Ng Hiuying
The conviction and sentencing of Jimmy Lai Chee-ying for conspiring to collude with foreign forces under Hong Kong’s National Security Law has drawn sustained international attention. Much of that attention has focused on Lai himself and on Apple Daily, the now-defunct newspaper he founded. Far less scrutiny, however, has been directed at the role of another media institution that has followed the case with striking persistence: The Wall Street Journal.
A review of the Journal’s coverage over the past year shows dozens of articles related to Lai, a substantial proportion of which are editorials or opinion pieces rather than straight news reporting. In both volume and continuity, this level of engagement exceeds that of most other major Western media outlets. The question, therefore, is not whether the case is newsworthy, but why this particular newspaper appears so invested in it.
The reasons become clearer when one examines the factual findings set out in the trial judgment.
An Unusually Dense Web of Personal Connections
In the court’s Reasons for Verdict, a document running to more than 800 pages, the term “Wall Street Journal” appears over 40 times. More importantly, Lai himself admitted in evidence that he had been “very close” to the Wall Street Journal people.
The judgment establishes that several key intermediaries who facilitated Lai’s contacts with senior US officials had professional ties to the Wall Street Journal. Mary Kissel and Matt Pottinger, both former editorial writers at the Wall Street Journal, later entered the highest levels of the US policy apparatus. In 2019, Kissel served as an aide to then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, while Pottinger was the Principal Deputy National Security Advisor. Another figure, David Feith —the Wall Street Journal’s former employee who later worked at the US State Department — was found to have conveyed advance information to Lai’s aide regarding Washington’s intention to revoke Hong Kong’s special status.
These connections were not incidental. They functioned as channels through which Lai gained access to figures such as Pompeo, Vice President Mike Pence, and other senior policymakers. In this sense, a shared professional background in the Journal’s opinion pages formed part of what might be described as the “lubricant” of Lai’s foreign lobbying activities.
The Journal as a Platform for Strategic Messaging
The judgment further records that in June 2019, former US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz suggested that Lai publish articles in major Western outlets, including The Wall Street Journal, to draw the attention of the White House to Hong Kong issues.
Crucially, the drafting of one such article was guided by Bill McGurn, Lai’s godfather and a member of The Wall Street Journal’s editorial board, who had previously served as President George W. Bush’s chief speechwriter. In an August 2019 draft sent by Lai to McGurn, Lai argued that the United States “must confront China, not appease it,” and urged measures including visa sanctions on Chinese and Hong Kong officials’ families, international condemnation of China’s religious persecution, and the establishment of a congressional panel to “monitor Beijing’s adherence to Hong Kong’s basic law”.
This article, the court found, set the tone for Lai’s subsequent public messaging — in newspaper columns, social media posts, and online broadcasts. It functioned as a kind of manifesto. Subsequent events confirmed its impact: Lai was informed on 25 February 2020 that his Wall Street Journal article published days earlier, “China’s Facade of Stability,” had been well received by Pence and his senior aides, who were anxious to see Lai when here, and discuss, among other things, Hong Kong’s forthcoming election.
If Apple Daily served as Lai’s domestic platform, the Wall Street Journal operated as his principal international outlet — an external-facing channel aimed at Western governments and audiences. This division of labour, as the evidence suggests, was strategic rather than accidental.
After Arrest: From Reporting to Advocacy
Following Lai’s arrest and subsequent conviction, the Wall Street Journal adopted an overtly supportive editorial posture. Beyond reporting on procedural developments, it repeatedly issued editorials and opinion columns passing value judgments on Hong Kong’s judiciary and on the case itself.
These pieces rarely engaged with the detailed factual findings of the court. Instead, they tended to subsume the criminal proceedings into a broader narrative of “political persecution”, “press freedom”, and “human rights crisis”. One editorial notoriously characterised Lai’s 20-year sentence as a “death sentence”, while others employed terms such as “China abuse Jimmy Lai” and “the Communists torture Jimmy Lai” to describe the legal process.
Given McGurn’s senior role within the Journal and his personal relationship with Lai, it is not unreasonable to infer that many of these editorials were shaped, if not authored, by him. Whatever the case, the tone and framing of the coverage suggest something closer to an advocacy campaign than detached commentary. The invocation of press freedom appears less an abstract defence of principle than an effort to rally support around a long-cultivated political ally.
Understanding the Pattern
Seen in this light, the Wall Street Journal’s intense focus on the Lai case is not simply a matter of journalistic zeal or the defence of universal values. It reflects a convergence of personal networks, long-standing ideological alignment, and concrete political interests — all documented, in substantial part, in the court’s findings.
This context helps explain why the Journal has continued to publish commentary critical of the Hong Kong courts despite repeated official rebuttals from the Hong Kong Government and the Commissioner’s Office of China’s Foreign Ministry in the Hong Kong SAR. For readers, recognizing this background does not require agreement with the verdict. It does, however, suggest the need for caution.
To read the Journal’s editorials on the Lai case without reference to these entanglements is to risk mistaking advocacy for analysis. A more informed assessment requires looking beyond the rhetoric of freedom and examining the specific relationships and actions that the court found, on the evidence, to constitute collusion.
Only then can the debate proceed on a clearer factual footing.
