Liang Yaqi, Chinese Association of Hong Kong & Macao Studies
Since the release of Hong Kong’s first five-year plan, one line of interpretation has grouped together its provisions on cooperation with the mainland and security governance, and from there concluded that a substantial part of the plan is not really about Hong Kong’s own development. With the latest Policy Address continuing to place strong emphasis on national security, the argument goes a step further: Hong Kong’s development agenda, it is said, is increasingly being crowded out by other priorities.
The central problem with this interpretation is that it artificially separates policy objectives that are, in reality, deeply intertwined.
For Hong Kong today, can “integration with the mainland,” “security” and “economic development” really be treated as three distinct agendas?
The answer is more complicated than it may appear.
On the one hand, the five-year plan explicitly calls for Hong Kong to align itself proactively with national development strategies. On the other, it also defines Hong Kong as a “super connector” between the mainland and global markets.
The provisions concerning the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, or CEPA, go further still, calling for wider access to the mainland market for Hong Kong service providers. In finance, the plan proposes deeper links with both mainland and overseas markets, enabling international capital to participate through Hong Kong in the growth of China and Asia while helping mainland companies and capital expand globally.
To classify all of this simply as “supporting mainland policy” is already to assume something that should instead be examined: that anything connected with national development is, by definition, separate from Hong Kong’s own development.
Yet Hong Kong’s economic structure makes that distinction increasingly difficult to sustain.
Hong Kong’s most distinctive economic value lies in its ability to connect two economic spheres vastly larger than itself. On one side is mainland China; on the other are global capital, trade, professional services and institutional networks. Much of Hong Kong’s competitive advantage has long rested on precisely this intermediary role.
That is why, in many cases, there is no clear line separating policies that “serve the country” from policies that “develop Hong Kong.”
Rather than asking how much of the plan is devoted to the mainland, the more meaningful question is whether those connections ultimately make Hong Kong more difficult to replace.
If closer access to China’s vast market generates greater demand for international financing, asset management, legal and arbitration services, RMB business and corporate globalization in Hong Kong, then deeper integration with the mainland and a stronger international role can advance at the same time.
Security should be understood within the same framework.
A common intuition is that policy attention is finite: the more emphasis placed on security, the less attention remains for economic growth and social welfare. But for a highly open international financial centre such as Hong Kong, security and development do not exist in a simple zero-sum relationship.
Capital does not merely chase the highest nominal return. It seeks the best risk-adjusted return.
For a highly open international financial centre, security is not separate from development. It is part of the economic environment that businesses and investors assess when deciding where to place capital, establish regional headquarters or manage wealth. They look not only at taxes and growth prospects, but also at financial stability, reliable infrastructure, cybersecurity and regulatory predictability.
In other words, companies choosing Hong Kong are not simply choosing lower taxes or office space. They are choosing an institutional environment that reduces uncertainty.
The International Monetary Fund’s 2026 assessment of Hong Kong illustrates this relationship well. On the one hand, the IMF recognised the financial system’s strong capital and liquidity buffers and its sound regulatory foundations. On the other, it noted that Hong Kong’s highly open and interconnected economy leaves it exposed to geopolitical and trade tensions, volatility in global financial markets, and disruptions to trade and capital flows. It also highlighted risks associated with commercial real estate, cybersecurity and operational resilience.[1]
The more open Hong Kong is, the more important strong risk management becomes.
This is also why the five-year plan’s emphasis on “coordinating development and security” should not be understood solely through a narrow conception of security. The plan also calls for stronger economic and urban resilience, better risk-warning mechanisms, closer cross-departmental coordination, improved cybersecurity and emergency governance, and greater use of technology to enhance the efficiency of public administration.
These priorities reflect a broader shift in global economic governance in recent years: economic competition is moving away from a singular pursuit of maximum efficiency towards a balance between efficiency and resilience.
The earlier phase of globalisation prized the lowest possible costs, minimal inventories and ever-longer cross-border supply chains. After the pandemic, geopolitical conflict, financial volatility and repeated supply-chain disruptions, however, governments and companies have become increasingly concerned with a different question: when a system is hit by a shock, can it continue to function?
