Mai Junhao
Hong Kong is set to begin its quadrennial election day for the Legislative Council tomorrow. While still recovering from the Tai Po fire, the city is once again in election mode, albeit in a more solemn mood. Candidates are making final efforts to garner support while citizens make up their minds on whom to support. As one voter said, “life goes on, I will vote this Sunday because it is my civic duty and I believe even one vote can make a difference.”
Yesterday, Secretary for Health Lo Chung-mau announced the heartwarming news that all hospitalized victims of the Tai Po fire were no longer in critical condition. In the wake of this sudden and tragic disaster, the people of Hong Kong have demonstrated outstanding resilience and solidarity that has won worldwide praise. Tomorrow’s LegCo election will be a sign that Hong Kong has successfully overcome the disaster and is ready for a new chapter.
Certain foreign media outlets and malicious actors have tried to paint a gloomy picture for Hong Kong recently, portraying Hong Kongers as too grief-stricken to vote and the SAR government as inconsiderate for pushing ahead with the election. This is both misleading and irresponsible. There is no contradiction between voting in the Legislative Council election and mourning the fire’s victims, just as there is no contradiction between holding an election and disaster relief. The people of Hong Kong have proven capable of being both outstanding citizens and empathetic human beings, and the SAR government has proven capable of taking care of affected residents and organizing the election at the same time. So far, the government has arranged temporary housing for nearly 4,000 affected residents and provided dedicated social workers for each affected family, with the official relief fund receiving more than HK\$3 billion in donations.
There is still much to be done, and this can only be achieved by first getting the best possible candidates into the Legislative Council. Taking care of displaced residents of Wang Fuk Court and rebuilding their homes requires legislative approval for relevant expenditure. As the government launches an independent commission to investigate the fire, it is up to the Legislative Council to pass laws that would strengthen safety measures and prevent future disasters. Many candidates have voiced their views on this matter and promised to make this their immediate priority in office.
Besides the aftermath of the Tai Po fire, legislators also have much long-term work laid out for them. On the one hand is the need to navigate China–US rivalry and global geopolitical turmoil, on the other is the need to better integrate into China’s overall development plans and continue to maintain Hong Kong’s special status. Hong Kong also needs to revitalize and reform its economy by utilizing the latest technological innovations, while tackling deep-seated social problems to improve people’s livelihood. The demand for capable legislators has never been greater. All 161 candidates have demonstrated their qualifications and visions for the coming four-year term, and it is up to the voters to decide which ones are most suitable for their own best interests and those of Hong Kong as a whole.
Just as Hong Kongers have come together to show support for victims of the fire, they will come together to show their support for a better tomorrow with their votes. This great city has gone through many periods of great hardship in its history—from the brutalities of World War II to the financial crisis of 1997 and the global pandemic of recent memory—yet none has managed to crush the optimistic spirit of its people, and Hong Kong has emerged from each one more confident and prosperous than ever. As its citizens turn out to cast their votes tomorrow, we have every reason to believe in a brighter future for Hong Kong.
InsightSpeak
** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **
Liang Yaqi, Chinese Association of Hong Kong & Macao Studies
Since the release of Hong Kong’s first five-year plan, one line of interpretation has grouped together its provisions on cooperation with the mainland and security governance, and from there concluded that a substantial part of the plan is not really about Hong Kong’s own development. With the latest Policy Address continuing to place strong emphasis on national security, the argument goes a step further: Hong Kong’s development agenda, it is said, is increasingly being crowded out by other priorities.
The central problem with this interpretation is that it artificially separates policy objectives that are, in reality, deeply intertwined.
For Hong Kong today, can “integration with the mainland,” “security” and “economic development” really be treated as three distinct agendas?
The answer is more complicated than it may appear.
On the one hand, the five-year plan explicitly calls for Hong Kong to align itself proactively with national development strategies. On the other, it also defines Hong Kong as a “super connector” between the mainland and global markets.
The provisions concerning the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, or CEPA, go further still, calling for wider access to the mainland market for Hong Kong service providers. In finance, the plan proposes deeper links with both mainland and overseas markets, enabling international capital to participate through Hong Kong in the growth of China and Asia while helping mainland companies and capital expand globally.
