China-US commanders hold first closed-door Taiwan Strait talks

The outside world learned of it late. On September 4, the Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China released the information, and only then did people learn this low-key meeting had taken place on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference in Victoria, Canada. 

General Yang Zhibin, commander of the Eastern Theater Command, and Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, had just completed their first face-to-face closed-door bilateral meeting.

Yang and Paparo: Chinese, US theater commanders hold closed-door Canada talks.

No advance briefings or warm-up. By the time the news went public, the sit-down between the two top frontline commanders was already an accomplished fact.

This meeting carried real weight. Yang Zhibin runs the Eastern Theater Command, the force that stares directly at the Taiwan Strait hotspot. Paparo, for his part, oversees US military deployments across the entire western Pacific. Both men are directly tied to the ship-and-aircraft standoffs and air-and-sea frictions that have flared repeatedly around the Taiwan Strait in recent years.

As the two officers responsible for this most sensitive front line, they sat down face to face for the first time. The significance spoke for itself.

Roll the clock back a few years, and direct communication between the two militaries at the theater-command level had gone dark. In the wake of then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan, China suspended three major military communication channels: talks between Chinese and US theater commanders, Defense Policy Coordination Talks between the two defense ministries, and meetings under the China-US Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA).

For a stretch after that, air and naval forces from both sides crossed paths at close range across the western Pacific with striking frequency. The two forces operated practically on top of each other, yet frontline commanders had no window for direct communication. A small tactical friction, paired with an information blackout, carried a real risk of being magnified into strategic miscalculation.

Since then, the two militaries have repaired their communication step by step. Commanders from the Southern Theater Command met with Paparo first by video and later in person, mainly to handle South China Sea issues. But for the Taiwan Strait, the highest-risk zone in the Indo-Pacific, the face-to-face link between theater commanders stayed vacant throughout. The closed-door talks in Canada count as finally patching that gap.

A Hardliner’s Pragmatic Bottom Line

This time, the US side was relatively direct. It disclosed simultaneously the key points to the outside world as soon as the talks ended.

The core consensus between the two sides came down to two points. First, keep high-level communication channels continuously open. Second, push the two militaries' air and naval forces to follow safe and professional codes of conduct, so as to minimize the probability that miscalculation erupts into conflict.

In effect, the US side laid its cards on the table: the competition will continue, but it does not want accidental friction sliding into a hot war.

Paparo is nobody's dove. His past remarks on China have been consistently tough. He is the admiral who declared, "I want to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape using a number of classified capabilities," and the talk of dominance in the Indo-Pacific also traces back to him. Many regard him as a representative hardliner on China.

But he clearly understands what the lack of direct, effective communication mechanisms means in the western Pacific, a stretch of sea where Chinese and US forces operate in dense numbers. In this meeting, he reached consensus with the Chinese side on maintaining high-level communication and reducing the risk of miscalculation. 

Frequent Pacific encounters raise miscalculation risks.

Objectively, that consensus also reflects the US recognition that without effective crisis management, once air and sea frictions escalate, the trajectory of the situation would be extremely difficult for the US side to control unilaterally.

Bolting a communication "safety guardrail" onto tensions that could escalate at any moment, so as to avoid an accidental exchange of fire, is a realistic need both sides share.

But one point must be made clear: restored communication does not mean the differences have disappeared, and risk management is not the same as compromising positions. Dialogue exists to "prevent accidents," not to resolve the fundamental contradictions of the Taiwan Strait.

Standing mechanisms of the past, such as the China-US Maritime Military Safety Consultations, focused on lowering the probability of accidental conflict. The resumption of face-to-face contact at the theater commander level now reinforces, on top of that existing framework, the highest-level direct line to the front. 

Restoring a mechanism at this tier fills the most glaring gap of the past two years: when the two sides' forces confronted each other at close range in sensitive waters, precisely when direct commander intervention was needed most, a dialogue window was missing for a time.

Reopening frontline communication is, in essence, fitting a "fuse" to the zone with the highest friction risk. Above the First Island Chain, the US military is still pushing intermediate-range missile deployments and tightening coordination with allies. The PLA's combat readiness patrols around Taiwan and its routine air and maritime rights protection operations will not stop because of this. 

