Skip to Content Facebook Feature Image

100 Warships, No Codename: Think Tank Sizes PLA Posture

Blog

100 Warships, No Codename: Think Tank Sizes PLA Posture
Blog

Blog

100 Warships, No Codename: Think Tank Sizes PLA Posture

2026-11-18 01:10 Last Updated At:01:10

The Western Pacific put on a rare show in early November: the aircraft carriers Liaoning and Fujian were both active at sea at the same time. On November 3, Wu Chao-hsieh, the head of Taiwan's security department, posted a situation map on social media claiming that the Chinese Navy and China Coast Guard had deployed more than 100 vessels in the Western Pacific. That figure comes from Taiwan's own public statements, and no independent source can currently verify it ship by ship.

Two Carriers at Sea

More Images
Taiwan map: PLA, coast guard vessels spread wide around island

Taiwan map: PLA, coast guard vessels spread wide around island

Liaoning carrier group drills in distant Western Pacific.

Liaoning carrier group drills in distant Western Pacific.

Fujian steps up sea trials toward full combat readiness.

Fujian steps up sea trials toward full combat readiness.

US carrier strike group transits waters for Middle East

US carrier strike group transits waters for Middle East

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) offers a different reading. China, the US think tank argues, may be running a large-scale military operation that was never publicly announced and carries no fixed exercise name, simulating the encirclement and isolation of the Taiwan region. Make no mistake: this is an analytical judgment built from vessel deployments, satellite imagery and open-source information. It is not how the Chinese military describes its own activity.

Taiwan map: PLA, coast guard vessels spread wide around island

Taiwan map: PLA, coast guard vessels spread wide around island

The Liaoning's route tells its own story. According to the Joint Staff Office of Japan's Ministry of Defense, the carrier group transited the Miyako Strait into the Western Pacific on October 14. It then passed through the Basilan Strait in the Philippines into the Sulawesi Sea on October 22-23, swung northeast into the Philippine Sea, and was still operating there in early November. Its escorts included multiple 10,000-ton Type 055 destroyers, Type 052D destroyers and large replenishment ships.

Liaoning carrier group drills in distant Western Pacific.

Liaoning carrier group drills in distant Western Pacific.

The Fujian is at a different stage. November 5 marks one year since it entered service. Satellite imagery from November 2 showed the carrier about 115 kilometers southeast of Sanya, heading east.

CCTV reporting makes the progress explicit. Within its first year of service, the Fujian sailed south through the Taiwan Strait into the South China Sea, then north to the East China Sea and Yellow Sea, completing cross-sea-area test training. The takeaway: the carrier has demonstrated the ability to operate in distant waters across sea areas. And 2026 looms as the pivotal year for its transition from basically forming combat capability to fully forming it.

Reading the Deployment

First, a word of caution. Satellite imagery can confirm where the vessels are and which way they are heading. It cannot prove the vessel has already sailed toward southern Taiwan.

The Fujian may be in service and equipped with electromagnetic catapults, but a new carrier's combat power takes more than that. Carrier-aircraft coordination, deck scheduling, formation operations and sustained support all have to fall into place. The Liaoning is operating in distant seas while the Fujian climbs its training curve. Two carriers at sea at the same time does not mean they have joined forces.

Fujian steps up sea trials toward full combat readiness.

Fujian steps up sea trials toward full combat readiness.

The 100-plus vessels marked on Wu Chao-hsieh's situation map need to be broken down. The ISW report says they include both naval and coast guard forces, spread across two main areas. One group sits between Taiwan and Guam, including the Liaoning carrier formation and multiple vessel formations from three theater commands.

The other group operates around Taiwan, including at least six coast guard ships and an unspecified number of naval vessels. The ISW particularly stresses that the deployment involves the Eastern, Southern and Northern theater commands. Major surface forces from three coastal theater commands all taking part in far-seas operations at the same time is not common.

Air power deserves attention too. Taiwan announced on November 3 that it detected 49 PLA aircraft sorties between 6 a.m. on November 2 and 6 a.m. on November 3. Of those, 31 entered its declared air defense identification zone.

US carrier strike group transits waters for Middle East

US carrier strike group transits waters for Middle East

The ISW believes these aircraft activities may have coordinated with the vessel deployments toward the Western Pacific. But the specific aircraft types, the nature of the missions, and whether they coordinated directly with the carrier formation all remain unclear. Public evidence is still thin.

The Missing Codename

The missing codename is the tell. In recent years, large PLA operations around the Taiwan Strait usually came with a public exercise name, such as the Joint Sword series.

