In February 2026, the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region issued its final judgment in the case of Jimmy Lai for conspiracy to collude with foreign forces, sentencing him to 20 years’ imprisonment. The proceedings spanned 156 days of public hearings, examined 2,220 pieces of evidence, and culminated in an 855-page judgment. This case is among the most emblematic judicial practices since the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law and exemplifies the rule of law’s normative function.
For a prolonged period, Hong Kong society has experienced normative disarray amid clashing values: illegal acts have been rebranded as “protests,” foreign interference reframed as “international support,” and the media’s role distorted by ideological confrontation. In this context, the Lai case systematically addressed these disorders through judicial authority, and its normative effects have served as an institutional anchor for reconstructing Hong Kong’s social norms.
From a legal-education perspective, judicial rulings have a socializing function: by formally condemning unlawful acts, they shape the public’s cognitive framework regarding legitimate behavior. The Lai case’s normative significance is especially evident in this respect.
Before 2019, Apple Daily employed selective reporting, visual rhetoric, and emotional mobilization to recast violent behavior as “mere protests,” thereby fostering a distorted cognitive schema among youths with underdeveloped legal consciousness. Among those arrested during the 2019 protests, more than 17% were under 18, and students accounted for nearly 40%. This phenomenon aligns with the “modeling effect” in social learning theory: when media leaders confer moral legitimacy on illegal acts, the rule-of-law concept is systematically undermined during youth socialization.
The court’s judgment made clear that Lai was not merely exercising free speech; he was organizing and intentionally colluding with foreign forces. His rhetoric on “protest” fundamentally conflicted with his conduct: while he incited youths to take to the streets with radical language, he sought to mitigate his own legal risks through asset transfers. The court’s adverse findings went beyond assigning criminal liability; they also demystified the discourse that had cloaked these actions. In sociological terms, the judgment functions as “institutional re-education,” conveying that illegal acts, even when justified by asserted values, cannot gain legitimacy within the rule-of-law framework. Reconstructing youth values begins with clearly delineated normative boundaries.
From a legal functionalist standpoint, the case reshapes media ethics on two levels: first, it rejects the erroneous claim that “virtuous motives absolve legal responsibility,” reaffirming that legal evaluation turns on conduct; second, it furnishes the media sector with operational guidelines grounded in judicial authority, stipulating that journalism must not transgress the fundamental norm of national security. For a society in which the media’s role has been significantly alienated, this normative restructuring is foundational to ethical renewal.
On procedural justice, the Lai proceedings offer compelling empirical support. External actors repeatedly characterized the case as a “political trial,” even circulating false claims about mistreatment. The record contradicts these assertions: first, the trial lasted 156 days, during which the defendant testified for 52 days; his defense counsel confirmed in court that his detention conditions and medical care met standards, and the defendant had “no complaints.” Second, the proceedings were public, attended by multiple foreign consular officials and representatives of international organizations. Third, three judges designated under the National Security Law deliberated with caution and unanimously found the defendant’s testimony contradictory and inconsistent with objective evidence. The 855-page judgment analyzed each of the 2,220 evidentiary items, demonstrating a density of reasoning and rigor that is exemplary even within common law practice.
In sum, the Lai case’s normative significance should not be assessed solely by the sentence imposed. From an integrated legal-sociological perspective, it represents an important institutional practice through which Hong Kong recalibrated norms after a period of value disarray, relying on the authority of law. It performed integrative functions across three domains—youth values, media professional ethics, and public confidence in the rule of law—through transparent procedures, rigorous legal reasoning, and clear normative declarations.
Reshaping social decay is a long-term historical process, and no single case can accomplish every institutional mission. Even so, the normative certainty offered by the Lai judgment has established a solid foundation for Hong Kong’s transition from radical opposition amid value pluralism to rational integration under a rule-of-law consensus. In this sense, the 855-page judgment is not only a legal reckoning with past unlawful conduct but also a guide to the values underpinning future social order.
Professor LAU Chi Pang
Member, Legislative Council, Hong Kong SAR
InsightSpeak
** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **
Liang Yaqi, Chinese Association of Hong Kong & Macao Studies
Since the release of Hong Kong’s first five-year plan, one line of interpretation has grouped together its provisions on cooperation with the mainland and security governance, and from there concluded that a substantial part of the plan is not really about Hong Kong’s own development. With the latest Policy Address continuing to place strong emphasis on national security, the argument goes a step further: Hong Kong’s development agenda, it is said, is increasingly being crowded out by other priorities.
The central problem with this interpretation is that it artificially separates policy objectives that are, in reality, deeply intertwined.
For Hong Kong today, can “integration with the mainland,” “security” and “economic development” really be treated as three distinct agendas?
