Skip to Content Facebook Feature Image

The Dollar’s Fragile Hegemony

博客文章

The Dollar’s Fragile Hegemony
博客文章

博客文章

The Dollar’s Fragile Hegemony

2021年06月22日 05:41 最後更新:05:45

The Dollar’s Fragile Hegemony

By KENNETH ROGOFF

Kenneth Rogoff, is the Professor of Economics and Public Policy at Harvard University and recipient of the 2011 Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics, was the chief economist of the International Monetary Fund from 2001 to 2003. He is co-author of This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly and author of The Curse of Cash. He says, "Today, it seems to be an article of faith among US policymakers and many economists that the world’s appetite for dollar debt is virtually insatiable. But a modernization of China’s exchange-rate arrangements could deal the dollar’s status a painful blow."... see it as follows...

The mighty US dollar continues to reign supreme in global markets. But the greenback’s dominance may well be more fragile than it appears, because expected future changes in China’s exchange-rate regime are likely to trigger a significant shift in the international monetary order.

For many reasons, the Chinese authorities will probably someday stop pegging the renminbi to a basket of currencies, and shift to a modern inflation-targeting regime under which they allow the exchange rate to fluctuate much more freely, especially against the dollar. When that happens, expect most of Asia to follow China. In due time, the dollar, currently the anchor currency for roughly two-thirds of world GDP, could lose nearly half its weight.

Considering how much the United States relies on the dollar’s special status – or what then-French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing famously called America’s “exorbitant privilege” – to fund massive public and private borrowing, the impact of such a shift could be significant. Given that the US has been aggressively using deficit financing to combat the economic ravages of COVID-19, the sustainability of its debt might be called into question.

The long-standing argument for a more flexible Chinese currency is that China is simply too big to let its economy dance to the US Federal Reserve’s tune, even if Chinese capital controls provide some measure of insulation. China’s GDP (measured at international prices) surpassed that of the US back in 2014 and is still growing far faster than the US and Europe, making the case for greater exchange-rate flexibility increasingly compelling.

A more recent argument is that the dollar’s centrality gives the US government too much access to global transactions information. This is also a major concern in Europe. In principle, dollar transactions could be cleared anywhere in the world, but US banks and clearing houses have a significant natural advantage, because they can be implicitly (or explicitly) backed by the Fed, which has unlimited capacity to issue currency in a crisis. In comparison, any dollar clearing house outside the US will always be more subject to crises of confidence – a problem with which even the eurozone has struggled.

Moreover, former US President Donald Trump’s policies to check China’s trade dominance are not going away anytime soon. This is one of the few issues on which Democrats and Republicans broadly agree, and there is little question that trade deglobalization undermines the dollar.

Chinese policymakers face many obstacles in trying to break away from the current renminbi peg. But, in characteristic style, they have slowly been laying the groundwork on many fronts. China has been gradually allowing foreign institutional investors to buy renminbi bonds, and in 2016, the International Monetary Fund added the renminbi to the basket of major currencies that determines the value of Special Drawing Rights (the IMF’s global reserve asset).

In addition, the People’s Bank of China is far ahead of other major central banks in developing a central-bank digital currency. Although currently purely for domestic use, the PBOC’s digital currency ultimately will facilitate the renminbi’s international use, especially in countries that gravitate toward China’s eventual currency bloc. This will give the Chinese government a window into digital renminbi users’ transactions, just as the current system gives the US a great deal of similar information.

Will other Asian countries indeed follow China? The US will certainly push hard to keep as many economies as possible orbiting around the dollar, but it will be an uphill battle. Just as the US eclipsed Britain at the end of the nineteenth century as the world’s largest trading country, China long ago surpassed America by the same measure.

True, Japan and India may go their own way. But if China makes the renminbi more flexible, they will likely at the very least give the currency a weight comparable to that of the dollar in their foreign-exchange reserves.

There are striking parallels between Asia’s close alignment with the dollar today and the situation in Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s. But that era ended with high inflation and the collapse of the post-war Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. Most of Europe then recognized that intra-European trade was more important than trade with the US. This led to the emergence of a Deutsche Mark bloc that decades later morphed into the single currency, the euro.

