Court Ruling Reveals Irrefutable Evidence: Jimmy Lai Is a Liar

Leung Ngar-ki, a member of Chinese Association of Hong Kong & Macao Studies

On 15 December 2025, the Court of First Instance of the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region delivered its final verdict: Jimmy Lai was found guilty on two counts of conspiracy to collude with foreign or external forces to endanger national security, and one count of conspiracy to publish seditious publications. The 855-page judgment explicitly stated his testimony was "inconsistent, evasive and not credible". Confronted with the prosecution's comprehensive chain of evidence presented in an 860-page written closing argument, comprising 2,222 items of evidence and over 80,000 pages of trial records, alongside irrefutable testimony from six former Apple Daily executives who pleaded guilty in the same case, the lies of this anti-China, pro-Hong Kong chaos instigator were exposed one by one. He has become an "absurd and despicable liar" despised by all Hong Kong citizens.

"Analysing the situation" became "stating facts", with contradictory statements on sanctions backfiring. In earlier live broadcasts, Jimmy Lai brazenly called on Germany, Australia, Canada and others to ally with the US in sanctioning China. He even boasted that "war threats" would cause "businessmen to suspend investment in China, putting its economy at risk of collapse", describing Hong Kong as a pawn for the West to counterbalance China. Yet when questioned about this in court, he immediately backtracked, claiming he was merely "analysing the global situation" and certainly not advocating sanctions. More outrageously, during a dialogue with the former chair of the American Institute in Taiwan, he extensively discussed "Taiwan's security dependence on the US" and "Taiwan being an excellent lever... the US and all free world nations must jointly support preserving Taiwan's status." Yet in court, he defended this as merely "stating facts that have already occurred," denying any advocacy for a "US-Taiwan alliance." His legal assistant, Wayland Chan Tsz-wah, directly testified that "without Jimmy Lai, there would be no political connections in the US and elsewhere to unify international efforts towards sanctions," accusing Lai of seeking foreign sanctions to precipitate China's political and economic collapse. Lai had allegedly boasted that "China's GDP would plummet by 40%, presenting the perfect opportunity to introduce American-style democracy." While actively stoking the flames by calling for foreign intervention, he vehemently denied soliciting hostile actions. This self-contradictory sophistry crumbled before audio-visual evidence and witness testimony.

"Forgotten" became his catchphrase, while the mastermind turned into a hands-off manager – utterly preposterous. During his court defence, Jimmy Lai frequently suffered "memory lapses," responding to multiple critical questions with "I don't know," "I don't recall," or "I'm not familiar with." Even when the prosecution presented meticulously organised evidence tables following a timeline, he claimed amnesia about his communications with former senior staff of Apple Daily. The testimony of Next Media's former Chief Executive, Cheung Kim-hung, directly exposed these falsehoods. Jimmy Lai was the founder and "helmsman" of Apple Daily, as well as the supreme leader and ultimate decision-maker of the Next Media Group. He dictated editorial and publishing policies, directing editorial direction through "lunchbox meetings". Following the 2014 illegal Occupy Central movement, he transformed the newspaper into a bastion of "anti-government and anti-central authority" sentiment. Former Apple Daily Deputy Publisher Chan Pui-man further testified that his management style was "so overbearing that no one dared refuse", and after the 2019 Legislative Council riots, he explicitly ordered "the public must be persuaded to support the protest movement". Yet in court, Jimmy Lai feigned ignorance, claiming his directives were "merely suggestions, not coercion," attempting to downplay his editorial responsibility. This charade of "masterminding while feigning amnesia" treats the courtroom as a stage, constituting a blatant disregard for the dignity of the law.

"Opposing violence" while condoning it: editorial directives expose true intentions. Jimmy Lai repeatedly professes his stance against violence, claiming articles were "heartfelt" reflections of reality. Yet trial evidence reveals that during the 2019 extradition bill protests, he issued editorial directives instructing staff to report with "sympathy" on young people storming the Legislative Council. He even messaged pan-democrats inquiring about "follow-up actions to sustain the protests." More ironically, while urging Hong Kongers to "lobby for international support," he denied inciting hatred against the government. He admitted hoping to force the SAR government to compromise through "numbers and momentum," yet claimed no incitement intent. This double standard of "saying one thing and doing another" exposed his true role in using the media to fan the flames and condone violence.

His "unaware" stance swiftly transformed into "strong support," yet colluding with external falsehoods proved untenable. Confronted with evidence of his ties to the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) and the Stand with Hong Kong Team (SWHK), Jimmy Lai initially falsely claimed "no knowledge of these organisations," only for social media posts to directly contradict him. Posts on Apple Daily and Jimmy Lai's personal social media accounts reveal his repeated public endorsement of IPAC, expressing strong support for its advocated "sanctions". Not only did Jimmy Lai establish an overseas network through his personal assistant, former CIA agent Mark Simon, frequently travelling to the US to meet politicians including then-Vice President Mike Pence and then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to plead for "sanctions" against the Chinese government and the Hong Kong SAR government, he also instructed Apple Daily executives to compile a "sanctions list", and even after the Hong Kong National Security Law came into effect, he continued to declare he would "go all the way, no turning back." Yet in court, he argued he "was not requesting sanctions." Such contradictory justifications, exposed by cross-border lobbying communications and witness testimony, have become utterly laughable.

The rule of law has ultimately exposed these falsehoods, and those who oppose China and disrupt Hong Kong cannot escape justice. Jimmy Lai's conduct during the trial could be described as a veritable "record of lies." From his inconsistent statements on sanctions, to the tired ploy of feigning amnesia, to his outright denial of colluding with external forces, each contradiction was exposed by irrefutable evidence. The rule of law is Hong Kong's core value and a vital cornerstone for the steady and enduring implementation of "one country, two systems". The 855-page judgment and overwhelming evidence not only substantiated Jimmy Lai's multiple offences but also exposed the deceitful nature concealed beneath his masks as a "democratic fighter" and "guardian of journalism". The dignity of Hong Kong's rule of law shall not be transgressed. National security and Hong Kong's fundamental interests shall be robustly safeguarded under the steadfast protection of the law.

