華盛頓近日發生了示威民眾攻入國會山莊事件,其混亂攻擊場面、其總統製造的失敗國家畫面,令世人目睹了美國的困境。此衝擊事件震動了美國政治體系,折射出美國社會的激烈分歧和怨恨。無論疫情還是政治方面,世界各國的民眾都看到了美國社會的真相。這些也讓中國民眾對本國的治理體系充滿信心。面對美國,中國很難再自卑。美國亂得搖搖欲墜,與之相比,中國稱得上是穩定的堡壘。
不久前哈佛大學的一項調查顯示,中國民眾對政府的支持率超過95%。中國人也沒把美國視為榜樣或政治上可效仿的國家,反而視為失敗的典型。特朗普的行為只會強化此類看法,並讓中國民眾認為西方自由民主制度越來越不靠譜。
美國對疫情的災難式反應:特朗普政府初初為了選情,刻意對病毒的危害性輕描淡寫,這被之後爆出的錄音所證實。特朗普甚至說這個病毒會神奇地消失,基本上沒有推出太多的抗疫措施,任由病毒蔓延,美國確診人數現已超過2200萬,死亡已超過37萬人。中國的數據疫情跟這些是沒有辦法比較的,從統計學上看,微不足道。中國基本上成功控制住疫情,並恢復了全面經濟增長。
在各國看來,特朗普政府的反复無常以及由此帶來的那些後果,暴露了美國日益分裂和不穩定的政治體系。以前,在許多中國人眼裡,美國是個值得欽佩和仰望的國家。那樣的時代恐怕一去不復返了。 最近20年來,越來越多的、以億計的中國人曾經去歐洲美國旅行、工作、留學等等,對他們的社會問題認識多了,也深了,知道他們有很多問題 ,之前他們是天堂的幻象早就破滅了。眼下華盛頓上演的一切, 令美國慣性的好形象進一步破滅。中國民眾看到自己的國家像是全球混亂大浪漩渦中的穩定器,認為是社會政治穩定而不是自私自利、不受約束的自由才是繁榮的更大前提,並感覺中國占據了上風。
特朗普政府的遺產和這些事件,也激起美國盟友的恐懼和質疑,認為美國越來越不可靠、不可預測。就算拜登回歸常態,傷害也已很深,日益毒化的社會和政治分歧不會消失。很多中國民眾之前擔憂美國與歐洲結成聯盟,一齊打壓中國。但,歐盟視商業利益顯然高於其大肆鼓吹的人權等問題,更何況歐洲美國的人權問題本身已經非常嚴重。西方政府或許真相信有必要牽制中國,但此類戰略難以形成統一陣線:每個國家都希望別國採取懲罰性行動,自己卻願意保持強勁的對中國經貿關係。歐美的經濟政策現實說明,再多言語也無法令中國作為世界工廠及主要產業鏈的主導地位消失....
"中國的體制會產生更好結果" , 這是2020年人們普遍的想法,在世界不斷努力擺脫2020年的慘淡之際,中國領導人和普通民眾的信心更強了。
彭安國 測量師
香港建設專業聯會理事
香港建設專業聯會
** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **
This article originally appeared on Responsible Statecraft on January 5, 2021, written by Ted Galen Carpenter. His sophisticated analysis revealed the cruel reality-- US‐Europe ‘Front’ Against China Is Pure Fantasy. You may see it, quite obvious, no need to read between the lines,as follows.
One unmistakable goal of the incoming Biden administration is to repair the damage that the Trump administration inflicted on America’s relations with its traditional diplomatic and strategic partners, especially the European allies. Biden and his advisers have explicitly criticized Trump’s “America First” approach with respect to both economic and security policies. Instead, they emphasize strengthening multilateral efforts to achieve common objectives in those arenas.
Biden himself has made it clear that one of those objectives is to induce Europe to join the United States in a common front to deal with China. “As we compete with China and hold China’s government accountable for its abuses on trade, technology, human rights, and other fronts,” he said in remarks delivered on December 28, “our position will be much stronger when we build coalitions of like-minded partners and allies to make common cause with us in defense of our shared interests and values.”
Biden added that “on any issue that matters to the U.S.-China relationship,” including “ensuring security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, [we]are stronger and more effective when we are flanked by nations that share our vision for the future of our world.”
Biden’s quest is likely to fail. Indeed, just two days after the president-elect’s comments, the European Union signed a major investment deal with Beijing. RealityChek blogger Alan Tonelson contended that the EU’s action constituted a “punch in the mouth.” That may be an exaggeration, but negotiations had been going on for seven years, and there was no reason why EU leaders could not have held off and consulted with the Biden administration after it took office before taking final action. Their failure to do so indicated that the EU will chart its own course regarding economic relations with China based on an assessment of European interests, not U.S. policy preferences.
Evidence is even stronger that Washington cannot count on European solidarity with the United States if it comes to a diplomatic confrontation with Beijing over human rights or other issues. That point became glaringly apparent last year when the Trump administration tried to enlist Europe in a united response to the PRC’s imposition of a new national security law on Hong Kong. U.S. leaders wanted a joint statement of condemnation as well as the imposition of some sanctions in response to Beijing’s brazen erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy.
Allied backing was tepid and grudging, at best. Among the major European powers, only Britain (Hong Kong’s former colonial ruler) joined the United States in embracing a hardline approach. . German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas argued that the best way for the European Union to influence China on the Hong Kong dispute was merely to maintain a dialogue with Beijing.
The European Union’s response was anemic and evasive as well. Apparently determined to avoid becoming entangled in America’s escalating rivalry with China, EU foreign ministers embraced Germany’s approach and emphasized the need for dialogue about Hong Kong. After a videoconference among the bloc’s 27 foreign ministers, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell emphasized that only one country bothered to raise the subject of sanctions. Borrell added that the EU was not planning even to postpone diplomatic meetings with China.
Such actions suggest that European governments have little interest in being part of a U.S.-led common front to deal with Beijing even on diplomatic and economic issues, much less security problems. In adopting that stance, they accurately reflect European public opinion.
Europeans want no part of a possible confrontation with China. When a September 2019 survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations asked, “Whose side should your country take in a conflict between the United States and China?” the results were emphatic against backing America.
Support for Washington was meager even among the usually Amerophile populations in Central and Eastern Europe. Just 19 percent in the Czech Republic, 17 percent in Romania, and 13 percent in Hungary supported the U.S. position. The outcome among Washington’s long‐standing economic and security partners in Western Europe was similar. Only 18 percent of French respondents, 20 percent of Italians, and 10 percent of Germans chose solidarity with the United States in a showdown with China. Overwhelming majorities in all countries surveyed favored neutrality.
Such a stance is unsurprising. The United States is a Pacific power with extensive economic and security interests in East Asia. China’s economic and military rise poses a serious challenge to the status of regional hegemon that the United States had enjoyed since the end of World War II.
Europe’s situation is fundamentally different. The European powers have limited economic interests and even fewer security concerns in the region. The risks associated with waging even a diplomatic feud with China — to say nothing of a trade war or a military confrontation — would appear to most Europeans to outweigh any conceivable benefits. From the standpoint of European interests, discreet neutrality regarding relations between the United States and China is the prudent course.
Given that reality, the Biden administration is likely to be disappointed in the probable European response to calls for a joint response to China’s transgressions. The new president may scorn the “America First” doctrine and seek to revitalize the coalition of Western democratic powers. But at least when it comes to policy toward China, Biden will find that the United States is a leader with few followers.
K. Y. Yip(葉啟賢) Engineer
HKFDP