Chan Kayu
On February 9, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region High Court sentenced Jimmy Lai to 20 years in prison for two counts of conspiring to collude with foreign forces and one count of conspiring to publish seditious publications. The Wall Street Journal, a long-time supporter of Jimmy Lai, promptly published an opinion piece titled “Jimmy Lai Gets a Death Sentence.” Setting aside the misleading headline, what caught the author's attention was the article's mention that five U.S. congressmen have nominated Jimmy Lai for the 2026 Nobel Peace Prize, stating that “no one deserves this award more than him.”
In my observation, this isn't the first time U.S. lawmakers have campaigned for Jimmy Lai's Nobel Peace Prize nomination. Yet despite annual nominations ending in failure, they persist with unwavering enthusiasm. This “relentless” stance invites reflection: What value does Jimmy Lai truly hold that warrants such “persistence”?
Driven by immense curiosity, the author investigated the source of these nominations—the website of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC). What emerged was a bittersweet revelation: the “honorable” U.S. lawmakers have never taken Jimmy Lai seriously! Their campaign for a Nobel Peace Prize for him is nothing short of an international farce! Why?
First, the nomination content remains utterly unoriginal year after year. In introductions typically under 200 words, U.S. lawmakers consistently describe Jimmy Lai using hollow phrases like “founder of Apple Daily” and “critic of the government.” The 2023 introduction, at a mere 48 words, was half as long as the one for Joshua Wong. This year saw a slight addition of hollow praise like “a global symbol of nonviolent resistance against authoritarianism” or “upholding peace, democracy, and the rule of law through free media.” Yet the writing remains as sloppy and perfunctory as ever, as if merely going through the motions to fulfill some obligation. This half-hearted approach is less an expression of “support” for Jimmy Lai and more a political performance and routine gesture.
Second, the number of co-signers is meager, and the same few individuals repeatedly appear. With over 500 members in the U.S. Congress, only 2 to 5 participated in nominating Jimmy Lai. Take 2024 as an example: only Christopher H. Smith and Jeffrey A. Merkley co-signed. In other years, it was mostly politicians like James P. McGovern and John Moolenaar, who have long held anti-China stances. More ironically, as long as the nomination list includes one Democratic and one Republican lawmaker, these politicians dare to claim the move represents a “bipartisan consensus.” This tactic of packaging the collusion of individuals as the opinion of the majority is undoubtedly a mockery of democratic procedures.
Most crucially, the nomination timing has repeatedly and deliberately missed the Nobel Peace Prize nomination deadline. According to the Nobel Peace Prize nomination rules, January 31st of each year is the deadline for nominating candidates for that year. As seasoned politicians, these prominent members of Congress should be well aware of this rule. Yet upon review, it was found that with the exception of 2024, all nominations by U.S. lawmakers for Jimmy Lai were submitted after the respective deadlines (e.g., the 2023 nomination was made on February 2, and the 2026 nomination on February 4). Anyone with basic knowledge understands this means such nominations are fundamentally ineligible for the award in the year they are submitted. This deliberate act of “late nomination” inevitably raises questions: Are these politicians genuinely “seeking honor” for Jimmy Lai, or are they using nominations as a pretext to interfere in China's internal affairs?
This annual nomination farce exposes the hypocrisy and impotence of certain Western powers' China strategy. The Nobel Peace Prize has extremely low nomination thresholds—university presidents and professors across disciplines can participate—yet even so, Jimmy Lai's nomination is treated with such carelessness. This inevitably raises the question: If Western politicians cannot even manage a symbolic award with proper diligence, how can they be expected to exert genuine pressure for “releasing Jimmy Lai”? Their support likely extends no further than mere “solidarity.” For Jimmy Lai and his supporters to still fantasize about external forces securing their acquittal is nothing short of wishful thinking. Wake up!
InsightSpeak
** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **
Liang Yaqi, a member of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macau Studies
On 7 May 2026, the Central Criminal Court in London delivered its verdict on Chung Biu Yuen, Administrative Manager of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in London, and Chi Leung Wai, a former UK border official. This first national security case to be heard under the UK National Security Act 2023 has been marred by an air of irregularity from start to finish: persistent procedural flaws, a fragile chain of evidence and numerous inconsistencies have led many to question whether this was a fair trial or a carefully orchestrated political manoeuvre.
Preconceived notions shaped public perception, undermining procedural fairness. Even before the trial had formally commenced, the public discourse was already fraught with tension. Following the case’s first court appearance in 2024, a document purported to be a ‘summary of the charges’ circulated widely in the media. It disclosed in detail the defendant’s specific actions, included screenshots of CCTV footage from relevant activities, and even listed details concerning the London Economic and Trade Office’s involvement in the case, clearly intended to steer public attention towards the Office’s role. Some Hong Kong media outlets have questioned why, in the past, law enforcement agencies would typically handle indictments involving sensitive case details with great caution or even keep them confidential; the current situation appears rather unusual. Even before a jury has been selected and the formal trial has begun, the public and potential jurors have already been led by preconceived notions into a narrative of the case dominated by the prosecution. This directly crosses the red line set by Section 52(a) of the UK’s Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which prohibits the media from reporting content that may prejudice the defendant during the preliminary hearing stage. Before the defendants have even spoken, they have been labelled – this practice of ‘pre-conviction’ by the media is clearly extremely unfair to the defence and undermines procedural fairness.
