Trump has now found himself in an uncomfortable spot: American farmers are howling over China’s refusal to buy US soybeans, a crisis that is hitting the Republican heartland the hardest.
On October 1, local time, Trump announced he was preparing for a “major topic of discussion” with President Xi Jinping at the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit to demand that China restart its soybean purchases.
Trump vows a soybean showdown with Xi at APEC. (AP Photo)
Trump’s Social Media Bluster
True to form, Trump took to his own social media platform, Truth Social, to blame China for the farmers’ woes, claiming Beijing was using “negotiations” as an excuse not to buy. He declared his administration would direct part of US tariff revenues into subsidies for farmers while accusing former president Joe Biden of failing to enforce an earlier multibillion-dollar trade agreement with Beijing that promised more farm exports. Trump ended his rant with the slogan: “MAKE SOYBEANS, AND OTHER ROW CROPS, GREAT AGAIN!!”
The high-stakes APEC meeting will be held in Gyeongju, South Korea, from October 31 to November 1. Back on September 22, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized that Heads-of-state diplomacy plays an irreplaceable role in providing strategic guidance for the China-US relations. The presidents of China and the US maintain close exchanges and communication” and "The two sides are in communication”. However, “I have no information to share at the moment,” said the MFA spokesperson.
Trump’s fiery post sent ripples through the market. According to Bloomberg, US soybean futures spiked 1.9% before slipping back, their sharpest daily swing since late August.
The report also noted that only a day earlier, Republican senators vented their frustration during a meeting with US Ambassador to China David Perdue, warning that Beijing was unlikely to resume soybean purchases soon and blasting the lack of a long-term US strategy.
The problem for Trump is obvious: farming states, for long a Republican stronghold, are being hammered by the collapse of the export market. With federal subsidies shrinking, America’s rural communities are under immense strain—turning into a political headache for Trump’s party ahead of next year’s midterm elections. GOP lawmakers from the agricultural heartland are now pressing harder than ever for Trump to cut a deal with Beijing.
China Holds the Cards
As the world’s largest soybean buyer, China wields enormous influence. US Department of Agriculture data shows that by mid-September, weeks into the new sales year, China had not booked a single cargo of American soybeans—the first time this has ever happened since records began in 1999. Last year, China bought over $12 billion worth of US soybeans, accounting for more than half of America’s soybean exports.
But Trump’s go-it-alone tariff war has backfired badly on his own farmers. Traders note that suspending tariff hikes won’t help much when China still imposes a 23% duty on American soybeans. By comparison, Argentina and Brazil enjoy tariffs of only 3%. Argentina has even scrapped its grain export taxes temporarily, making its soybeans cheaper still.
China’s tariffs make US soybeans uncompetitive against Brazil and Argentina. (AP Photo)
Farmers Feeling the Pain
The White House has started to realize the political cost. On September 25, Trump promised reporters in the Oval Office that tariff revenues would be redirected to farmers, insisting they are “for a little while going to be hurt, until it kicks in, the tariffs kick in to their benefit,” and “Ultimately, the farmers are going to be making a fortune.”
Yet for America’s farmers, the promise of eventual benefits remains abstract, while their mounting losses are very real. Axios reported that farmers now face between $100 and $150 in losses per acre.
To add to Trump’s troubles, Bloomberg pointed out that his “tariff cash for farmers” scheme could collapse in court. His tariffs, imposed under emergency powers, were already ruled unlawful by a lower court. If the Supreme Court upholds that ruling, the federal government may be forced to refund tens of billions of dollars in collected tariffs—a devastating blow to Trump’s trade war narrative.
Deep Throat
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South Korea wants its military back. Seoul hopes to reclaim wartime operational control of its own armed forces from the United States within two years. Washington refuses to commit to a specific transfer date.
Seoul Wants Control Back
Wartime operational control answers a simple question: if war breaks out again on the Korean Peninsula, who commands South Korean troops? For now, the answer is Washington. That authority has sat in American hands since shortly after the Korean War erupted in 1950, according to reports.
Lee chairs top military meeting, pushes wartime command transfer.
Under current arrangements, designated South Korean units would fold into the ROK-US Combined Forces Command in wartime, led by a US Army general. That general is Brunson, the commander of US Forces Korea. He also commands the roughly 28,500 American troops stationed in the South.
Exactly which units are involved is classified. But they are believed to include all of the South Korean Army's frontline combat units, plus most of its Air Force and Navy forces.
Washington Won't Commit
South Korean President Lee Jae-myung is pressing to take back wartime operational control. On October 19 he said Seoul "should take back wartime operation control at an early time" and is "fully capable of it". The government's target is to finish the transfer by 2028, two years before Lee's term ends in 2030.
The US military has its own timeline. At a congressional hearing in April, Brunson said it had already submitted a roadmap to hit the transfer conditions by the first quarter of 2029 at the latest. He was describing when the conditions could be met, not setting a handover date.
