黎恩灝昨天(6月 22日)在明報發文《司法獨立、新聞自由與開放社會》。筆者點評之，望可聯系到他的專業界同事傳此文給他， 筆者愿意與他聚一下談談。
黎恩灝在文中說："... 換言之，國安處是基於報章的新聞工作和行使新聞及出版自由之權利，針對文章內容作出檢控，正是以言入罪（speech crime）的典型..." 。筆者認為，黎恩灝的認知是"任何言論都不受法律規管" 。稍微有一些法律常識的人都知道，"任何言論都不受法律規管" 的認知是非常錯誤的。 黎恩灝如果不斷去美國報紙發表支持 拉登Usama bin Laden 的言論，可看看美國報紙會不會刊登？如果刋登了，可進一步看看美國政府會怎樣對待這份報紙丶 美國CIA會怎樣對待黎恩灝？ 又或者，黎恩灝可試一下不斷地在facebook上面發表支持Usama bin Laden 拉登的言論，看看他自己會有什麼後果？
黎恩灝說，"儘管保安局長強調一般新聞工作者有別於涉案人士，但由於總裁判官蘇惠德繼續以《刑事訴訟程序條例》第9P條限制傳媒報道保釋程序，公眾仍然無從得知控方所指涉的文章，到底包括多少新聞報道或評論文章、牽涉多少公眾人士和市民的訪問等重要資料。那麼，官方說辭，又能有多大說服力呢？" 筆者認為，因爲案件已經進入司法程序。而任何國家的訴訟，事先都不會詳細說明一切的，這有一個過程。 另外，官方的說詞有沒有說服力，視乎不同政治立場的人怎樣看吧！這是常識。而這位黎先生有些天真，他以為他是最正確的，他可以代表所有人，這是荒謬的。
黎恩灝說：" 國安處今次的搜捕和檢控行動，已經取得3個「第一」：這是政權第一次動用《國安法》拘捕和起訴新聞工作者、第一次針對公司法人提出檢控，以及第一次得到法庭批出手令，授予警方搜查包括新聞材料的權力。.... 保障新聞材料不受警方查閱，是為了保護受訪人士的身分；即使是匿名受訪者，只要和記者有互信，就能暢所欲言，讓傳媒工作者如實報道... 新聞自由的可貴，就是讓報道者無畏無懼，自由和自主地傳播社會真相，促進每個公民都掌握充分資訊（well-informed citizens），負責任地建設民主和開放的社會。"。 筆者認為黎恩灝假裝不知道英國丶美國警方或情報機構如何徹底地搜查一些報社；更何況美國英國經常不依法地濫用職權，監察丶搜查媒體機構。幾年前，Snowden斯諾登將美國稜鏡計劃透露給英國《衛報》，《衛報》報道了出來，指出了英國政府也參與其中。結果，此報館被英國警察及情報部門徹底搜查。 那黎恩灝認為美國英國是民主開放的社會嗎？
黎恩灝說，："... 法庭批出手令，等於加劇一股針對新聞界的歪風，間接降低大眾和掌握真相者接受記者訪問的意欲、增加記者採訪和蒐證的難度；當法官和警察合作，要傳媒機構交出新聞材料的話，就會為記者自己、同儕和受訪者帶來以言入罪的風險。"。 筆者留意到他又一次講到以言入罪，斯諾登Snowden 因為於2013年6月將美國國家安全域關於稜鏡計劃監聽各國各機構之專案的秘密文件披露給英國《衛報》和美國《華盛頓郵報》，他遭到了美國政府和英國政府的通緝。 之後，英國當局又搜查《衛報》， 美國英國政府是否想禁制言論自由呢 ？是否不讓人披露真相呢？這是不是以言入罪呢？這就是讓報道者無畏無懼丶自由和自主地傳播社會真相？我們知道美國英國都講出了他們搜查丶通緝的法理依據，說他們是依法行事呢！ 我們只可以說各有各的依法行事。
黎恩灝說，"..... 不少普通法傳統的法官和法律學者，更加認為新聞自由和司法獨立，是維護自由、民主和法治的兩個等量齊觀的樞紐。歷史最悠久的成文憲法──即1780年的美國《馬薩諸塞憲法》──的草擬人亞當斯（John Adams）嘗言道：人民享有自由的新聞媒體（free press）和獨立的司法機構，是維護自由和保障一切權利的兩個關鍵人權。"， 這裏，筆者留意到黎恩灝似乎根本不清楚美國的歷史，在1780年時美國白人當局依然把黑人當成奴隸，黑人的法律地位就是奴隸。買賣黑人奴隸合理合法。John Adams 本人也擁有很多黑人奴隸，他說的 "人民享有自由的新聞媒體（free press）和獨立的司法機構，是維護自由和保障一切權利的兩個關鍵人權" 根本不包括黑人，因此美國的法律及憲法是非常虛偽的。這就是美國的政治現實。因此，黎恩灝只是很膚淺地看美國人的文字，不看美國人的歷史事實，只講出空泛的理論上的東西，不知現實世界為何物。
