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An Open Letter to President Donald J. Trump: Hear the Truth About Jimmy Lai’s Trial and Stand by Justice

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An Open Letter to President Donald J. Trump: Hear the Truth About Jimmy Lai’s Trial and Stand by Justice
Blog

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An Open Letter to President Donald J. Trump: Hear the Truth About Jimmy Lai’s Trial and Stand by Justice

2026-05-11 09:16 Last Updated At:09:17

Dear President Trump,

We Hong Kongers are shocked to learn that you, of all people, would claim to raise the subject of releasing Jimmy Lai during your much anticipated China visit. Jimmy Lai is not a champion of media freedom but a disgraced fake news propagator and convicted criminal. People around the world know you as a champion against fake news media and their malicious influence in politics. Therefore, we implore you to see through the lies and tricks of biased politicians and the media they control, so that you may form a well-informed judgment on this matter.

Since 2016, you have endured relentless attacks from fake news outlets backed by your political opponents. You have repeatedly called out The New York Times, The Washington Post, and CNN as dishonest, corrupt, and phony. As you said last year: “I actually believe it’s seditious, perhaps even treasonous, for The New York Times, and others, to consistently do FAKE reports in order to libel and demean ‘THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.’ They are true Enemies of the People, and we should do something about it.” No one understands better than you the damage fake news has done to America’s national security, social trust, and public well-being. You have been deeply hurt by misinformation, smeared by untruthful journalism, and seen your country’s security threatened by these media outlets. We firmly sympathize with you.

Yet, you have been profoundly misinformed about Jimmy Lai. The man you pleaded for is the mastermind behind decades of fake news and malicious political influence in Hong Kong. What he has done here dwarfs even the actions of outlets like CNN in the United States. His media group Next Digital and his newspaper Apple Daily spent years spreading vulgar misinformation, inciting hatred among Hong Kong people toward Hong Kong government and China’s central government, and advocating for international sanctions against China. His influence was directly behind the 2019 social unrest in Hong Kong, where misled citizens were instigated to join violent insurrections—like how Antifa terrorists, supported by radical left-wing media, have terrorized American cities. Lai and his media puppets notoriously churned out lies that Hong Kong’s police force has killed demonstrators, when it was masked rioters who used violence on both law enforcement officers and civilians. It was our city’s great misfortune that many peaceful folks were incited by Lai’s lies and participated in riots, many of them would later regret their mistakes.

As made clear by court rulings, Jimmy Lai has always used his media outlets as political tools, with the ultimate goal of overthrowing China’s central government. By plunging Hong Kong into chaos, he expected US and other Western countries to intervene and help him achieve his goal. For years, Jimmy Lai has tried to drag the United States into a direct and prolonged confrontation with China over Hong Kong, which would severely harm the interests of American investors in Asia. All these outrageous crimes just to realize his own twisted political ambitions. Lai’s actions have gone way beyond the scopes of freedom of expression, and have done tremendous damage to China’s national security, productive US-China relationship, and world peace.

As you can see, Jimmy Lai is no champion of media freedom or human rights. He is a dangerous demagogue who manipulates fake news to destabilize his country. His actions, in your own words, are “insidious” and “treasonous.” Imagine if someone in America openly sought support from another country to overthrow the U.S. constitution—surely neither you nor the American justice system would let them walk free.

Jimmy Lai’s trial was conducted over 150 days, with both prosecution and defense given full opportunity to present their cases. The judicial process was sound, transparent, and met all common law standards. The evidence against him, as detailed in the verdict, is irrefutable. Western media’s misinformation about his so-called “poor health” has also been debunked by his fine appearance in court.

Jimmy Lai’s trial marks a milestone in the global fight against fake news and its malicious political influence. As perpetrators like Lai are brought to justice, we can look forward to a healthier media environment—one purged of rampant misinformation, where journalism returns to its impartial roots. Hong Kong’s court has waged the same righteous battle against fake news as you had in America. Surely, you of all people understand that releasing a convicted criminal would undermine the rule of law.

Dear President Trump, we earnestly urge you to recognize Jimmy Lai for who he truly is and to refrain from     further pleas on behalf of this convicted criminal and insurrectionist. The United States and China can achieve great things together. Respecting Hong Kong’s judicial independence and China’s sovereignty would be a positive step toward that future. We trust you to do the right thing as you head to China for a historic summit.

Yours sincerely,

James Chan




InsightSpeak

** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **

Liang Yaqi,  Chinese Association of Hong Kong & Macao Studies

Since the release of Hong Kong’s first five-year plan, one line of interpretation has grouped together its provisions on cooperation with the mainland and security governance, and from there concluded that a substantial part of the plan is not really about Hong Kong’s own development. With the latest Policy Address continuing to place strong emphasis on national security, the argument goes a step further: Hong Kong’s development agenda, it is said, is increasingly being crowded out by other priorities.