The mysterious death of the third defendant has deepened the mystery surrounding the case. Even more chilling is the fact that shortly after the case was brought before the court, the third defendant, Matthew Trickett, a former Royal Marines serviceman, died under mysterious circumstances in a park. As a former soldier and an enforcement officer with the Home Office’s Immigration Service, Trickett could have provided crucial testimony to clarify whether the operation was ‘officially authorised’ or a private act. His sudden passing deprived the defence of a vital witness, preventing the full chain of evidence from being thoroughly examined in court and sparing the prosecution from the potential risks of cross-examination. Given the highly sensitive timing of his death, Trickett’s solicitor expressed shock at his passing, whilst some netizens have even suspected that he was “silenced”. Although the authorities have denied foul play, it is lamentable that the judicial process has been “streamlined” due to the death of a single individual.
The prosecution’s evidence was flimsy and unconvincing. Section 3 of the UK National Security Act 2023 stipulates that the offence of “aiding a foreign intelligence service” requires proof that the act “is likely to substantially assist a foreign intelligence service”. Yet throughout the trial, the prosecution failed to present any fundamental evidence that the defendant’s actions had substantially harmed UK national security. The alleged acts cited by the prosecution—such as the defendant’s purported surveillance of Hong Kong residents, unauthorised access to immigration databases, and door-to-door “debt collection”—sound more like ordinary criminal offences. The prosecution essentially pieced together a case based on electronic evidence such as communication records and financial transactions, yet never produced irrefutable proof that the defendant engaged in “intelligence activities” that posed an actual security threat to the UK. Forcing ordinary behaviour to be elevated to the level of national security constitutes a “hat trick” that fails to convince.
The judge’s guidance was markedly biased, contravening her role of impartiality. Prior to the verdict, the judge’s instructions to the jury were also biased. She repeatedly emphasised the prosecution’s perspective regarding the admissibility of evidence and the assessment of witness credibility. For instance, although much of the evidence presented by the prosecution in court occurred before the UK National Security Act 2023 came into force—and should therefore not have retroactive effect—the judge reminded the jury that they could treat this as “background information” to understand the defendant’s network of contacts. Although the judge stated that such background information could not be used directly as a basis for conviction, and this appeared neutral on the surface, in reality it had already painted the defendant in a negative light. Furthermore, when the jury had deliberated for several days without reaching a ‘unanimous verdict’ on all charges against the defendant, the judge instructed that the standard be lowered from a ‘unanimous verdict’ to a ‘majority verdict’. Whilst this move was not unlawful, in such a highly sensitive national security case, might the proactive lowering of the threshold to facilitate a conviction give rise to public doubts regarding the impartiality of the trial? Might it create a negative perception that the judicial process is not sufficiently fair?
The jury’s deliberations were fraught with difficulties, and there appeared to be political pressure. The deliberation phase was marked by a series of setbacks: one juror was hospitalised due to ill health, whilst another requested to withdraw. Chi Leung Wai’s defence counsel at one point questioned whether this juror had been ‘bullied’ by other dissenting jurors; this was precisely why the judge instructed the jury that day to ‘respect differences of opinion but continue to work together to seek consensus’.After four days of deliberations, the jury had still failed to reach a “unanimous verdict”, indicating that it was struggling to reach a consensus on the facts of the case. It was not until the fifth day, following the judge’s instruction to lower the standard of the verdict, that the jury, after a protracted stalemate, barely met the minimum threshold of a 10-2 majority verdict on the charge of “assisting a foreign intelligence agency”, whilst they remained unable to reach a verdict on the charge of “foreign interference”. Whether this outcome truly reflects the jurors’ inner conviction or is merely a compromise born of prolonged pressure is a matter for reflection.
The UK National Security Act is defined in overly broad terms, making it highly susceptible to expansion and abuse. A review of the entire case process exposes the fundamental flaw of the UK National Security Act 2023, which is its extreme vagueness. The Act stipulates that the offence of “aiding a foreign intelligence service” is committed whenever an act is likely to assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out activities relating to the UK; the definition of a foreign intelligence service is even broader, encompassing any person conducting intelligence activities for or on behalf of a foreign state. It is clear that the threshold for the offence of “aiding a foreign intelligence service” is so low that it could encompass many ordinary activities. Even Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer appointed by the UK Home Secretary, has publicly stated that the relevant provisions of the UK National Security Act 2023 could extend to political, journalistic and other everyday activities, placing legitimate lobbying, journalistic investigations and even ordinary commercial activities at risk of criminalisation. He emphasised that the Act must be subject to oversight to prevent its “abuse and overreach”.
Ironically, the UK completely ignores the fact that its own national security provisions are vague and broadly applicable, and turns a blind eye to the various flaws in the adjudication of national security cases, yet it repeatedly criticises and meddles in the Hong Kong National Security Law. Such double standards appear particularly hypocritical and laughable. If the UK truly cares about the rule of law, it would do well to return to the principles of evidence-based adjudication and procedural justice, rectify errors in cases as soon as possible, and ensure that the judiciary does not become a mere appendage of politics, thereby trampling the spirit of the rule of law underfoot!