黎說，"..... 在政府濫權和以法律打壓異己的時候，本應是新聞自由和司法獨立互相扶持之時。Cordy引述美國1971年「五角大樓文件案」（N. Y. Times Co. v. United States），當時尼克遜政府為了向公眾隱瞞越戰真相，試圖以法律手段阻止《紐約時報》和《華盛頓郵報》出版有關內部文件的報道，最後美國最高法院多數裁決新聞自由比國家機密、國家安全更重要，判《紐時》和《華郵》有權繼續出版。..." ， 筆者認為，既然如此，那為何美國法庭又批出通緝Snowden斯諾登的文件呢？斯諾登只不過揭露了美國政府如何監察所有人丶機構丶監察所有其他國家的真相而已，這也是新聞自由的範疇呀？ 上面他舉的例子當中，美國法庭針對的只不過是某一個政黨的當權者而作出判決。但是，如果披露者違反美國國家利益，美國法庭就會針對這位披露者，如snowden斯諾登，作判決，以維護美國的國家利益，不講新聞自由了！ 所以，由此我們可以看到黎恩灝天真幼稚的一面：他不知道現實世界當中，是以國家利益至上的。
其實，黎恩灝與劉進圖一樣， 劉進圖昨天也評論蘋果日報之事， 他們似乎都是生活在書本紙張上，就好似當初我自己是港大醫科生，以為讀好醫科的書 丶畢業成績優秀就可以成為著名的醫生一樣，想法很單純天真。又或者，黎恩灝與劉進圖只看到一面，看不到另外一面。 他們假裝看不到蘋果日報並非一份報紙這麼簡單。其實，他們也知道黎智英親自去美國拜美國的當權者；他們也知道黎智英的反中反共立場丶黎智英是香港反中陣營的領袖及金主丶 黎智英的報紙支持美國丶攻擊中國。 他們更加應該知道：2019年，黎智英公開宣佈反修例黑暴運動就是"為美國而戰"，他本人也是"為美國而戰" ，他控制的蘋果日報就成為"為美國而戰" 的政治鬥爭工具，不停地煽動暴亂。 即使在國安法實施之後，他的政治鬥爭工具～蘋果日報也在涉嫌做違反國安法的事情。 黎智英基本上是孤注一擲地運用蘋果日報參與你死我活的政治鬥爭～顏色革命。 對於這些，黎恩灝丶劉進圖假裝視而不見，說蘋果日報是一個單純的新聞機構。 這兩位仁兄是真天真還是假天真？讀者們可以自行判斷。
林沛瑩測量師 林志文醫生
香港建設專業聯會理事
香港建設專業聯會
** 博客文章文責自負,不代表本公司立場 **
The Dollar’s Fragile Hegemony
By KENNETH ROGOFF
Kenneth Rogoff, is the Professor of Economics and Public Policy at Harvard University and recipient of the 2011 Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics, was the chief economist of the International Monetary Fund from 2001 to 2003. He is co-author of This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly and author of The Curse of Cash. He says, "Today, it seems to be an article of faith among US policymakers and many economists that the world’s appetite for dollar debt is virtually insatiable. But a modernization of China’s exchange-rate arrangements could deal the dollar’s status a painful blow."... see it as follows...
The mighty US dollar continues to reign supreme in global markets. But the greenback’s dominance may well be more fragile than it appears, because expected future changes in China’s exchange-rate regime are likely to trigger a significant shift in the international monetary order.