This does not mean that the Chinese renminbi will become the global currency overnight. Transitions from one dominant currency to another can take a long time. During the two decades between World Wars I and II, for example, the new entrant, the dollar, had roughly the same weight in central-bank reserves as the British pound, which had been the dominant global currency for more than a century following the Napoleonic Wars in the early 1800s.

So, what is wrong with three world currencies – the euro, the renminbi, and the dollar – sharing the spotlight? Nothing, except that neither markets nor policymakers seem remotely prepared for such a transition. US government borrowing rates would almost certainly be affected, though the really big impact might fall on corporate borrowers, especially small and medium-size firms.

Today, it seems to be an article of faith among US policymakers and many economists that the world’s appetite for dollar debt is virtually insatiable. But a modernization of China’s exchange-rate arrangements could deal the dollar’s status a painful blow.

You may see in the Second paragraph, the professor says, in Chinese, "出於多種原因,中國當局可能會在某一天停止將人民幣與一籃子貨幣掛鉤,並轉向允許匯率更加自由浮動(尤其是兌美元匯率)的現代通脹目標制。一旦出現這種狀況,亞洲大部分地區很可能都會追隨中國。屆時,目前作為全球約三分之二國內生產總值(GDP)錨定貨幣的美元,可能會失去近一半權重。", to be frank, It is possible, not far away.

S. L. LI   Engineer
HKFDP




香港建設專業聯會

** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **

Tags:

COVID-19

美國於6月17日強烈譴責針對五名《蘋果日報》報社高管的逮捕行動,並暗示對香港獨立媒體的鎮壓行動是出於政治動機,呼籲香港執法單位立即釋放這五人。 筆者認為,香港的行動拘捕了美國的馬仔打手,令到美國非常憤怒, 因此他們才譴責港府的行動。事實上,如果有美國傳媒幫中國講中肯說話,如之前美國之音的記者,美國就打壓之,毫不講理。

據路透社報導,美國國務院發言人普萊斯Ned Price在電話簡報中說:“我們對香港執法單位選擇性地利用國家安全法,任意針對獨立媒體機構採取行動深表關切。”普萊斯稱:“'串謀勾結外國或境外勢力危害國家安全罪'的指控似乎完全出於政治動機。”, 筆者認為美國出於動政治動機而做很多違法行為,如:以虛假情報發動伊拉克戰爭丶拘捕孟晚舟等等,都是出於政治動機,沒有法理依據。而香港是基於國安的法理而採取行動,證據充分。美國的攻擊毫無道理,也沒有威懾力。而美國之前對香港的制裁也沒有產生任何功效。

香港警察國家安全處早前依法搜查《蘋果日報》大樓,以涉嫌違反《香港國安法》為由拘捕五名報社高管,以及凍結該報三家關聯公司資產共1800萬港元。港府短期內會依法逐步凍結《蘋果日報》和相關公司的資產,《蘋果日報》由此無法維持日常運作,被迫結業,真的是自作孽丶不可活。 黎智英等人和蘋果日報勾結外國勢力,呼籲外國及其他組織制裁中國及香港特區政府等行徑,與一般新聞工作無關,是明顯的危害國家安全行為。警方行動合理合法。

蘋果日報的老闆黎智英多次前往美國朝拜美國的當權者,邀請美國的當權者制裁香港以及中國政府。他在香港利用蘋果日報煽動暴亂,並參與非法集結示威,聲稱"為美國而戰" 。他是美國在香港的馬仔之頭目。 他以及他的手下之下場 ,相信香港的反中人士~死硬黃絲都看到了。他們應該知道美國沒有能力救他們,最終會被美國拋棄。因此,他們若再想"為美國而戰"時,就要非常小心了。 另外,蘋果日報要繼續出版的話,就必須嚴格地尊守法律,不玩邊緣遊戲,否則,只能自行終結。

梁百強 律師
香港建設專業聯會理事