In February 2026, the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region issued its final judgment in the case of Jimmy Lai for conspiracy to collude with foreign forces, sentencing him to 20 years’ imprisonment. The proceedings spanned 156 days of public hearings, examined 2,220 pieces of evidence, and culminated in an 855-page judgment. This case is among the most emblematic judicial practices since the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law and exemplifies the rule of law’s normative function.
For a prolonged period, Hong Kong society has experienced normative disarray amid clashing values: illegal acts have been rebranded as “protests,” foreign interference reframed as “international support,” and the media’s role distorted by ideological confrontation. In this context, the Lai case systematically addressed these disorders through judicial authority, and its normative effects have served as an institutional anchor for reconstructing Hong Kong’s social norms.
From a legal-education perspective, judicial rulings have a socializing function: by formally condemning unlawful acts, they shape the public’s cognitive framework regarding legitimate behavior. The Lai case’s normative significance is especially evident in this respect.
Before 2019, Apple Daily employed selective reporting, visual rhetoric, and emotional mobilization to recast violent behavior as “mere protests,” thereby fostering a distorted cognitive schema among youths with underdeveloped legal consciousness. Among those arrested during the 2019 protests, more than 17% were under 18, and students accounted for nearly 40%. This phenomenon aligns with the “modeling effect” in social learning theory: when media leaders confer moral legitimacy on illegal acts, the rule-of-law concept is systematically undermined during youth socialization.
The court’s judgment made clear that Lai was not merely exercising free speech; he was organizing and intentionally colluding with foreign forces. His rhetoric on “protest” fundamentally conflicted with his conduct: while he incited youths to take to the streets with radical language, he sought to mitigate his own legal risks through asset transfers. The court’s adverse findings went beyond assigning criminal liability; they also demystified the discourse that had cloaked these actions. In sociological terms, the judgment functions as “institutional re-education,” conveying that illegal acts, even when justified by asserted values, cannot gain legitimacy within the rule-of-law framework. Reconstructing youth values begins with clearly delineated normative boundaries.
From a legal functionalist standpoint, the case reshapes media ethics on two levels: first, it rejects the erroneous claim that “virtuous motives absolve legal responsibility,” reaffirming that legal evaluation turns on conduct; second, it furnishes the media sector with operational guidelines grounded in judicial authority, stipulating that journalism must not transgress the fundamental norm of national security. For a society in which the media’s role has been significantly alienated, this normative restructuring is foundational to ethical renewal.
On procedural justice, the Lai proceedings offer compelling empirical support. External actors repeatedly characterized the case as a “political trial,” even circulating false claims about mistreatment. The record contradicts these assertions: first, the trial lasted 156 days, during which the defendant testified for 52 days; his defense counsel confirmed in court that his detention conditions and medical care met standards, and the defendant had “no complaints.” Second, the proceedings were public, attended by multiple foreign consular officials and representatives of international organizations. Third, three judges designated under the National Security Law deliberated with caution and unanimously found the defendant’s testimony contradictory and inconsistent with objective evidence. The 855-page judgment analyzed each of the 2,220 evidentiary items, demonstrating a density of reasoning and rigor that is exemplary even within common law practice.
In sum, the Lai case’s normative significance should not be assessed solely by the sentence imposed. From an integrated legal-sociological perspective, it represents an important institutional practice through which Hong Kong recalibrated norms after a period of value disarray, relying on the authority of law. It performed integrative functions across three domains—youth values, media professional ethics, and public confidence in the rule of law—through transparent procedures, rigorous legal reasoning, and clear normative declarations.
Reshaping social decay is a long-term historical process, and no single case can accomplish every institutional mission. Even so, the normative certainty offered by the Lai judgment has established a solid foundation for Hong Kong’s transition from radical opposition amid value pluralism to rational integration under a rule-of-law consensus. In this sense, the 855-page judgment is not only a legal reckoning with past unlawful conduct but also a guide to the values underpinning future social order.
Professor LAU Chi Pang
Member, Legislative Council, Hong Kong SAR
InsightSpeak
** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **
Liang Yaqi, a member of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macau Studies
On 7 May 2026, the Central Criminal Court in London delivered its verdict on Chung Biu Yuen, Administrative Manager of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in London, and Chi Leung Wai, a former UK border official. This first national security case to be heard under the UK National Security Act 2023 has been marred by an air of irregularity from start to finish: persistent procedural flaws, a fragile chain of evidence and numerous inconsistencies have led many to question whether this was a fair trial or a carefully orchestrated political manoeuvre.
Preconceived notions shaped public perception, undermining procedural fairness. Even before the trial had formally commenced, the public discourse was already fraught with tension. Following the case’s first court appearance in 2024, a document purported to be a ‘summary of the charges’ circulated widely in the media. It disclosed in detail the defendant’s specific actions, included screenshots of CCTV footage from relevant activities, and even listed details concerning the London Economic and Trade Office’s involvement in the case, clearly intended to steer public attention towards the Office’s role. Some Hong Kong media outlets have questioned why, in the past, law enforcement agencies would typically handle indictments involving sensitive case details with great caution or even keep them confidential; the current situation appears rather unusual. Even before a jury has been selected and the formal trial has begun, the public and potential jurors have already been led by preconceived notions into a narrative of the case dominated by the prosecution. This directly crosses the red line set by Section 52(a) of the UK’s Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which prohibits the media from reporting content that may prejudice the defendant during the preliminary hearing stage. Before the defendants have even spoken, they have been labelled – this practice of ‘pre-conviction’ by the media is clearly extremely unfair to the defence and undermines procedural fairness.