The answer is more complicated than it may appear.
On the one hand, the five-year plan explicitly calls for Hong Kong to align itself proactively with national development strategies. On the other, it also defines Hong Kong as a “super connector” between the mainland and global markets.
The provisions concerning the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, or CEPA, go further still, calling for wider access to the mainland market for Hong Kong service providers. In finance, the plan proposes deeper links with both mainland and overseas markets, enabling international capital to participate through Hong Kong in the growth of China and Asia while helping mainland companies and capital expand globally.
To classify all of this simply as “supporting mainland policy” is already to assume something that should instead be examined: that anything connected with national development is, by definition, separate from Hong Kong’s own development.
Yet Hong Kong’s economic structure makes that distinction increasingly difficult to sustain.
Hong Kong’s most distinctive economic value lies in its ability to connect two economic spheres vastly larger than itself. On one side is mainland China; on the other are global capital, trade, professional services and institutional networks. Much of Hong Kong’s competitive advantage has long rested on precisely this intermediary role.
That is why, in many cases, there is no clear line separating policies that “serve the country” from policies that “develop Hong Kong.”
Rather than asking how much of the plan is devoted to the mainland, the more meaningful question is whether those connections ultimately make Hong Kong more difficult to replace.
If closer access to China’s vast market generates greater demand for international financing, asset management, legal and arbitration services, RMB business and corporate globalization in Hong Kong, then deeper integration with the mainland and a stronger international role can advance at the same time.
Security should be understood within the same framework.
A common intuition is that policy attention is finite: the more emphasis placed on security, the less attention remains for economic growth and social welfare. But for a highly open international financial centre such as Hong Kong, security and development do not exist in a simple zero-sum relationship.
Capital does not merely chase the highest nominal return. It seeks the best risk-adjusted return.
For a highly open international financial centre, security is not separate from development. It is part of the economic environment that businesses and investors assess when deciding where to place capital, establish regional headquarters or manage wealth. They look not only at taxes and growth prospects, but also at financial stability, reliable infrastructure, cybersecurity and regulatory predictability.
In other words, companies choosing Hong Kong are not simply choosing lower taxes or office space. They are choosing an institutional environment that reduces uncertainty.
The International Monetary Fund’s 2026 assessment of Hong Kong illustrates this relationship well. On the one hand, the IMF recognised the financial system’s strong capital and liquidity buffers and its sound regulatory foundations. On the other, it noted that Hong Kong’s highly open and interconnected economy leaves it exposed to geopolitical and trade tensions, volatility in global financial markets, and disruptions to trade and capital flows. It also highlighted risks associated with commercial real estate, cybersecurity and operational resilience.[1]
The more open Hong Kong is, the more important strong risk management becomes.
This is also why the five-year plan’s emphasis on “coordinating development and security” should not be understood solely through a narrow conception of security. The plan also calls for stronger economic and urban resilience, better risk-warning mechanisms, closer cross-departmental coordination, improved cybersecurity and emergency governance, and greater use of technology to enhance the efficiency of public administration.
These priorities reflect a broader shift in global economic governance in recent years: economic competition is moving away from a singular pursuit of maximum efficiency towards a balance between efficiency and resilience.
The earlier phase of globalisation prized the lowest possible costs, minimal inventories and ever-longer cross-border supply chains. After the pandemic, geopolitical conflict, financial volatility and repeated supply-chain disruptions, however, governments and companies have become increasingly concerned with a different question: when a system is hit by a shock, can it continue to function?
For Hong Kong, that resilience is itself part of what an international financial centre offers. Clear rules, predictable enforcement and reliable institutions allow businesses to price risk with greater confidence; uncertainty, by contrast, raises risk premiums and discourages long-term investment.
The proper measure of Hong Kong’s future security governance, therefore, is not how often security appears in the five-year plan or the Policy Address. The more important question is whether that governance ultimately makes Hong Kong more predictable.
Over the next five years, several developments will be worth watching.
As Hong Kong deepens its links with the mainland, will demand increase for international capital to use the city as a platform for allocating assets in China and across Asia? As mainland companies expand globally, will they rely more heavily on Hong Kong’s financial, legal and professional services? Will Hong Kong’s ties with Europe, the United States, ASEAN and the Middle East deepen at the same time? And will security governance reduce the uncertainty costs inherent in operating an open economy?
If these functions become stronger, then “integrating into national development,” “safeguarding security” and “remaining international” are not competing objectives.
They may, in fact, be three dimensions of the same question:
In an increasingly fragmented and uncertain world, how can Hong Kong remain an interface that both China and the rest of the world want to use—and one that neither can easily replace?
[1]https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2026/114/002.2026.issue-114-en.xml?cid=576398-com-dsp-crossref