What communication builds is a "firewall." It cannot change the reality of strategic rivalry between the two sides, and it will not change the nature of the Taiwan Strait issue in any way.

The Firewall That Cannot Reshape the Contest

The biggest risk point between China and the United States has always been the Taiwan issue. China regards it as the core of its core interests.

If the US side sits down to talk about communication and stability while continuing to play so-called 'edge ball' on the Taiwan issue, such communication can hardly be called sincere and cannot truly mitigate risks. Arms sales to Taiwan keep moving forward. Official exchanges keep expanding. Military exercises around China's periphery are held frequently.

Genuine positive interaction requires the US side to earnestly abide by the One-China principle. It must deliver on its commitment to control 'Taiwan independence.' It must stop sending wrong signals to 'Taiwan independence' forces. Otherwise, a few meetings alone cannot eliminate the hidden dangers in the Taiwan Strait situation.

The meeting stayed low-key throughout. No media buildup. No public relations performance. That restraint was itself a pragmatic choice.

Both sides understand the meeting's value is not publicity. It lies in being a buffer valve for frontline maritime and air confrontations. If an emergency erupts at sea or in the air, at least a communication channel remains to prevent small incidents from turning into major chaos.

PLA advances maritime power, asserting rights at sea.

Zoom out, and the broader picture is clear. Military deterrence keeps ratcheting up on one side. High-level frontline meetings are being resumed on the other to manage risk. That is the true shape of today's China-US military contest.

China is firm in safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the same time it rationally manages crises and prevents the situation from being hijacked by unexpected events. Running deterrence and risk control in parallel is the realistic logic that should govern interactions between responsible major countries.

The Art of Stopping War

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Just a week ago, observers were still asking who would become the third user of China's homegrown J-10CE fighter. A week later, that question can barely keep up with events. Bangladesh, Azerbaijan and Indonesia have all reported new progress at almost the same time.

The Buyers Line Up

In a matter of days, the overseas customer list for a single fighter jet has jumped from two countries to several. That kind of surge is rare in today's international arms market.

Start with Bangladesh. Reports say the country's price list and budget for 20 J-10CEs have gone public, and negotiations have entered the final stage.

The process has moved fast. Last year China said it would actively push air force cooperation with Bangladesh and deepen practical exchanges. The two sides then reached an intent to sell, and now a detailed quotation sits on the table. At this point, what remains is mainly a question of when the pen hits the paper. What public channels show so far is still the quotation and the progress of negotiations. No formal contract has appeared yet.

The Bangladesh track is no surprise in itself. The country has long used a considerable amount of Chinese equipment for air defense and training. Public records show that man-portable missiles like the FN-6 have even been licensed for local production.

On that foundation, buying the J-10CE is a step up along an existing channel. It is not a new system built from scratch.

Azerbaijan displayed a full-scale J-10CE model bearing the national flag, an eagle emblem and President Aliyev's signature at the defense exhibition.

Baku's Bold Signal

Azerbaijan is the loudest thread in this story, and the one that demands the most caution. At a defense exhibition in Baku, organizers rolled out a full-scale J-10CE model dressed up in remarkable detail. The vertical tail carries Azerbaijan's national flag and eagle emblem. The fuselage wears the number "27-001," and President Aliyev's signature sits above the canard.

On top of that, reports say Baku has scrapped plans to buy follow-on batches of the JF-17 Block 3 and is preparing to pivot to the J-10CE instead.

The signaling here is hard to miss. The JF-17 Block 3 is a fourth-and-a-half-generation fighter, but it is still a light jet. Public information puts the Azerbaijani Air Force's inventory at roughly a dozen-plus MiG-29s, a handful of MiG-21s and more than ten Su-25s. That is over thirty aging aircraft waiting to be replaced.

The logic writes itself. Use the JF-17 first to bed down the Chinese-style ecosystem of logistics, munitions and data links, then jump straight to a medium-weight fourth-and-a-half-generation mainstay fighter. For a country caught in the Caucasus arms race, it is an understandable path.

