth day, following the judge’s instruction to lower the standard of the verdict, that the jury, after a protracted stalemate, barely met the minimum threshold of a 10-2 majority verdict on the charge of “assisting a foreign intelligence agency”, whilst they remained unable to reach a verdict on the charge of “foreign interference”. Whether this outcome truly reflects the jurors’ inner conviction or is merely a compromise born of prolonged pressure is a matter for reflection.
The UK National Security Act is defined in overly broad terms, making it highly susceptible to expansion and abuse. A review of the entire case process exposes the fundamental flaw of the UK National Security Act 2023, which is its extreme vagueness. The Act stipulates that the offence of “aiding a foreign intelligence service” is committed whenever an act is likely to assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out activities relating to the UK; the definition of a foreign intelligence service is even broader, encompassing any person conducting intelligence activities for or on behalf of a foreign state. It is clear that the threshold for the offence of “aiding a foreign intelligence service” is so low that it could encompass many ordinary activities. Even Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer appointed by the UK Home Secretary, has publicly stated that the relevant provisions of the UK National Security Act 2023 could extend to political, journalistic and other everyday activities, placing legitimate lobbying, journalistic investigations and even ordinary commercial activities at risk of criminalisation. He emphasised that the Act must be subject to oversight to prevent its “abuse and overreach”.
Ironically, the UK completely ignores the fact that its own national security provisions are vague and broadly applicable, and turns a blind eye to the various flaws in the adjudication of national security cases, yet it repeatedly criticises and meddles in the Hong Kong National Security Law. Such double standards appear particularly hypocritical and laughable. If the UK truly cares about the rule of law, it would do well to return to the principles of evidence-based adjudication and procedural justice, rectify errors in cases as soon as possible, and ensure that the judiciary does not become a mere appendage of politics, thereby trampling the spirit of the rule of law underfoot!