For many reasons, the Chinese authorities will probably someday stop pegging the renminbi to a basket of currencies, and shift to a modern inflation-targeting regime under which they allow the exchange rate to fluctuate much more freely, especially against the dollar. When that happens, expect most of Asia to follow China. In due time, the dollar, currently the anchor currency for roughly two-thirds of world GDP, could lose nearly half its weight.
Considering how much the United States relies on the dollar’s special status – or what then-French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing famously called America’s “exorbitant privilege” – to fund massive public and private borrowing, the impact of such a shift could be significant. Given that the US has been aggressively using deficit financing to combat the economic ravages of COVID-19, the sustainability of its debt might be called into question.
The long-standing argument for a more flexible Chinese currency is that China is simply too big to let its economy dance to the US Federal Reserve’s tune, even if Chinese capital controls provide some measure of insulation. China’s GDP (measured at international prices) surpassed that of the US back in 2014 and is still growing far faster than the US and Europe, making the case for greater exchange-rate flexibility increasingly compelling.
A more recent argument is that the dollar’s centrality gives the US government too much access to global transactions information. This is also a major concern in Europe. In principle, dollar transactions could be cleared anywhere in the world, but US banks and clearing houses have a significant natural advantage, because they can be implicitly (or explicitly) backed by the Fed, which has unlimited capacity to issue currency in a crisis. In comparison, any dollar clearing house outside the US will always be more subject to crises of confidence – a problem with which even the eurozone has struggled.
Moreover, former US President Donald Trump’s policies to check China’s trade dominance are not going away anytime soon. This is one of the few issues on which Democrats and Republicans broadly agree, and there is little question that trade deglobalization undermines the dollar.
Chinese policymakers face many obstacles in trying to break away from the current renminbi peg. But, in characteristic style, they have slowly been laying the groundwork on many fronts. China has been gradually allowing foreign institutional investors to buy renminbi bonds, and in 2016, the International Monetary Fund added the renminbi to the basket of major currencies that determines the value of Special Drawing Rights (the IMF’s global reserve asset).
In addition, the People’s Bank of China is far ahead of other major central banks in developing a central-bank digital currency. Although currently purely for domestic use, the PBOC’s digital currency ultimately will facilitate the renminbi’s international use, especially in countries that gravitate toward China’s eventual currency bloc. This will give the Chinese government a window into digital renminbi users’ transactions, just as the current system gives the US a great deal of similar information.
Will other Asian countries indeed follow China? The US will certainly push hard to keep as many economies as possible orbiting around the dollar, but it will be an uphill battle. Just as the US eclipsed Britain at the end of the nineteenth century as the world’s largest trading country, China long ago surpassed America by the same measure.
True, Japan and India may go their own way. But if China makes the renminbi more flexible, they will likely at the very least give the currency a weight comparable to that of the dollar in their foreign-exchange reserves.
There are striking parallels between Asia’s close alignment with the dollar today and the situation in Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s. But that era ended with high inflation and the collapse of the post-war Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. Most of Europe then recognized that intra-European trade was more important than trade with the US. This led to the emergence of a Deutsche Mark bloc that decades later morphed into the single currency, the euro.
This does not mean that the Chinese renminbi will become the global currency overnight. Transitions from one dominant currency to another can take a long time. During the two decades between World Wars I and II, for example, the new entrant, the dollar, had roughly the same weight in central-bank reserves as the British pound, which had been the dominant global currency for more than a century following the Napoleonic Wars in the early 1800s.
So, what is wrong with three world currencies – the euro, the renminbi, and the dollar – sharing the spotlight? Nothing, except that neither markets nor policymakers seem remotely prepared for such a transition. US government borrowing rates would almost certainly be affected, though the really big impact might fall on corporate borrowers, especially small and medium-size firms.
Today, it seems to be an article of faith among US policymakers and many economists that the world’s appetite for dollar debt is virtually insatiable. But a modernization of China’s exchange-rate arrangements could deal the dollar’s status a painful blow.
You may see in the Second paragraph, the professor says, in Chinese, "出於多種原因，中國當局可能會在某一天停止將人民幣與一籃子貨幣掛鉤，並轉向允許匯率更加自由浮動（尤其是兌美元匯率）的現代通脹目標制。一旦出現這種狀況，亞洲大部分地區很可能都會追隨中國。屆時，目前作為全球約三分之二國內生產總值（GDP）錨定貨幣的美元，可能會失去近一半權重。", to be frank, It is possible, not far away.
S. L. LI Engineer
HKFDP
