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Democrats Demand Starlink Records as Senate Subpoena Power Nears

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Democrats Demand Starlink Records as Senate Subpoena Power Nears
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Democrats Demand Starlink Records as Senate Subpoena Power Nears

2026-11-21 09:30 Last Updated At:09:30

Two US Democratic senators have written to Elon Musk, demanding that SpaceX preserve every record tied to restrictions on Ukraine's use of Starlink and Starshield.

Senators demand SpaceX keep Ukraine Starlink records.

Senators demand SpaceX keep Ukraine Starlink records.

Democrats Demand the Records

The dust had barely settled on Nvidia founder Jensen Huang's resignation saga when Washington swung its political spotlight onto another Silicon Valley titan: Elon Musk.

Huang announced his departure on November 12 over a personal controversy. The very next day, November 13, Senate Foreign Relations Committee ranking Democrat Jeanne Shaheen and Senator Chris Coons moved in. They wrote to SpaceX CEO Musk demanding the company preserve all documents and communications since September 1 concerning restrictions on Ukraine's use of the Starlink and military-grade Starshield satellite networks.

No wonder the news set Chinese-language social media buzzing, with some joking that after dealing with 'Daddy Huang,' it was now 'Old Ma's' turn.

The two lawmakers set a hard deadline. SpaceX must confirm in writing by November 30 that it has properly preserved all records, including Musk's communications with the White House, the Pentagon and Trump. They also pressed three core questions: Who conveyed, approved or issued the restrictions? Which restrictions remain in force today? And has SpaceX assessed the consequences of these practices for Ukraine's air defense?

This is not the first time Democrats have pressed the issue. Back on October 15, the same two senators joined four Republican senators in a letter to the Department of Defense Inspector General, pressing for an answer as to whether senior Pentagon officials took part in the decision-making. On October 19, four Democratic lawmakers also wrote to SpaceX seeking an explanation.

Now the stakes are higher. With the midterm elections settled and Democrats holding a Senate majority, Coons is expected to chair the Foreign Relations Committee once the new Congress takes office in January 2027, formally wielding congressional subpoena power.

In an earlier interview with CBS, Coons said bluntly that if Musk could, on personal whim or political judgment, arbitrarily shut down a communications service funded by US taxpayers and vital to the battlefield, it would mean too much power concentrated in one person's hands.

The 161 km/h Cutoff

To understand why Washington politicians refuse to let this go, let's take a look at how the satellite system actually works on the battlefield. Starlink is SpaceX's low-Earth-orbit satellite internet for civilian and commercial users. Starshield is the encrypted military version the same company has built specifically for the US government and military.

Since the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out, that satellite link has carried almost everything on the Ukrainian front line, from drone operations, artillery coordination to logistics supply.

Satellite gear: vital lifeline on Ukraine's front lines.

Satellite gear: vital lifeline on Ukraine's front lines.

Then came the cutoff. Starting in mid-October this year, Ukraine says, Starshield and Starlink terminals on the front line were hit with a movement speed limit, without any prior warning. Any equipment carrying a terminal that moves faster than 161 kilometers per hour (about 100 miles per hour) loses its satellite connection automatically.

The problem is that the target flies much faster. The Associated Press notes that Russia's main jet-powered drones can reach about 370 kilometers per hour (about 230 miles per hour). Picture a high-speed chase where the moment a race car floors it past the speed limit, someone remotely kills its navigation signal. Ukrainian drones that take off to intercept inside Ukraine go dark the instant they accelerate, and simply cannot catch their targets.

The letter says these communications outages hit in two windows: October 13 to 24, and November 12.

In a mid-October media interview, Ukrainian President Zelensky complained publicly about the restrictions. The same batch of terminals, he noted, still connected normally above 100 miles per hour when traveling outside Ukraine, yet were restricted only inside it. He said bluntly that he felt betrayed by the US side.

Who Gave the Order

From Washington's vantage point, this is the strange part. The technical fingerprints of the satellite speed limit are there for all to see. Yet not one senior American political or business figure will admit to giving the order.

Musk moved fast to wash his hands of it. When news of the speed limit first broke on October 14, he drew a sharp line on the social platform X. The Starshield system, he stressed, is owned and controlled by the US government: "Starshield systems are owned and controlled by the US government. Any limits on speed or usage are decided by the US military and ultimately POTUS". The civilian Starlink service, he added, is strictly barred from offensive military operations.

The message was clear. Musk was kicking the responsibility straight through the White House gates.

Yet the leaks from officials flatly contradict one another. Reuters at one point cited sources saying the restriction order originated inside the White House. CNN quoted senior officials denying the order came from Trump, with some even suggesting Musk bore the greater responsibility. The Wall Street Journal and CBS, citing people in the know, said it was Musk's own call.