The mysterious death of the third defendant has deepened the mystery surrounding the case. Even more chilling is the fact that shortly after the case was brought before the court, the third defendant, Matthew Trickett, a former Royal Marines serviceman, died under mysterious circumstances in a park. As a former soldier and an enforcement officer with the Home Office’s Immigration Service, Trickett could have provided crucial testimony to clarify whether the operation was ‘officially authorised’ or a private act. His sudden passing deprived the defence of a vital witness, preventing the full chain of evidence from being thoroughly examined in court and sparing the prosecution from the potential risks of cross-examination. Given the highly sensitive timing of his death, Trickett’s solicitor expressed shock at his passing, whilst some netizens have even suspected that he was “silenced”. Although the authorities have denied foul play, it is lamentable that the judicial process has been “streamlined” due to the death of a single individual.
The prosecution’s evidence was flimsy and unconvincing. Section 3 of the UK National Security Act 2023 stipulates that the offence of “aiding a foreign intelligence service” requires proof that the act “is likely to substantially assist a foreign intelligence service”. Yet throughout the trial, the prosecution failed to present any fundamental evidence that the defendant’s actions had substantially harmed UK national security. The alleged acts cited by the prosecution—such as the defendant’s purported surveillance of Hong Kong residents, unauthorised access to immigration databases, and door-to-door “debt collection”—sound more like ordinary criminal offences. The prosecution essentially pieced together a case based on electronic evidence such as communication records and financial transactions, yet never produced irrefutable proof that the defendant engaged in “intelligence activities” that posed an actual security threat to the UK. Forcing ordinary behaviour to be elevated to the level of national security constitutes a “hat trick” that fails to convince.
The judge’s guidance was markedly biased, contravening her role of impartiality. Prior to the verdict, the judge’s instructions to the jury were also biased. She repeatedly emphasised the prosecution’s perspective regarding the admissibility of evidence and the assessment of witness credibility. For instance, although much of the evidence presented by the prosecution in court occurred before the UK National Security Act 2023 came into force—and should therefore not have retroactive effect—the judge reminded the jury that they could treat this as “background information” to understand the defendant’s network of contacts. Although the judge stated that such background information could not be used directly as a basis for conviction, and this appeared neutral on the surface, in reality it had already painted the defendant in a negative light. Furthermore, when the jury had deliberated for several days without reaching a ‘unanimous verdict’ on all charges against the defendant, the judge instructed that the standard be lowered from a ‘unanimous verdict’ to a ‘majority verdict’. Whilst this move was not unlawful, in such a highly sensitive national security case, might the proactive lowering of the threshold to facilitate a conviction give rise to public doubts regarding the impartiality of the trial? Might it create a negative perception that the judicial process is not sufficiently fair?
The jury’s deliberations were fraught with difficulties, and there appeared to be political pressure. The deliberation phase was marked by a series of setbacks: one juror was hospitalised due to ill health, whilst another requested to withdraw. Chi Leung Wai’s defence counsel at one point questioned whether this juror had been ‘bullied’ by other dissenting jurors; this was precisely why the judge instructed the jury that day to ‘respect differences of opinion but continue to work together to seek consensus’.After four days of deliberations, the jury had still failed to reach a “unanimous verdict”, indicating that it was struggling to reach a consensus on the facts of the case. It was not until the fifth day, following the judge’s instruction to lower the standard of the verdict, that the jury, after a protracted stalemate, barely met the minimum threshold of a 10-2 majority verdict on the charge of “assisting a foreign intelligence agency”, whilst they remained unable to reach a verdict on the charge of “foreign interference”. Whether this outcome truly reflects the jurors’ inner conviction or is merely a compromise born of prolonged pressure is a matter for reflection.
The UK National Security Act is defined in overly broad terms, making it highly susceptible to expansion and abuse. A review of the entire case process exposes the fundamental flaw of the UK National Security Act 2023, which is its extreme vagueness. The Act stipulates that the offence of “aiding a foreign intelligence service” is committed whenever an act is likely to assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out activities relating to the UK; the definition of a foreign intelligence service is even broader, encompassing any person conducting intelligence activities for or on behalf of a foreign state. It is clear that the threshold for the offence of “aiding a foreign intelligence service” is so low that it could encompass many ordinary activities. Even Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer appointed by the UK Home Secretary, has publicly stated that the relevant provisions of the UK National Security Act 2023 could extend to political, journalistic and other everyday activities, placing legitimate lobbying, journalistic investigations and even ordinary commercial activities at risk of criminalisation. He emphasised that the Act must be subject to oversight to prevent its “abuse and overreach”.
Ironically, the UK completely ignores the fact that its own national security provisions are vague and broadly applicable, and turns a blind eye to the various flaws in the adjudication of national security cases, yet it repeatedly criticises and meddles in the Hong Kong National Security Law. Such double standards appear particularly hypocritical and laughable. If the UK truly cares about the rule of law, it would do well to return to the principles of evidence-based adjudication and procedural justice, rectify errors in cases as soon as possible, and ensure that the judiciary does not become a mere appendage of politics, thereby trampling the spirit of the rule of law underfoot!