InsightSpeak

** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **

Liang Yaqi,  Chinese Association of Hong Kong & Macao Studies

Since the release of Hong Kong’s first five-year plan, one line of interpretation has grouped together its provisions on cooperation with the mainland and security governance, and from there concluded that a substantial part of the plan is not really about Hong Kong’s own development. With the latest Policy Address continuing to place strong emphasis on national security, the argument goes a step further: Hong Kong’s development agenda, it is said, is increasingly being crowded out by other priorities.

The central problem with this interpretation is that it artificially separates policy objectives that are, in reality, deeply intertwined.

For Hong Kong today, can “integration with the mainland,” “security” and “economic development” really be treated as three distinct agendas?

The answer is more complicated than it may appear.

On the one hand, the five-year plan explicitly calls for Hong Kong to align itself proactively with national development strategies. On the other, it also defines Hong Kong as a “super connector” between the mainland and global markets.

The provisions concerning the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, or CEPA, go further still, calling for wider access to the mainland market for Hong Kong service providers. In finance, the plan proposes deeper links with both mainland and overseas markets, enabling international capital to participate through Hong Kong in the growth of China and Asia while helping mainland companies and capital expand globally.

To classify all of this simply as “supporting mainland policy” is already to assume something that should instead be examined: that anything connected with national development is, by definition, separate from Hong Kong’s own development.

Yet Hong Kong’s economic structure makes that distinction increasingly difficult to sustain.

Hong Kong’s most distinctive economic value lies in its ability to connect two economic spheres vastly larger than itself. On one side is mainland China; on the other are global capital, trade, professional services and institutional networks. Much of Hong Kong’s competitive advantage has long rested on precisely this intermediary role.

That is why, in many cases, there is no clear line separating policies that “serve the country” from policies that “develop Hong Kong.”

Rather than asking how much of the plan is devoted to the mainland, the more meaningful question is whether those connections ultimately make Hong Kong more difficult to replace.

If closer access to China’s vast market generates greater demand for international financing, asset management, legal and arbitration services, RMB business and corporate globalization in Hong Kong, then deeper integration with the mainland and a stronger international role can advance at the same time.

Security should be understood within the same framework.

A common intuition is that policy attention is finite: the more emphasis placed on security, the less attention remains for economic growth and social welfare. But for a highly open international financial centre such as Hong Kong, security and development do not exist in a simple zero-sum relationship.

Capital does not merely chase the highest nominal return. It seeks the best risk-adjusted return.

For a highly open international financial centre, security is not separate from development. It is part of the economic environment that businesses and investors assess when deciding where to place capital, establish regional headquarters or manage wealth. They look not only at taxes and growth prospects, but also at financial stability, reliable infrastructure, cybersecurity and regulatory predictability.

In other words, companies choosing Hong Kong are not simply choosing lower taxes or office space. They are choosing an institutional environment that reduces uncertainty.

The International Monetary Fund’s 2026 assessment of Hong Kong illustrates this relationship well. On the one hand, the IMF recognised the financial system’s strong capital and liquidity buffers and its sound regulatory foundations. On the other, it noted that Hong Kong’s highly open and interconnected economy leaves it exposed to geopolitical and trade tensions, volatility in global financial markets, and disruptions to trade and capital flows. It also highlighted risks associated with commercial real estate, cybersecurity and operational resilience.[1]

The more open Hong Kong is, the more important strong risk management becomes.

This is also why the five-year plan’s emphasis on “coordinating development and security” should not be understood solely through a narrow conception of security. The plan also calls for stronger economic and urban resilience, better risk-warning mechanisms, closer cross-departmental coordination, improved cybersecurity and emergency governance, and greater use of technology to enhance the efficiency of public administration.

These priorities reflect a broader shift in global economic governance in recent years: economic competition is moving away from a singular pursuit of maximum efficiency towards a balance between efficiency and resilience.

The earlier phase of globalisation prized the lowest possible costs, minimal inventories and ever-longer cross-border supply chains. After the pandemic, geopolitical conflict, financial volatility and repeated supply-chain disruptions, however, governments and companies have become increasingly concerned with a different question: when a system is hit by a shock, can it continue to function?

For Hong Kong, that resilience is itself part of what an international financial centre offers. Clear rules, predictable enforcement and reliable institutions allow businesses to price risk with greater confidence; uncertainty, by contrast, raises risk premiums and discourages long-term investment.

The proper measure of Hong Kong’s future security governance, therefore, is not how often security appears in the five-year plan or the Policy Address. The more important question is whether that governance ultimately makes Hong Kong more predictable.

Over the next five years, several developments will be worth watching.

As Hong Kong deepens its links with the mainland, will demand increase for international capital to use the city as a platform for allocating assets in China and across Asia? As mainland companies expand globally, will they rely more heavily on Hong Kong’s financial, legal and professional services? Will Hong Kong’s ties with Europe, the United States, ASEAN and the Middle East deepen at the same time? And will security governance reduce the uncertainty costs inherent in operating an open economy?

If these functions become stronger, then “integrating into national development,” “safeguarding security” and “remaining international” are not competing objectives.

They may, in fact, be three dimensions of the same question:

In an increasingly fragmented and uncertain world, how can Hong Kong remain an interface that both China and the rest of the world want to use—and one that neither can easily replace?

[1]https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2026/114/002.2026.issue-114-en.xml?cid=576398-com-dsp-crossref