Trump himself flatly denied any role when reporters asked in mid-October. It was not him, he said, and he did not think it was Musk either.

Then came the twist. Just 10 days later, on October 24, with service back to normal, Musk reversed himself on X. He accused Ukraine of violating Starlink's terms of service by using the civilian service for lethal offensive drone strikes, and hinted the earlier restrictions were meant to close a system loophole.

That account pulled the initiative right back to SpaceX itself. The Ukrainian military shot back that Starlink simply cannot operate on the Russian territory. As Kyiv put it: "Ukraine replied that this was technically impossible over Russian territory."

The story did not end there. On November 12, Ukraine said the 161 km/h speed limit had resurfaced on the front lines. On November 15, Zelensky publicly urged the US side and Musk to lift the restrictions, warning they would weaken Ukraine's ability to protect energy facilities before winter.

SpaceX hit back at once, publicly dismissing the claims as false and insisting that no changes had been made to the system. Even inside Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, accounts differed on whether the front lines were under restrictions again.

Outsourcing Runs Wild

This murky saga keeps getting louder in Washington, and for two reasons. Democrats have added Musk's past work leading the "Department of Government Efficiency" (DOGE), which sharply cut federal spending, to their list of investigations. Just as important, wariness over runaway military-industrial outsourcing now crosses party lines.

Democrats target Musk's DOGE stint, Starlink records.

Democrats target Musk's DOGE stint, Starlink records.

Four Republican senators who signed the earlier letter to the Department of Defense Inspector General, including Cornyn, Tillis, Collins and Murkowski, are demanding to know whether the Pentagon took part in the decision. After receiving a classified briefing, Republican Senator Cramer publicly conceded that the United States should not put too many eggs in one company's basket.

The warning signs were already there in 2023. That year, Musk refused a Ukrainian request to activate Starlink service near Crimea, setting off a storm of controversy. The episode exposed the hidden risk of leaving the battlefield switch for commercial satellites in the hands of a single corporate executive.

Starshield was supposed to fix all this. It was billed as a more reliable communications system for the US military, one fully controlled by the government. Yet even the military network Washington itself relies on has produced a Rashomon-style dispute with no clear lines of authority or responsibility.

This is what happens when the US government hands its most core military communications services to private tech giants. Once something goes wrong on the front lines, the White House and the company cannot even say clearly who actually holds the final switch.

The Fight Is Not Over

One thing is certain: the fight over who controls battlefield communications is far from over.

Come January, a new US Congress is sworn in and Democrats pick up subpoena power in the Senate. A political-business mystery so murky that US senators are sending letters demanding to know "who exactly is giving the orders" is set to stay a flashpoint in Washington's power games.




Deep Throat

** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **

The Takaichi government plans to build permanent defense research bases at Japanese universities by fiscal 2031. The move chips away at the Japanese academic world's postwar bottom line: "never engage in military research".

Japan defense lab tests equipment; seeks university research help.

Japan defense lab tests equipment; seeks university research help.

The Plan Unveiled

On paper, Tokyo's political establishment has long flown the banners of the pacifist constitution and an exclusively defense-oriented policy. But in recent years, its moves in the security field have grown steadily more aggressive.

On November 10, 2026, the Nikkei broke the story in a report on specialized defense research institutes. The Japanese government plans to set up permanent defense research bases inside national, public and private universities and national research and development corporations, meaning government-funded research institutions, by fiscal 2031. The bases will target cutting-edge fields such as artificial intelligence (AI) and space technology, with the aim of turning research results into the development of defense equipment.

Research results can in principle be published openly, the report added. Where exactly the bases will be located, how many will be set up, and who will run them are all still under review.

This is no isolated idea. It is a key piece of Tokyo's latest overhaul of defense policy. On the same day, November 10, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the Japanese Innovation Party began working-level talks within the ruling camp on revising the Three Strategic Documents, aiming for formal approval at a Cabinet meeting in mid-to-late December this year.

The Three Strategic Documents are three core guidelines led by the National Security Strategy, effectively the master blueprint for Japan's diplomatic and military course. The government is now weighing whether to write the plan for university research bases directly into one of them: the Defense Buildup Program.

Salami Slicing the Taboo

To grasp the weight of this move, you first have to open the postwar ledger of Japan's academic world. As a defeated nation in World War II, Japan's scientific community took a hard look at the wartime lesson of scholars who helped the military develop weapons. The Science Council of Japan, which speaks for the country's scientists, declared as early as 1950 that it would "never engage in scientific research for the purpose of war". It reaffirmed in 1967 that it would not conduct research for military purposes. Then in 2017 it issued yet another statement confirming that it stood by that position, and it demanded that universities set up censorship systems.

Japan science council repeatedly opposes war-purpose research.

