美國總統Joe Biden 拜登上週三（3月31日）在Pennsylvania賓夕法尼亞州Pittsburgh公佈2.3萬億美元的8年基建投資計劃。Biden稱，中國有可能在全球影響力和能力上迅速超越美國～這是在為其國內支出計劃尋找國家安全理由。
美國社會嚴重分裂，兩黨為私利惡鬥，若基建工程觸及的利益關係很複雜，其政治鬥爭機會就非常大，以致工程半途而廢，這是美國無法解決的問題。美國的大量基礎設施老舊，這是美國社會的共識。但Obama 上台提出的更新美國基礎設施設想，其兩個任期都沒有搞出什麼結果。Trump 更是高調作類似承諾，也不見任何踪影。Biden 是第三輪再啟動，他的計劃看上去最有決心。
這個被稱為1960年代以來規模最大的公共投資項目，Biden 宣稱可重塑美國經濟，他提出了提高企業稅以籌集所需資金。不過外界對該計劃的規模大小、向企業加稅方面存在分歧。共和黨已表示反對，前總統Trump 稱它是送給中國的禮物，為籌到那2萬億的增稅計劃將毀掉美國製造業。為辯護，Biden 於是扯上中國，說不那樣做會被中國超越，中國威脅會更大。那樣做，有助與中國競爭，戰勝中國。搞基礎設施建設，社會需求動力本應大於利益紛爭的阻力，但今天的美國竟能扯上中國威脅以作推動計劃的主要動力，你說可不可悲？！
美國政府說要建高鐵十幾年了，為什麼一公里也沒建成？美國這樣的低效跟中國有關係嗎？Trump上台推翻了Obama 奧巴馬的政策，Biden上台又推翻了Trump的，這跟中國有關嗎？Boston University研究員葉敏說，在美國，“幾乎每天”都會有某個地方的服務商宣布“停電了，斷網了”。聯邦政府估計有1800萬美國人沒有連上互聯網，美國的互聯網太貴。這也與中國有關嗎？美國政府不能解決自身問題，想轉移視線，嫁禍中國，因此不斷以虛假指控攻擊中國，以此凝聚其社會分裂，可惜，其自毀自沉難救啊！
記得Trump 特朗普入主白宮時也曾強調中國的基礎設施先進，並承諾要重建美國。特朗普在2016年的一次集會上表示：“他們的大橋讓人難以置信。”
“真的很羨慕中國，”，Thomas J. Campanella，康奈爾大學專注於城市規劃研究的歷史學家，表示，“中國人看起來能做到我們過去常常做的這些事。”Campanella在中國東部生活過。在基建方面，中國實現了從自行車到高鐵的跨越式發展。
另外，美國建築業巨頭Skidmore, Owings & Merrill中國區總監Silas Chiow稱，中國的市長們有動力大膽建設，因為他們期待每過幾年就有新的城市廣招人才。Chiow常與城市規劃師會面。他表示，政府官員得到的獎勵取決於他們在改善城市上能有多大成果。
可見，中國的基建是由內部需求驅動，從未扯上美國，故生機活力旺盛。美國的當權者及政客說中國制度不好，美國的好等等，那麼，他們應該自信些丶正面些，如今在基礎設施方面，Biden 一再警告中國正“吃掉我們的午餐”，太陰暗了。
李碩華建築師 王錦添工程師
香港建設專業聯會理事
香港建設專業聯會
** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **
Can we prevent the global fire next time?
APR 6, 2021 05:50 AM
Washington, DC
By SIMON JOHNSON
The writer, a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, is a professor at MIT's Sloan School of Management and a co-chair of the Covid-19 Policy Alliance. He is the co-author, with Jonathan Gruber, of Jump-Starting America: How Breakthrough Science Can Revive Economic Growth and the American Dream, and the co-author, with James Kwak, of 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and The Next Financial Meltdown. I find this article helpful in clearing the foggy horizon, you may see it as follows.