The central problem with this interpretation is that it artificially separates policy objectives that are, in reality, deeply intertwined.

For Hong Kong today, can “integration with the mainland,” “security” and “economic development” really be treated as three distinct agendas?

The answer is more complicated than it may appear.

On the one hand, the five-year plan explicitly calls for Hong Kong to align itself proactively with national development strategies. On the other, it also defines Hong Kong as a “super connector” between the mainland and global markets.

The provisions concerning the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, or CEPA, go further still, calling for wider access to the mainland market for Hong Kong service providers. In finance, the plan proposes deeper links with both mainland and overseas markets, enabling international capital to participate through Hong Kong in the growth of China and Asia while helping mainland companies and capital expand globally.

To classify all of this simply as “supporting mainland policy” is already to assume something that should instead be examined: that anything connected with national development is, by definition, separate from Hong Kong’s own development.

Yet Hong Kong’s economic structure makes that distinction increasingly difficult to sustain.

Hong Kong’s most distinctive economic value lies in its ability to connect two economic spheres vastly larger than itself. On one side is mainland China; on the other are global capital, trade, professional services and institutional networks. Much of Hong Kong’s competitive advantage has long rested on precisely this intermediary role.

That is why, in many cases, there is no clear line separating policies that “serve the country” from policies that “develop Hong Kong.”

Rather than asking how much of the plan is devoted to the mainland, the more meaningful question is whether those connections ultimately make Hong Kong more difficult to replace.

If closer access to China’s vast market generates greater demand for international financing, asset management, legal and arbitration services, RMB business and corporate globalization in Hong Kong, then deeper integration with the mainland and a stronger international role can advance at the same time.

Security should be understood within the same framework.

A common intuition is that policy attention is finite: the more emphasis placed on security, the less attention remains for economic growth and social welfare. But for a highly open international financial centre such as Hong Kong, security and development do not exist in a simple zero-sum relationship.

Capital does not merely chase the highest nominal return. It seeks the best risk-adjusted return.

For a highly open international financial centre, security is not separate from development. It is part of the economic environment that businesses and investors assess when deciding where to place capital, establish regional headquarters or manage wealth. They look not only at taxes and growth prospects, but also at financial stability, reliable infrastructure, cybersecurity and regulatory predictability.

In other words, companies choosing Hong Kong are not simply choosing lower taxes or office space. They are choosing an institutional environment that reduces uncertainty.

The International Monetary Fund’s 2026 assessment of Hong Kong illustrates this relationship well. On the one hand, the IMF recognised the financial system’s strong capital and liquidity buffers and its sound regulatory foundations. On the other, it noted that Hong Kong’s highly open and interconnected economy leaves it exposed to geopolitical and trade tensions, volatility in global financial markets, and disruptions to trade and capital flows. It also highlighted risks associated with commercial real estate, cybersecurity and operational resilience.[1]

The more open Hong Kong is, the more important strong risk management becomes.

This is also why the five-year plan’s emphasis on “coordinating development and security” should not be understood solely through a narrow conception of security. The plan also calls for stronger economic and urban resilience, better risk-warning mechanisms, closer cross-departmental coordination, improved cybersecurity and emergency governance, and greater use of technology to enhance the efficiency of public administration.

These priorities reflect a broader shift in global economic governance in recent years: economic competition is moving away from a singular pursuit of maximum efficiency towards a balance between efficiency and resilience.

The earlier phase of globalisation prized the lowest possible costs, minimal inventories and ever-longer cross-border supply chains. After the pandemic, geopolitical conflict, financial volatility and repeated supply-chain disruptions, however, governments and companies have become increasingly concerned with a different question: when a system is hit by a shock, can it continue to function?

For Hong Kong, that resilience is itself part of what an international financial centre offers. Clear rules, predictable enforcement and reliable institutions allow businesses to price risk with greater confidence; uncertainty, by contrast, raises risk premiums and discourages long-term investment.

The proper measure of Hong Kong’s future security governance, therefore, is not how often security appears in the five-year plan or the Policy Address. The more important question is whether that governance ultimately makes Hong Kong more predictable.

Over the next five years, several developments will be worth watching.

As Hong Kong deepens its links with the mainland, will demand increase for international capital to use the city as a platform for allocating assets in China and across Asia? As mainland companies expand globally, will they rely more heavily on Hong Kong’s financial, legal and professional services? Will Hong Kong’s ties with Europe, the United States, ASEAN and the Middle East deepen at the same time? And will security governance reduce the uncertainty costs inherent in operating an open economy?

If these functions become stronger, then “integrating into national development,” “safeguarding security” and “remaining international” are not competing objectives.

They may, in fact, be three dimensions of the same question:

In an increasingly fragmented and uncertain world, how can Hong Kong remain an interface that both China and the rest of the world want to use—and one that neither can easily replace?

[1]https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2026/114/002.2026.issue-114-en.xml?cid=576398-com-dsp-crossref

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