For Hong Kong, that resilience is itself part of what an international financial centre offers. Clear rules, predictable enforcement and reliable institutions allow businesses to price risk with greater confidence; uncertainty, by contrast, raises risk premiums and discourages long-term investment.
The proper measure of Hong Kong’s future security governance, therefore, is not how often security appears in the five-year plan or the Policy Address. The more important question is whether that governance ultimately makes Hong Kong more predictable.
Over the next five years, several developments will be worth watching.
As Hong Kong deepens its links with the mainland, will demand increase for international capital to use the city as a platform for allocating assets in China and across Asia? As mainland companies expand globally, will they rely more heavily on Hong Kong’s financial, legal and professional services? Will Hong Kong’s ties with Europe, the United States, ASEAN and the Middle East deepen at the same time? And will security governance reduce the uncertainty costs inherent in operating an open economy?
If these functions become stronger, then “integrating into national development,” “safeguarding security” and “remaining international” are not competing objectives.
They may, in fact, be three dimensions of the same question:
In an increasingly fragmented and uncertain world, how can Hong Kong remain an interface that both China and the rest of the world want to use—and one that neither can easily replace?
[1]https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2026/114/002.2026.issue-114-en.xml?cid=576398-com-dsp-crossref
InsightSpeak
** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **
Liang Yaqi, a member of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macau Studies
On 7 May 2026, the Central Criminal Court in London delivered its verdict on Chung Biu Yuen, Administrative Manager of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in London, and Chi Leung Wai, a former UK border official. This first national security case to be heard under the UK National Security Act 2023 has been marred by an air of irregularity from start to finish: persistent procedural flaws, a fragile chain of evidence and numerous inconsistencies have led many to question whether this was a fair trial or a carefully orchestrated political manoeuvre.
Preconceived notions shaped public perception, undermining procedural fairness. Even before the trial had formally commenced, the public discourse was already fraught with tension. Following the case’s first court appearance in 2024, a document purported to be a ‘summary of the charges’ circulated widely in the media. It disclosed in detail the defendant’s specific actions, included screenshots of CCTV footage from relevant activities, and even listed details concerning the London Economic and Trade Office’s involvement in the case, clearly intended to steer public attention towards the Office’s role. Some Hong Kong media outlets have questioned why, in the past, law enforcement agencies would typically handle indictments involving sensitive case details with great caution or even keep them confidential; the current situation appears rather unusual. Even before a jury has been selected and the formal trial has begun, the public and potential jurors have already been led by preconceived notions into a narrative of the case dominated by the prosecution. This directly crosses the red line set by Section 52(a) of the UK’s Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which prohibits the media from reporting content that may prejudice the defendant during the preliminary hearing stage. Before the defendants have even spoken, they have been labelled – this practice of ‘pre-conviction’ by the media is clearly extremely unfair to the defence and undermines procedural fairness.
The mysterious death of the third defendant has deepened the mystery surrounding the case. Even more chilling is the fact that shortly after the case was brought before the court, the third defendant, Matthew Trickett, a former Royal Marines serviceman, died under mysterious circumstances in a park. As a former soldier and an enforcement officer with the Home Office’s Immigration Service, Trickett could have provided crucial testimony to clarify whether the operation was ‘officially authorised’ or a private act. His sudden passing deprived the defence of a vital witness, preventing the full chain of evidence from being thoroughly examined in court and sparing the prosecution from the potential risks of cross-examination. Given the highly sensitive timing of his death, Trickett’s solicitor expressed shock at his passing, whilst some netizens have even suspected that he was “silenced”. Although the authorities have denied foul play, it is lamentable that the judicial process has been “streamlined” due to the death of a single individual.