To classify all of this simply as “supporting mainland policy” is already to assume something that should instead be examined: that anything connected with national development is, by definition, separate from Hong Kong’s own development.
Yet Hong Kong’s economic structure makes that distinction increasingly difficult to sustain.
Hong Kong’s most distinctive economic value lies in its ability to connect two economic spheres vastly larger than itself. On one side is mainland China; on the other are global capital, trade, professional services and institutional networks. Much of Hong Kong’s competitive advantage has long rested on precisely this intermediary role.
That is why, in many cases, there is no clear line separating policies that “serve the country” from policies that “develop Hong Kong.”
Rather than asking how much of the plan is devoted to the mainland, the more meaningful question is whether those connections ultimately make Hong Kong more difficult to replace.
If closer access to China’s vast market generates greater demand for international financing, asset management, legal and arbitration services, RMB business and corporate globalization in Hong Kong, then deeper integration with the mainland and a stronger international role can advance at the same time.
Security should be understood within the same framework.
A common intuition is that policy attention is finite: the more emphasis placed on security, the less attention remains for economic growth and social welfare. But for a highly open international financial centre such as Hong Kong, security and development do not exist in a simple zero-sum relationship.
Capital does not merely chase the highest nominal return. It seeks the best risk-adjusted return.
For a highly open international financial centre, security is not separate from development. It is part of the economic environment that businesses and investors assess when deciding where to place capital, establish regional headquarters or manage wealth. They look not only at taxes and growth prospects, but also at financial stability, reliable infrastructure, cybersecurity and regulatory predictability.
In other words, companies choosing Hong Kong are not simply choosing lower taxes or office space. They are choosing an institutional environment that reduces uncertainty.
The International Monetary Fund’s 2026 assessment of Hong Kong illustrates this relationship well. On the one hand, the IMF recognised the financial system’s strong capital and liquidity buffers and its sound regulatory foundations. On the other, it noted that Hong Kong’s highly open and interconnected economy leaves it exposed to geopolitical and trade tensions, volatility in global financial markets, and disruptions to trade and capital flows. It also highlighted risks associated with commercial real estate, cybersecurity and operational resilience.[1]
The more open Hong Kong is, the more important strong risk management becomes.
This is also why the five-year plan’s emphasis on “coordinating development and security” should not be understood solely through a narrow conception of security. The plan also calls for stronger economic and urban resilience, better risk-warning mechanisms, closer cross-departmental coordination, improved cybersecurity and emergency governance, and greater use of technology to enhance the efficiency of public administration.
These priorities reflect a broader shift in global economic governance in recent years: economic competition is moving away from a singular pursuit of maximum efficiency towards a balance between efficiency and resilience.
The earlier phase of globalisation prized the lowest possible costs, minimal inventories and ever-longer cross-border supply chains. After the pandemic, geopolitical conflict, financial volatility and repeated supply-chain disruptions, however, governments and companies have become increasingly concerned with a different question: when a system is hit by a shock, can it continue to function?
For Hong Kong, that resilience is itself part of what an international financial centre offers. Clear rules, predictable enforcement and reliable institutions allow businesses to price risk with greater confidence; uncertainty, by contrast, raises risk premiums and discourages long-term investment.
The proper measure of Hong Kong’s future security governance, therefore, is not how often security appears in the five-year plan or the Policy Address. The more important question is whether that governance ultimately makes Hong Kong more predictable.
Over the next five years, several developments will be worth watching.
As Hong Kong deepens its links with the mainland, will demand increase for international capital to use the city as a platform for allocating assets in China and across Asia? As mainland companies expand globally, will they rely more heavily on Hong Kong’s financial, legal and professional services? Will Hong Kong’s ties with Europe, the United States, ASEAN and the Middle East deepen at the same time? And will security governance reduce the uncertainty costs inherent in operating an open economy?
If these functions become stronger, then “integrating into national development,” “safeguarding security” and “remaining international” are not competing objectives.
They may, in fact, be three dimensions of the same question:
In an increasingly fragmented and uncertain world, how can Hong Kong remain an interface that both China and the rest of the world want to use—and one that neither can easily replace?
[1]https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2026/114/002.2026.issue-114-en.xml?cid=576398-com-dsp-crossref