IN the immediate aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, measures were taken to prevent another potential systemic meltdown. The process of reform was contentious at the time, but the legislation and associated regulations that were adopted have held up remarkably well.
Twelve years later, in the face of the far-reaching damage wrought by the coronavirus pandemic in 2020, large private financial firms proved more resilient, and policymakers had sufficient political backing to take steps that helped stabilise the global economy, relative to what could have happened. And they are likely to put it on the road to recovery in 2021. So, what comes next?
With some countries beginning to get a handle on Covid-19, mostly through vaccination programmes, we can hope for another post-crisis reform phase, this time aimed at substantially reducing the probability of another global pandemic or similar public-health shock. But hope is not belief. Unfortunately, there are four reasons to think progress may be slower and more difficult than after the 2008 financial crisis.
First, we are not out of the woods yet. By mid-2009, the United States and the world economy had turned the corner on the global financial crisis, and the G-7 (and most of the G-20) could agree on the need for tighter financial sector regulation. By contrast, many countries around the world, including in Europe, are still struggling with the coronavirus.
It is hard to focus on a deep reform agenda with the crisis still raging and neighbours arguing about who has access to how much vaccine.
Second, not all countries shared the same experience this time around. In 2008-09, all countries in the world, almost without exception, were caught up in - or deeply worried about - some aspect of the financial panic that began on Wall Street. Global finance really does reach almost every corner of the globe. But when it came to the Covid-19 pandemic, some countries - most notably in East Asia - were better prepared and acted faster, thereby avoiding some of the most dire effects. China, for example, is unlikely to view post-pandemic policy requirements through the same lens as the US and most of Europe.
And yet, to prevent or mitigate pandemics requires truly global action. The 2008 financial crisis was primarily a trans-Atlantic phenomenon, with other countries dragged along. To fix the underlying problems - or at least to make them less likely to recur - called for real reform in the US, along with sufficient cooperation in Europe (particularly on rules such as equity capital requirements and how to treat cross-border derivative trading).
We have surely learned in the past year that new pathogens can develop anywhere and spread in unpredictable ways, and that we need a disease surveillance system that covers everyone on Earth. But this will be hard to build unless and until all governments make it a top share priority.
COST OF HEALTHCARE
Third, better public health costs real money. This is particularly true in the US, which has woefully under-invested in providing basic health care to residents. There are some glimmers of hope - including America's growing ability to scale up diagnostic testing, and the likelihood that some Covid-related technology will also help us grapple with other diseases. But who will pay for deploying these technology around the world, including in lower-income countries?
Lastly, there is a lot of high-frequency data about finance, whereas the global burden of disease is perceived only in much rougher terms. To be sure, not all relevant financial-sector data is easy for policymakers to access and understand.
Still, the situation in finance is much better than in public health, where one country's authorities (for example, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) have only very limited access to what is happening elsewhere with enough detail and timeliness to be useful.
For the US, the good news is that President Joe Biden's administration is addressing the country's own public health, providing a helpful initial fiscal boost to the economy, and laying the groundwork for a much-needed renewal of infrastructure investment, including (one hopes) everything needed to support stronger public health.
The administration also appears to understand that health policy is an important dimension of foreign policy. For example, helping countries to access a reliable vaccine can both help them to recover now and build the trust necessary for future cooperation in the never-ending fight against contagious disease.
Can we go even further and apply the lessons from the pandemic to climate change and the extreme weather that the world faces? Can we develop helpful technology to reduce risk, and build enough cooperation to deploy it - and pay for its use - around the world?
With the pandemic and the 2008 financial crisis, we waited until disaster struck before finally acting. When it comes to climate change, we do not have that luxury.
It is noteworthy that it says, "... 但對于冠病疫情，一些國家準備得更加充分，主要是東亞國家，準備充足丶行動迅速，從而避免了最糟糕的後果。比如，中國看待疫情后的政策要求的角度，就不可能和美國及大部分歐洲國家一樣.. ", true and founded, a pure scholar.
S. L. LI Engineer
HKFDP