The prosecution’s evidence was flimsy and unconvincing. Section 3 of the UK National Security Act 2023 stipulates that the offence of “aiding a foreign intelligence service” requires proof that the act “is likely to substantially assist a foreign intelligence service”. Yet throughout the trial, the prosecution failed to present any fundamental evidence that the defendant’s actions had substantially harmed UK national security. The alleged acts cited by the prosecution—such as the defendant’s purported surveillance of Hong Kong residents, unauthorised access to immigration databases, and door-to-door “debt collection”—sound more like ordinary criminal offences. The prosecution essentially pieced together a case based on electronic evidence such as communication records and financial transactions, yet never produced irrefutable proof that the defendant engaged in “intelligence activities” that posed an actual security threat to the UK. Forcing ordinary behaviour to be elevated to the level of national security constitutes a “hat trick” that fails to convince.
The judge’s guidance was markedly biased, contravening her role of impartiality. Prior to the verdict, the judge’s instructions to the jury were also biased. She repeatedly emphasised the prosecution’s perspective regarding the admissibility of evidence and the assessment of witness credibility. For instance, although much of the evidence presented by the prosecution in court occurred before the UK National Security Act 2023 came into force—and should therefore not have retroactive effect—the judge reminded the jury that they could treat this as “background information” to understand the defendant’s network of contacts. Although the judge stated that such background information could not be used directly as a basis for conviction, and this appeared neutral on the surface, in reality it had already painted the defendant in a negative light. Furthermore, when the jury had deliberated for several days without reaching a ‘unanimous verdict’ on all charges against the defendant, the judge instructed that the standard be lowered from a ‘unanimous verdict’ to a ‘majority verdict’. Whilst this move was not unlawful, in such a highly sensitive national security case, might the proactive lowering of the threshold to facilitate a conviction give rise to public doubts regarding the impartiality of the trial? Might it create a negative perception that the judicial process is not sufficiently fair?
The jury’s deliberations were fraught with difficulties, and there appeared to be political pressure. The deliberation phase was marked by a series of setbacks: one juror was hospitalised due to ill health, whilst another requested to withdraw. Chi Leung Wai’s defence counsel at one point questioned whether this juror had been ‘bullied’ by other dissenting jurors; this was precisely why the judge instructed the jury that day to ‘respect differences of opinion but continue to work together to seek consensus’.After four days of deliberations, the jury had still failed to reach a “unanimous verdict”, indicating that it was struggling to reach a consensus on the facts of the case. It was not until the fifth day, following the judge’s instruction to lower the standard of the verdict, that the jury, after a protracted stalemate, barely met the minimum threshold of a 10-2 majority verdict on the charge of “assisting a foreign intelligence agency”, whilst they remained unable to reach a verdict on the charge of “foreign interference”. Whether this outcome truly reflects the jurors’ inner conviction or is merely a compromise born of prolonged pressure is a matter for reflection.
The UK National Security Act is defined in overly broad terms, making it highly susceptible to expansion and abuse. A review of the entire case process exposes the fundamental flaw of the UK National Security Act 2023, which is its extreme vagueness. The Act stipulates that the offence of “aiding a foreign intelligence service” is committed whenever an act is likely to assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out activities relating to the UK; the definition of a foreign intelligence service is even broader, encompassing any person conducting intelligence activities for or on behalf of a foreign state. It is clear that the threshold for the offence of “aiding a foreign intelligence service” is so low that it could encompass many ordinary activities. Even Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer appointed by the UK Home Secretary, has publicly stated that the relevant provisions of the UK National Security Act 2023 could extend to political, journalistic and other everyday activities, placing legitimate lobbying, journalistic investigations and even ordinary commercial activities at risk of criminalisation. He emphasised that the Act must be subject to oversight to prevent its “abuse and overreach”.
Ironically, the UK completely ignores the fact that its own national security provisions are vague and broadly applicable, and turns a blind eye to the various flaws in the adjudication of national security cases, yet it repeatedly criticises and meddles in the Hong Kong National Security Law. Such double standards appear particularly hypocritical and laughable. If the UK truly cares about the rule of law, it would do well to return to the principles of evidence-based adjudication and procedural justice, rectify errors in cases as soon as possible, and ensure that the judiciary does not become a mere appendage of politics, thereby trampling the spirit of the rule of law underfoot!