A name is a signal in itself. It tells outsiders that forces are exercising, and it hints at how far they plan to go.

ISW's read is blunt: this time there is none. Ships are moving, aircraft are flying, and a carrier is leaving port, but no public exercise label has appeared.

The think tank sees a possible capability on display: shifting fast from routine deployment to military operations, while skipping the buffer step of announcing an exercise. That logic holds up only with a caveat. No public announcement does not mean combat missions are already under way, and it certainly does not mean a combat state has begun.

Large-scale force movements can still be training, deterrence, or combat-readiness verification.

ISW also reads the pieces together: the carriers Liaoning and Fujian, China Coast Guard forces, and deployments from three theater commands. Taken as one picture, they point toward a sea-air isolation concept.

Isolation, in this framing, is not a classic amphibious landing. It is about controlling maritime traffic, deterring outside support forces, and coordinating pressure from several directions.

Not the Same Chessboard

One contrast is easy to miss: the US carrier is in transit, not in a standoff. While the Liaoning operates in the Philippine Sea and the Fujian trains in the South China Sea, the US Navy's Roosevelt carrier strike group is sailing from the South China Sea to Singapore. The Roosevelt reportedly arrived in Singapore on November 6 and docked at Changi Naval Base, and will continue through the Strait of Malacca to the Middle East to relieve the Washington, which has already been deployed for a long stretch.

The Western Pacific may look like two Chinese carriers against one American carrier. But the US carrier is hurrying off to another theater. Sharing the same broad waters does not mean playing on the same chessboard.

The value of the ISW report is not whether it correctly guessed what China is doing. It lies in what it reveals about the focus of US defense analysts. They used to ask whether the PLA will fight. Now they ask how far the PLA can go without firing a shot.

From exercise to quarantine, from landing to blockade, the analytical framework has shifted. The US assessment of the Taiwan Strait situation is extending from the outbreak of conflict toward gray-zone pressure.

But there is a fundamental logical mismatch here worth pointing out. When US think tanks use terms such as "quarantine" and "blockade" to describe PLA actions, they are essentially fitting US military concepts onto Chinese military practice.

Beijing Sets the Pace

On Oct. 29, China's Ministry of National Defense gave the official line on the Liaoning carrier group's far-sea activity: it is a routine arrangement inside the annual plan, meant to test and improve far-sea combat capability, and it does not target any specific country or objective.

That is the official characterization of the Liaoning carrier group's training. It cannot be stretched into one blanket label for the Fujian's current departure from port, every vessel deployment, and all air activity.

For China, the hard power is already visible: two carriers deployed, three theater commands coordinating, and sea and air forces linking up in multiple directions. That buildup is real.

The Fujian is still moving from basic combat capability toward full combat capability. The Liaoning, by contrast, has already settled into a smooth far-sea deployment rhythm.

As for when these capabilities might be used, and in what form, the initiative sits in Beijing, not in an ISW report.

US think tanks can analyze, speculate, and stay alert. But the PLA moves at its own pace, and one report will not change that.




The Art of Stopping War

** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **

On October 14, the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning led its group through the Miyako Strait into the Western Pacific Ocean for far-sea training.

That same day, the Joint Staff Office of Japan's Ministry of Defense released its regular update on PLA ship and aircraft movements. The photos showed more than the carrier and its escorts. A large drone cruised at high altitude, its long, slender wings upturned at the tips. That was the WZ-7.
 
A Flyby That Says Plenty
The F-15J fighters dispatched by the Japan Air Self-Defense Force tailed it the whole way. From far below, they trained their cameras on it.

Japanese F-15Js shadowed the WZ-7, cameras aimed up.

Japanese F-15Js shadowed the WZ-7, cameras aimed up.

 
These photos say plenty on their own. Japan has long relied on close-range visual observation to track PLA ships and aircraft moving in and out of the First Island Chain. The images are usually sharp enough to count the carrier aircraft on deck and read the hull numbers.
 
Not this time. What the F-15J caught was the WZ-7 as a distant silhouette high in the frame, clear in outline but far away. The camera could reach it only thanks to a telephoto lens and an upward shooting angle. The fighter itself could never climb to that altitude.
 
Out of Reach
The WZ-7 cruises at around 18,000 meters, can climb to roughly 20,000 meters when it needs to, and flies at more than 750 kilometers per hour, according to public information. That puts it beyond the effective operating range of conventional fighter jets.
 
Its joined-wing layout, with fore and aft wings staggered and connected, squeezes maximum lift and range out of a limited wingspan. That lets the drone loiter at altitude for more than ten hours. Its job is not to charge into a combat zone and open fire, but to watch from a safe height and record everything moving on the sea and in the air.
 