USFK's Brunson testifies on transfer timetable to Congress.
Washington's official line is simple: No transfer until agreed conditions are met. At a think tank seminar in Washington on October 14, Brunson said any handover must rest on satisfying the relevant conditions and cannot be tied to a political timetable. US officials repeated the message on October 27, saying "the United States intends to transfer OPCON to South Korea when the agreed conditions are met."
A South Korean defense ministry spokesperson voiced the fear out loud on October 15. In her personal view, the handover may never happen if Washington keeps moving the goalposts.
The Kyunghyang Shinmun reported on October 27 that, in midyear consultations, the US demanded that stronger air-ground communications through the SATURN program be added as a new yardstick for the transfer. SATURN is a next-generation, NATO-standard anti-jamming technology for upgrading military radios, and its full deployment has slipped from 2028 to 2032. That delay has some in the South Korean government worried that, if Washington keeps adding evaluation items, Lee's goal of finishing the transfer within his term will be at risk.
The two defense chiefs met in Cebu, the Philippines, on October 28. They agreed to push the annual security consultative meeting, originally set for October, to early 2027 and to hold talks in Washington in December.
South Korean media blamed scheduling difficulties. The Korea Herald, though, noted earlier speculation that the delay was tied to the fallout from the US-Iran conflict and the US midterm elections.
South Korean Defense Minister Kang Shin-chul said on October 30 that US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth reaffirmed the transfer commitment at the meeting and dismissed talk of alliance discord as "fake news." National Security Office Director Wi Sung-lac said South Korea expects progress at the talks early next year.
DMZ Remark Sparks Uproar
Brunson stepped into another storm around the same time. On Oct. 14, he told the same seminar that, from the UN Command's point of view, South Korea starts at the barbed-wire fence on the southern edge of the Demilitarized Zone.
Barbed wire, guard posts on DMZ's southern side.
The DMZ is the buffer strip along the inter-Korean border, running about 2 kilometers on each side, and the fence sits on the southern side. Read literally, his line left the band north of the fence outside South Korean territory.
Kim Min-seok of the ruling Democratic Party said the remark was highly inappropriate on constitutional grounds. South Korea's Ministry of National Defense called it the UNC commander's personal view, and the Army chief of staff told a parliamentary audit he could not agree.
The UN Command said the comment was tied to management duties under the armistice agreement. One South Korean online program headlined the story by asking whether Brunson was a governor-general, a loaded reference to the top Japanese ruler of Korea from 1910 to 1945.
Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said on Oct. 27 that he had met US Ambassador to South Korea Michelle Steele the previous week and lodged a protest, according to reports.
Lawmakers Split on Transfer
The sparks flew on October 26, when the National Assembly grilled the Ministry of National Defense in a parliamentary audit and the command issue set off a fierce debate. Sung Il-jong of the opposition People Power Party warned that the matter concerns the life and death of the nation, and demanded the defense minister be extremely cautious when offering recommendations.
Kang Shin-chul pushed back. He called the claim that transferring command authority would endanger South Korea's security an exaggeration. Given the uncertainty in the global security environment, he questioned whether Seoul could keep betting everything on US forces.
Some commentators read those remarks as doubting the US military. The ministry clarified the next day that Kang was rebutting lawmakers' concerns about the transfer, and stressed the importance of mutual trust.
Within the ruling party, some wanted a harder line. Kim Byung-joo, a Democratic Party lawmaker who serves as the president's defense policy adviser, said that if Washington keeps obstructing the transfer process, South Korea should declare it will exercise wartime operational control on its own. He also proposed legislation making clear that the president can hold supreme command even in wartime.
The JoongAng Ilbo pushed back in an editorial. A unilateral declaration that bypasses consultations, it argued, would only damage the negotiations.
Kang Shin-chul rejected the approach the same day. Command authority, he said, must be transferred through close consultations between the two countries, on the premise of mutual trust.
China Looms Behind Conditions
So why does Washington insist on the conditions? Kim Yeol-soo, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for Military Affairs, points to what he calls an undisclosed motive: keeping influence over the South Korean military to counter challenges from China.
The context he cites is telling. In May, Brunson compared South Korea to a dagger on a podcast at the US Army War College. Last year he went further, calling the country a fixed aircraft carrier between China and Japan.
Brunson explains US East Asia posture at US Army War College.
Beijing fired back. A spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in South Korea said on May 28 that his remarks had crossed the line.
Doo Jin-ho, a researcher at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University, sees it the same way. Washington, he said, wants to use the ROK-US alliance not only to deter North Korea but also to contain China.
The geography explains the stakes. China's Shandong Province sits only about 300 kilometers from the Korean Peninsula, he noted, and fighter jets could cross that gap in under 10 minutes. On strategic value alone, he said, the United States cannot afford to lose South Korea.