But a model, a paint scheme and a signature are all exhibition-floor theater. The claim that Baku canceled its JF-17 order exists only at the level of reports. Neither development has been confirmed by a formal contract, and should not be treated the as a signed deal.

What can be said with confidence is this: Azerbaijan's interest in the J-10CE is now out in the open, and it sits just one step away from a final deal.

Jakarta Closes the Loop

Indonesia's courtship has run the longest. It has also come full circle.

From May to June 2025, the rumor was that Jakarta would buy second-hand J-10s. Observers even debated whether the jets would be early J-10As or the scarcer J-10Bs fitted with passive phased-array radar.

By October 2025, the story had escalated to funding for 42 new J-10CEs. The defense minister said at the time that the fighters would soon be flying over Jakarta.

Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff Haryono, asked about progress on the fighter purchase, urged the public to be patient. Reports say the first batch of J-10s is expected to arrive within six months.

In June 2026, media reports said the number had been adjusted and that the package would include PL-15E long-range air-to-air missiles. Deputy Defense Minister Donny Ermawan Taufanto backed the plan, saying it would strengthen modern combat capability while delivering value for the defense budget.

Then, on October 5, Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff Hajorono told reporters in Jakarta that the public should patiently await the J-10s. He said the first batch would arrive in six months.

That was the final click. The air force's top professional officer had matched his message to procurement details that had been tightening step by step, closing the loop.

Indonesia's choice looks even more revealing against the makeup of its own fleet. The air force already flies Russian Su-27/30s, American F-16s, French Rafales and British Hawk trainers.

For a buyer accustomed to shopping around, adding a cost-effective medium fighter fills a gap in the system. It also preserves Jakarta's leverage to keep pushing on price and hedge its bets across multiple suppliers.

As for social media claims by users saying they are relatives of Indonesian pilots, some have alleged that the pilots have already gone through training in China. Without any official confirmation, those accounts remain unverified rumors.

After Pakistan inducted the J-10CE, observers turned their attention to the liveries and movements of potential users such as Uzbekistan.

Combat Sells Jets

Line the threads up and a rough trajectory emerges. Pakistan was the first overseas customer, and around the May 7 air battle the jet got its first real combat test. After that, doubts over whether Chinese fighters had seen actual combat gradually gave way to open discussion.

Uzbekistan was widely seen as the second user. The cold-toned new paint scheme that surfaced in CCTV coverage was generally read as matching its Central Asian livery style.

Then came Bangladesh's quoted scheduling, Azerbaijan closing in as a system user, and finally a bet from a regional heavyweight like Indonesia.

Behind the thread sits a familiar logic of the arms trade. Combat performance is the best advertisement, system integration is the hardest bar to clear, and price is what pulls hesitant buyers to the table.

France's Rafale has dominated the market for years on the strength of the first two. Its product is combat-proven and comes with NATO data links and logistics standards built in.

Now the J-10CE packs all three advantages: combat experience, system integration and price. That gives the expansion of its customer list a solid footing.

Signatures Still Count

A name on a list is not a signed contract. There is still real distance between the two. A budget is a budget, a quote is a quote, and a signature on a model is just a gesture. Only an order committed to paper counts.

Egypt is the ready example. Cairo got a close-up look at the Chinese Air Force's full system during joint exercises. Yet it remained boxed in by U.S. military loans and France's after-sales lock-in, and turned back to order more Rafales.

The lesson is clear. The cost of switching systems remains the most realistic hurdle Chinese equipment must clear as it goes global.

So the real story is not three buyers appearing overnight. It is the J-10CE graduating from "a candidate aircraft with real combat results" to "a mature option with a delivery record." The combat results of the May 7 air battle are all holding a place for the next user on the potential list.

Whether names like Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt show up depends on whether each can clear the hurdles of U.S. loans, the NATO system, and technical standards.

The international arms trade has always followed one rule: when equipment proves itself in real combat, customers crowd the shelves. The market attention now swirling around the J-10CE is, roughly speaking, one more confirmation of that rule.