The F-15J's problem runs deeper than simply not reaching 20,000 meters. On paper, the fighter's maximum ceiling is close to 19,000 meters, but that figure assumes an empty load, light fuel and ideal weather. A real combat sortie means hauling external fuel tanks and air-to-air missiles. The added weight drags the usable ceiling down.
 
Up high, the air is thin. Holding speed means keeping the afterburner lit for long stretches, fuel burn multiplies, and the tanks empty fast. Japanese pilots have said in interviews that when tracking the WZ-7, they mostly operate at around 15,000 meters. To get a clear look at the target above, the rear-seat weapons systems officer has to point a camera straight up.

WZ-7 has appeared near the First Island Chain before.

WZ-7 has appeared near the First Island Chain before.


 
In other words, even if an F-15J claws its way to its maximum altitude, the fuel and time left over are not enough for any kind of response. It has no margin to intercept and no margin to escort and drive the drone off. All it can do is snap a photo from afar and leave it at that.
 
Those photos are showing up in Japan's Ministry of Defense reports more and more often. They have almost become a fixed image.
 
Running on Empty
Tokyo knows the problem well. In recent years, the Air Self-Defense Force has repeatedly rewritten its interception rules, cutting back on emergency scrambles against aircraft of unknown nationality and saving its limited F-15J fleet for the missions that matter most.
 
The fleet itself is wearing out. Aging airframes, scarce spare parts and rising maintenance hours all stack up, and the number of jets ready to fly keeps shrinking.
 
Japan is pushing ahead with F-15J modernization, aiming to fit new active electronically scanned array radars and long-range missiles, and it is gradually bringing in the F-35. But re-equipping takes time, upgrade slots are limited, and none of it solves the near-term problem of tracking a high-altitude reconnaissance target.
 
The WZ-7 is no stranger to the First Island Chain. The Air Self-Defense Force has spotted it over the East China Sea and around the Miyako Strait several times before, but Japanese notices back then usually said only "presumed to be a Chinese unmanned aircraft" without confirming the model.
 
That changed on September 27 this year, when the Southern Theater Command organized a joint sea-and-air exercise around Scarborough Shoal. A CCTV Military report explicitly said the WZ-7 and the KJ-500 took part. It was the first time official media confirmed the drone had joined a theater-level joint exercise.
 
From the South China Sea to the East China Sea, this aircraft is becoming a routine sight.
 
A System, Not a Plane
The same thinking shows up across the rest of the fleet. The KJ-500 pulls sea and air targets into a single situational picture, then pushes it out over data links to ships, aircraft, and shore-based command posts.
 
The division of labor is clear. Unmanned reconnaissance aircraft see far and see long, airborne early warning aircraft gather and distribute the information, and surface vessels handle the response. This chain runs smoothly only because of years spent building communications and data links. Take one platform out of the system, and even the most advanced hardware accomplishes little on its own.

Japan photographed the WZ-7 shows the drone has entered the category of things that must be tracked and recorded.

Japan photographed the WZ-7 shows the drone has entered the category of things that must be tracked and recorded.


 
Seen this way, the scene over the Miyako Strait was less a victory for any single piece of equipment than a shift in how reconnaissance gets done. In the past, Japan used its geographic edge and a dense network of bases along the First Island Chain corridors to watch PLA movements in and out at close range, continuously, and with a fairly clear picture.
 
Now the PLA has pushed its reconnaissance platforms to high altitude and distant seas. Observation no longer comes from just one direction, and the two sides' situational awareness is moving toward parity. The very fact that Japan photographed the WZ-7 shows the drone has entered the category of things that must be recorded and answered.
 
One detail is easy to miss. The WZ-7's airframe carries low-observable coatings, and it is smaller than a manned fighter, so its radar cross-section is modest. That compresses the distance at which Japanese radars can pick it up and sharply degrades the continuity of tracking.
 
What the Air Self-Defense Force sees may not be the whole picture, and what its notices release may not be the full story. That kind of incomplete information works against Tokyo when it tries to judge the intensity and rhythm of the other side's reconnaissance.
 
The New Normal
Looked at this way, a single low-angle photograph can only say so much. But the trend it captures is unmistakable.
 
The information asymmetry in the First Island Chain passages is being erased, bit by bit. Reaching 20,000 meters is just a technical detail. What really changes the game is the system behind the aircraft, one that links land-based, maritime and aerial reconnaissance and command assets into a single web.
 
Japan will keep taking pictures, and those pictures will keep getting published. But what they record is no longer what it was twenty years ago.

Recommended Articles