Japan science council repeatedly opposes war-purpose research.

But that line of defense has already given way. A Yomiuri Shimbun editorial points out that the body banned defense research right up until 2022. In recent years, though, academia's attitude toward the boundary of dual-use technology has subtly shifted, and the firewall has loosened.

Long before the bottom line formally loosened, big money had quietly pried open a gap. In fiscal 2015, the then Abe Shinzo administration rolled out the "Security Technology Research Promotion System" through the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency. Flying the flag of dual-use, it openly invited advanced basic research in the defense field. It dangled competitive research funding to draw proposals from universities and companies, then paid out the winners through commissions or subsidies.

This is salami tactics, one thin slice at a time. Each cut looks small. By the time you look up, the sausage is almost gone.

Japan defense ministry solicits university and corporate research proposals.

Japan defense ministry solicits university and corporate research proposals.

Figures released by the Ministry of Defense on October 20 this year show just how wide that gap has been torn. For fiscal 2026, the program drew 560 research applications, a surge of roughly 65 percent from 340 the year before. That is a record since the system was created. Applications from universities and other research institutions jumped from 123 the previous year to 291 this year.

In the end, 47 projects won funding this year. For the first time, the list includes projects from 11 universities, among them Nagoya University, Osaka University and Keio University.

The signal behind these numbers could not be clearer. The "absolutely not" once written in black and white has become one application form after another on the Ministry of Defense's funding list.

More telling still is the upgrade in what this plan actually is. Past open calls were one-off project grants. When the project ended, the team disbanded. The permanent base the Takaichi government plans to set up by fiscal 2031 means something else entirely: dedicated long-term staff, laboratory equipment and a fixed funding stream.

Moving from soliciting projects to establishing bases is, in essence, a shift from borrowing the brains of universities to stationing the military on campus for the long haul.

Double Standards and Backlash

The starkest contrast is the yawning gap between Tokyo's vigilance abroad and its loosening at home. In recent years, Japanese politicians and media have repeatedly talked up the risk of technology leaking out through China's military-civil fusion strategy. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) even disclosed a survey in the Diet showing that in fiscal year 2019 more than 50 Japanese universities had exchange agreements with Chinese research institutions. The finding put Japanese society on high alert.

Yet in the Defense White Paper published on August 4, 2026, Tokyo stated in black and white that it would cultivate the defense industry to cope with new forms of warfare. It also pledged to make greater use of the advanced research capabilities of universities and national research and development corporations. When others turn civilian research to military ends, Tokyo denounces it in righteous tones. When its own turn comes, all it takes is a fresh coat of paint labeled defense, and the same behavior suddenly looks fully justified.

This step-by-step advance has also triggered sharply divergent reactions inside Japan. In an October 26 editorial, The Asahi Shimbun said bluntly that universities are getting too close to the military and warned of the danger.

The Yomiuri Shimbun bucked that view in its November 15 editorial. It argued that Japan has fallen behind in drones and AI and should further strengthen cooperation with universities.

Anxiety is also brewing among the public and academia. The Global Times reported on November 12 that Hibi Yoshitaka, a professor of humanities at Nagoya University, lamented on social media that the situation now coming to light would have been utterly unimaginable not long ago. The newspaper also noted that among the comments on his post, some Japanese netizens said outright that this was a typical sign of militarism in bud.

There is an irony here. The very university where this professor teaches, Nagoya University, is one of the 11 universities mentioned earlier whose research topics were adopted by the Ministry of Defense for the first time this year. On one campus, some scholars are deeply worried while research projects are already winning the ministry's approval. It is a telling snapshot of Japan's new reality.

Following the Money

Tokyo is in a hurry, and the reason is money. Back in June, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the Japanese Innovation Party submitted recommendations to the prime minister, demanding stronger research and development to keep pace with the new ways of fighting that AI and drones are bringing.

The money tells its own story. In the Ministry of Defense's budget request outline for fiscal 2027, total defense spending has already hit about 8.9 trillion yen, roughly HK$450 billion. By the ministry's own measure, that is yet another record high.

For now, the permanent university base sits in the outline as an request item with no specific amount filled in. Only when the government's formal budget proposal lands in late December will outsiders see the true scale of this special allocation.

The wordplay is telling. The Nikkei headline pointed to a dedicated defense research institute, while the body text settled for the more restrained term base. The gap between the two leaves plenty of room to wonder.

Where the institute will ultimately sit, and how far its results will be made public, remain open questions. The answers await the list with the figures written on it, due in late December.

But the trajectory is already unmistakable. From the declaration that once vowed 'absolutely not', to the 560 topics on the application forms, to the permanent base about to be written into Japan's security documents, academia's peace line is being hollowed out step by step. And with each step, the picture gets clearer.

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