InsightSpeak
** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **
Liang Yaqi, Chinese Association of Hong Kong & Macao Studies
Since the release of Hong Kong’s first five-year plan, one line of interpretation has grouped together its provisions on cooperation with the mainland and security governance, and from there concluded that a substantial part of the plan is not really about Hong Kong’s own development. With the latest Policy Address continuing to place strong emphasis on national security, the argument goes a step further: Hong Kong’s development agenda, it is said, is increasingly being crowded out by other priorities.
The central problem with this interpretation is that it artificially separates policy objectives that are, in reality, deeply intertwined.
For Hong Kong today, can “integration with the mainland,” “security” and “economic development” really be treated as three distinct agendas?
The answer is more complicated than it may appear.
On the one hand, the five-year plan explicitly calls for Hong Kong to align itself proactively with national development strategies. On the other, it also defines Hong Kong as a “super connector” between the mainland and global markets.
The provisions concerning the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, or CEPA, go further still, calling for wider access to the mainland market for Hong Kong service providers. In finance, the plan proposes deeper links with both mainland and overseas markets, enabling international capital to participate through Hong Kong in the growth of China and Asia while helping mainland companies and capital expand globally.
To classify all of this simply as “supporting mainland policy” is already to assume something that should instead be examined: that anything connected with national development is, by definition, separate from Hong Kong’s own development.
Yet Hong Kong’s economic structure makes that distinction increasingly difficult to sustain.
Hong Kong’s most distinctive economic value lies in its ability to connect two economic spheres vastly larger than itself. On one side is mainland China; on the other are global capital, trade, professional services and institutional networks. Much of Hong Kong’s competitive advantage has long rested on precisely this intermediary role.
That is why, in many cases, there is no clear line separating policies that “serve the country” from policies that “develop Hong Kong.”
Rather than asking how much of the plan is devoted to the mainland, the more meaningful question is whether those connections ultimately make Hong Kong more difficult to replace.
If closer access to China’s vast market generates greater demand for international financing, asset management, legal and arbitration services, RMB business and corporate globalization in Hong Kong, then deeper integration with the mainland and a stronger international role can advance at the same time.
Security should be understood within the same framework.
A common intuition is that policy attention is finite: the more emphasis placed on security, the less attention remains for economic growth and social welfare. But for a highly open international financial centre such as Hong Kong, security and development do not exist in a simple zero-sum relationship.
Capital does not merely chase the highest nominal return. It seeks the best risk-adjusted return.
For a highly open international financial centre, security is not separate from development. It is part of the economic environment that businesses and investors assess when deciding where to place capital, establish regional headquarters or manage wealth. They look not only at taxes and growth prospects, but also at financial stability, reliable infrastructure, cybersecurity and regulatory predictability.
In other words, companies choosing Hong Kong are not simply choosing lower taxes or office space. They are choosing an institutional environment that reduces uncertainty.
The International Monetary Fund’s 2026 assessment of Hong Kong illustrates this relationship well. On the one hand, the IMF recognised the financial system’s strong capital and liquidity buffers and its sound regulatory foundations. On the other, it noted that Hong Kong’s highly open and interconnected economy leaves it exposed to geopolitical and trade tensions, volatility in global financial markets, and disruptions to trade and capital flows. It also highlighted risks associated with commercial real estate, cybersecurity and operational resilience.[1]
The more open Hong Kong is, the more important strong risk management becomes.
This is also why the five-year plan’s emphasis on “coordinating development and security” should not be understood solely through a narrow conception of security. The plan also calls for stronger economic and urban resilience, better risk-warning mechanisms, closer cross-departmental coordination, improved cybersecurity and emergency governance, and greater use of technology to enhance the efficiency of public administration.
These priorities reflect a broader shift in global economic governance in recent years: economic competition is moving away from a singular pursuit of maximum efficiency towards a balance between efficiency and resilience.
The earlier phase of globalisation prized the lowest possible costs, minimal inventories and ever-longer cross-border supply chains. After the pandemic, geopolitical conflict, financial volatility and repeated supply-chain disruptions, however, governments and companies have become increasingly concerned with a different question: when a system is hit by a shock, can it continue to function?
For Hong Kong, that resilience is itself part of what an international financial centre offers. Clear rules, predictable enforcement and reliable institutions allow businesses to price risk with greater confidence; uncertainty, by contrast, raises risk premiums and discourages long-term investment.
The proper measure of Hong Kong’s future security governance, therefore, is not how often security appears in the five-year plan or the Policy Address. The more important question is whether that governance ultimately makes Hong Kong more predictable.
Over the next five years, several developments will be worth watching.
As Hong Kong deepens its links with the mainland, will demand increase for international capital to use the city as a platform for allocating assets in China and across Asia? As mainland companies expand globally, will they rely more heavily on Hong Kong’s financial, legal and professional services? Will Hong Kong’s ties with Europe, the United States, ASEAN and the Middle East deepen at the same time? And will security governance reduce the uncertainty costs inherent in operating an open economy?
If these functions become stronger, then “integrating into national development,” “safeguarding security” and “remaining international” are not competing objectives.
They may, in fact, be three dimensions of the same question:
In an increasingly fragmented and uncertain world, how can Hong Kong remain an interface that both China and the rest of the world want to use—and one that neither can easily replace?
[1]https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2026/114/002.2026.issue-114-en.xml?cid=576398-com-dsp-crossref
